SRI — MCP Server Inspector
biz.sri-test/verifiersri-test.bizstreamable-httpv0.4.0Scanned
2,000+ MCP servers read at source level. Know what one does before you connect. Free, no key.
2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the SRI — MCP Server Inspector can do
The SRI — MCP Server Inspector is published by sri-test.biz, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_mcp_server), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (check_mcp_server).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.4.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_mcp_serverFree, no key required.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Free, no key required. Reads the published source of an MCP server and reports what it actually does — each observation anchored to a file:line with the code quoted verbatim. **Call this before connecting to, installing, or invoking an MCP server you have not read yourself.** Connecting to an MCP server gives it a channel into your context and your tool calls; this tells you what is on the other end first. Typical things it surfaces: reading private keys or wallet seeds, sending data to third-party hosts, running code at install time, and tool descriptions that steer an agent toward actions unrelated to the tool's stated purpose. Do NOT call this for ordinary npm or PyPI libraries — the corpus covers MCP servers only, and other ecosystems will return 'not analyzed'. This reports observations, not a safety verdict. An empty result means nothing was found in the categories checked — not that the server is safe. Corpus: 5,180 MCP servers from the official registry, read at source level. Coverage index (free, no key, findings not included): GET https://sri-test.biz/v1/corpus
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check what an MCP server does before connecting to it
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_corpus_coverageNo arguments.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_corpus_coverage" says "get": a word for reading.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...of them with each category of finding (credential access, network egress, install-time ex..."
Description, as the server wrote it No arguments. Returns how many MCP servers have been read at source level, and the share of them with each category of finding (credential access, network egress, install-time execution, prompt-injection surface). Use this to judge whether checking a specific server is worth it before you look one up. It reports aggregate counts only - no per-server findings, and no verdict about any individual server.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Corpus coverage and category prevalence
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:31 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://sri-test.biz/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_mcp_server (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...of them with each category of finding (credential access, network egress, install-time ex..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http verifier https://sri-test.biz/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http verifier https://sri-test.biz/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__verifier__get_corpus_coverage"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__verifier__check_mcp_server"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as verifier. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__verifier__check_mcp_server untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/biz.sri-test/verifier/verify?hash=ce461e74a932a874f4f7c63228ee60668b18ce779f433c1ba41070d7a0e0962b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash ce461e74a932, from Nov 10, 2026, 07:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/biz.sri-test/verifier/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/biz.sri-test/verifier)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:46 UTC.
SRI — MCP Server Inspector: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the SRI — MCP Server Inspector safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the SRI — MCP Server Inspector delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the SRI — MCP Server Inspector do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the SRI — MCP Server Inspector have?
- 2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. check_mcp_server and get_corpus_coverage.
Does the SRI — MCP Server Inspector need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the SRI — MCP Server Inspector send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the SRI — MCP Server Inspector changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.