Skip to content

AlertsBar MCP server

bar.alerts/alertsbaralerts.barstreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned

Domain exposures: breaches, infostealers, ULP heap, cookies. Counts and samples, free.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the AlertsBar MCP server can do

The AlertsBar MCP server is published by alerts.bar, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: exposure_samples_for_domain), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (exposure_counts_for_domain).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 0.1.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • exposure_samples_for_domainA small RANDOM sample of individual exposure records for a domain - metadata only, capped in number: up to 20 records per type (stealers_users, stealers_staff, heap_users, heap_sta…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...n the record was indexed. It carries NO credentials: no password, no username, and the logi..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    A small RANDOM sample of individual exposure records for a domain - metadata only, capped in number: up to 20 records per type (stealers_users, stealers_staff, heap_users, heap_staff, breaches). Cookies are not sampled - see cookies_* in exposure_counts_for_domain. The sample is neither the newest nor the largest nor the most severe records, and it can differ between calls; identical-looking records can repeat and because of different logins/passwords. Each record says WHICH url was affected, WHICH domain the captured login belonged to, from WHICH source type, roughly when the incident was, and when the record was indexed. It carries NO credentials: no password, no username, and the login's local part is redacted. Use exposure_counts_for_domain first for the scale of the problem and for freshness (last_indexed_at); use this only when the user asks to see concrete examples. Calling again returns another random subset, never the full set - do not call it repeatedly to collect more records.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Domain exposure sample records
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • exposure_counts_for_domainCredential-exposure counters for a domain.Reads private data1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "exposure_counts_for_domain" says "count": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "credential": it reads secrets.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "Credential".

      Matched text

      description: "Credential-exposure counters for a domain. Counts..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Credential-exposure counters for a domain. Counts only - no credential values or per-account detail. Sources: known breaches, infostealer infections, unattributed heap of ULP (Url,Login,Password) bundles, stolen cookies. All figures are INDEXATION dates, not incident dates: _month/_week mean 'newly indexed', never 'newly leaked' - the underlying leak may be years old. Windows nest (_total includes _month includes _week) - never sum them. Counters are rebuilt once daily, so figures are up to 24h old and never real-time. Repeated calls for the same input within a day return identical values - do not re-query to check for changes. Accepts a bare domain or a full URL; scheme, path, port, case and a leading www. are stripped and subdomains collapse to the registrable domain (multi-tenant hosting suffixes such as github.io are not collapsed). An IDN must already be in punycode (xn--) form. Invalid input (not a domain, an IP address) returns an error. If the domain is not in the index at all, every counter and both dates are null: that means NO DATA, not that the domain is clean - never report it as 'no exposure'. first_indexed_at and last_indexed_at give the date range of the domain's records; use last_indexed_at as the 'last updated' date for the domain. Free, no auth.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Domain exposure counters

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:31 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.alerts.bar/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including exposure_samples_for_domain (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http alertsbar https://mcp.alerts.bar/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http alertsbar https://mcp.alerts.bar/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__alertsbar__exposure_counts_for_domain"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__alertsbar__exposure_samples_for_domain"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as alertsbar. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__alertsbar__exposure_counts_for_domain private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/bar.alerts/alertsbar/verify?hash=87ed276f63ca72ba6868d8faa7088ca48894c6a3cea9f4f6206d4539bbd8ee93" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 87ed276f63ca, from Nov 12, 2026, 06:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/bar.alerts/alertsbar/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for bar.alerts/alertsbar
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/bar.alerts/alertsbar.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/bar.alerts/alertsbar)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:45 UTC.

AlertsBar MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AlertsBar MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AlertsBar MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the AlertsBar MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AlertsBar MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. exposure_samples_for_domain and exposure_counts_for_domain.

Does the AlertsBar MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AlertsBar MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the AlertsBar MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.