StructureClerk MCP server
ca.structureclerk/mcpstructureclerk.castreamable-httpv2.0.0Scanned
AI agent policy decisions: ALLOW, DENY, APPROVE, ESCALATE. 192 jurisdictions, signed evidence.
5 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the StructureClerk MCP server can do
The StructureClerk MCP server is published by structureclerk.ca, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (authority_decide) and create or change data (2 tools: compliance_roadmap and algorithmic_compliance_assessment), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 2.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
authority_decideDeterministic, rule-based advisory decision (no LLM) on whether an AI agent may execute an action: ALLOW, APPROVE (human approval required), DENY (human-only decision) or ESCALATE …No findings
Why it is in this group
- The input carries an amount (input.action.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
Description, as the server wrote it Deterministic, rule-based advisory decision (no LLM) on whether an AI agent may execute an action: ALLOW, APPROVE (human approval required), DENY (human-only decision) or ESCALATE (doubt threshold). Cites applicable frameworks per jurisdiction and sector, and returns an evidence record. Advisory only: StructureClerk decides, your infrastructure enforces.
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
algorithmic_compliance_assessmentAssess algorithmic compliance maturity for AI systems.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Assess algorithmic compliance maturity for AI systems. Returns applicable frameworks (EU AI Act, Law 25, AIDA/C-27, ISO 42001, NIST AI RMF), sector-specific obligations and assessment dimensions.
compliance_roadmapGenerate a phased compliance action plan with cost estimates adapted to SME budgets.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate a phased compliance action plan with cost estimates adapted to SME budgets.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
compliance_checkAnalyze regulatory obligations for a company based on jurisdiction, size and sector.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "analyze": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyze regulatory obligations for a company based on jurisdiction, size and sector. Returns applicable frameworks, risk level and priority actions.
jurisdiction_mapGet applicable regulatory frameworks for a jurisdiction.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get applicable regulatory frameworks for a jurisdiction. Without a jurisdiction parameter, returns all 192 jurisdictions.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:31 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-03-26
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://structureclerk.ca/api/mcp-http: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including authority_decide (irreversible), compliance_roadmap (write), algorithmic_compliance_assessment (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 2.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http structureclerk https://structureclerk.ca/api/mcp-httpclaude mcp add --transport http structureclerk https://structureclerk.ca/api/mcp-httpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__structureclerk__compliance_check",
"mcp__structureclerk__jurisdiction_map"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__structureclerk__compliance_roadmap",
"mcp__structureclerk__algorithmic_compliance_assessment",
"mcp__structureclerk__authority_decide"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as structureclerk. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ca.structureclerk/mcp/verify?hash=ee94ba60d24cbcd16077346ddd6d6e9fab4347c3363dc0eabc887008294a475b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash ee94ba60d24c, from Nov 12, 2026, 07:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ca.structureclerk/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ca.structureclerk/mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:46 UTC.
StructureClerk MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the StructureClerk MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the StructureClerk MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the StructureClerk MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: authority_decide.
What tools does the StructureClerk MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read. authority_decide, compliance_roadmap, algorithmic_compliance_assessment, compliance_check and jurisdiction_map.
Does the StructureClerk MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the StructureClerk MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the StructureClerk MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.