À proximité MCP server
ca.aproximite/aproximiteaproximite.castreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
A company that comes to your home in Vaudreuil-Soulanges. No company can pay for its place.
4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the À proximité MCP server can do
The À proximité MCP server is published by aproximite.ca, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (submit_referral_request) and create or change data (1 tool: prepare_referral_request), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (lookup_service_address and submit_referral_request); 1 tool can send data out of your system (prepare_referral_request).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
submit_referral_requestSend the request exactly as reviewed.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_referral_request" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Send the request exactly as reviewed. CONSEQUENTIAL: call only after showing the customer the review from prepare_referral_request and getting their explicit permission. Pass that review token and privacy version with customerAuthorized:true. Repeating the same token never creates a second request.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
prepare_referral_requestValidate the customer's details and return the exact request and consent notice to show them, with a review token.Can send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "prepare_referral_request" says "request": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "prepare_referral_request" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "prepare_referral_request" says "request": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Validate the customer's details and return the exact request and consent notice to show them, with a review token. Nothing is sent. Work from two or more trades goes in services, one entry per trade with only that trade's part of the description, in this one call: never one description for several trades. Pass the situation, since and answers from the customer's words and get_referral_options' situations. Municipality must be the customer's stated job location; ask if unknown. Call again with corrected details if fieldsToCorrect is not empty. Photos are not supported here; the customer can add them on aproximite.ca.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_referral_optionsFind out how to connect a homeowner with a local company chosen on merit for work in and around their home (an electrician, a plumber, a heating and cooling company, an exterminato…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_referral_options" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Find out how to connect a homeowner with a local company chosen on merit for work in and around their home (an electrician, a plumber, a heating and cooling company, an exterminator, a cleaning company, a painter, a roofer, a moving company, a landscaper, a snow removal company, a window washer, a gutter company, a tree service, a general contractor, a handyman, a fence and deck builder, an appliance repair company, a window and door company, a pool company or a chimney sweep) through À proximité in Vaudreuil-Soulanges, Quebec. You can collect the job and contact details, prepare a request, show the customer a review and submit with their explicit permission. When a suitable professional accepts, they contact the customer directly. Read services, municipalities, availability and the workflow. No booking or callback-time guarantee. This tool only reads public information. Call this first.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
lookup_service_addressReturn up to five labeled address suggestions or resolve one opaque selection.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_service_address" says "lookup": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Return up to five labeled address suggestions or resolve one opaque selection. Read-only: this never changes a request or records consent. Query and selection are mutually exclusive. Suggestions are candidates only; never guess or auto-select. Manual entry is always available. If Google output is shown to the customer, include the exact attribution text Google Maps.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://aproximite.ca/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_referral_request (irreversible), prepare_referral_request (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "prepare_referral_request" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "prepare_referral_request" says "request": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http aproximite https://aproximite.ca/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http aproximite https://aproximite.ca/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__aproximite__get_referral_options",
"mcp__aproximite__lookup_service_address"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__aproximite__prepare_referral_request",
"mcp__aproximite__submit_referral_request"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as aproximite. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__aproximite__lookup_service_address untrusted-input
- mcp__aproximite__prepare_referral_request outbound
- mcp__aproximite__submit_referral_request untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ca.aproximite/aproximite/verify?hash=cc691b26001c5c7f37f2c7d9dcdbc4db32c6f1e72102d31d99deb2e70c378077" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash cc691b26001c, from Nov 17, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ca.aproximite/aproximite/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ca.aproximite/aproximite)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 17:17 UTC.
À proximité MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the À proximité MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the À proximité MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the À proximité MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: submit_referral_request.
What tools does the À proximité MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read. submit_referral_request, prepare_referral_request, get_referral_options and lookup_service_address.
Does the À proximité MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the À proximité MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): prepare_referral_request.
Has the À proximité MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.