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swiftsign.ca MCP server

ca.swiftsign/mcpswiftsign.castreamable-httpv0.5.2Scanned

E-signatures for agents: mint a sandbox key, send PDFs, track status, download the sealed result.

10 tools: 4 can delete or cancel things, 3 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 4 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 3
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the swiftsign.ca MCP server can do

The swiftsign.ca MCP server is published by swiftsign.ca, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can delete or cancel things (4 tools: swiftsign_send_envelope, swiftsign_confirm_send, swiftsign_send_from_template and swiftsign_void_envelope) and create or change data (3 tools: swiftsign_download_signed_pdf, swiftsign_upgrade and swiftsign_create_embedded_url). 3 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (swiftsign_list_envelopes); 5 tools bring in text other people can write (swiftsign_send_envelope, swiftsign_confirm_send, swiftsign_send_from_template and 2 more); 3 tools can send data out of your system (swiftsign_send_envelope, swiftsign_confirm_send and swiftsign_send_from_template). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.5.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Deletes or cancels 4Claude Code: deny
  • swiftsign_confirm_sendDispatch a DRAFT envelope — use after a human has reviewed an envelope that swiftsign_send_envelope or swiftsign_send_from_template returned as draft_pending_confirmation.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "swiftsign_confirm_send" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "swiftsign_confirm_send" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Dispatch a DRAFT envelope — use after a human has reviewed an envelope that swiftsign_send_envelope or swiftsign_send_from_template returned as draft_pending_confirmation. This emails the signers. Does NOT work on envelopes already SENT/COMPLETED/VOIDED.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • swiftsign_send_envelopeSend a document for e-signature.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "swiftsign_send_envelope" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The input addresses people (input.recipients): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "swiftsign_send_envelope" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send a document for e-signature. Accepts PDF as base64, recipients, and field placement. Sandbox keys (sk_test_) send immediately (watermarked test mail). LIVE keys create a DRAFT and return it for human review unless confirm: true — nothing is emailed until confirmed. Field placement: page+x+y (percent, top-left origin) OR an anchor string, not both. After everyone signs, retrieve the sealed PDF with swiftsign_download_signed_pdf.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • swiftsign_send_from_templateSend an envelope from a saved template by assigning signers to roles.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "swiftsign_send_from_template" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "swiftsign_send_from_template" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send an envelope from a saved template by assigning signers to roles. Sandbox keys (sk_test_) send immediately; LIVE keys create a DRAFT for human review unless confirm: true — nothing is emailed until confirmed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • swiftsign_void_envelopeCancel/void an envelope that hasn't been completed yet.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "swiftsign_void_envelope" says "void": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Cancel/void an envelope that hasn't been completed yet. Signers can no longer sign a voided envelope. Works in both sandbox (sk_test_ keys) and live.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • swiftsign_create_embedded_urlMint a short-lived embedded signing URL for a recipient (30-minute expiry).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "swiftsign_create_embedded_url" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Mint a short-lived embedded signing URL for a recipient (30-minute expiry). Returns a url to embed plus its expiresAt. The envelope must already be SENT. Works in both sandbox (sk_test_ keys) and live.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
  • swiftsign_download_signed_pdfDownload the completed, sealed PDF (or its Certificate of Completion) for an envelope.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Download the completed, sealed PDF (or its Certificate of Completion) for an envelope. Only works once status is COMPLETED — run swiftsign_check_status first. Does NOT work on DRAFT or SENT envelopes; nothing has been signed yet on those.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • swiftsign_upgradeInitiate the upgrade to PRO ($15/mo flat).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Initiate the upgrade to PRO ($15/mo flat). Returns a Stripe checkout_url that a human opens once to add a card — agents cannot complete the payment themselves. Moves the account from sandbox (sk_test_) to live sends. Returns status 'updated' if already on the plan.

    Annotations the server declares

    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • swiftsign_check_statusCheck the status of an envelope — who signed, who hasn't, download links.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "swiftsign_check_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check the status of an envelope — who signed, who hasn't, download links. Works in both sandbox (sk_test_ keys) and live.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • swiftsign_list_envelopesList envelopes (sent documents) with their status.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "swiftsign_list_envelopes" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "document": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List envelopes (sent documents) with their status. Scoped to your key's mode — sandbox (sk_test_) keys see test envelopes, live keys see live.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • swiftsign_list_templatesList your saved templates.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "swiftsign_list_templates" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List your saved templates. Scoped to your key's mode — sandbox (sk_test_) keys see test templates, live keys see live.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

15 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_list_envelopes"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:31 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
7
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://swiftsign.ca/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://swiftsign.ca
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (4 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://swiftsign.ca/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including swiftsign_send_envelope (destructive), swiftsign_confirm_send (destructive), swiftsign_send_from_template (destructive), swiftsign_void_envelope (destructive), swiftsign_download_signed_pdf (write) and 2 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 7
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://swiftsign.ca/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • Authorization servers: none to https://swiftsign.ca
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
  2. Oct 29, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://swiftsign.ca/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource to none
    • Authorization servers: https://swiftsign.ca to none
    • Dynamic client registration: yes to not observed
    • Client ID metadata documents: no to not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: no -> yes; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes (and 6 more).View diff
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 7
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://swiftsign.ca/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • Authorization servers: none to https://swiftsign.ca
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 6 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://swiftsign.ca/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource to none
    • Authorization servers: https://swiftsign.ca to none
    • Dynamic client registration: yes to not observed
    • Client ID metadata documents: no to not observed

Install

Pinned to version 0.5.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http swiftsign https://swiftsign.ca/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http swiftsign https://swiftsign.ca/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_check_status",
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_list_envelopes",
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_list_templates"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_download_signed_pdf",
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_upgrade",
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_create_embedded_url"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_send_envelope",
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_confirm_send",
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_send_from_template",
      "mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_void_envelope"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as swiftsign. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_send_envelope untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_confirm_send untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_send_from_template untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_list_envelopes private-data
  • mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_upgrade untrusted-input
  • mcp__swiftsign__swiftsign_create_embedded_url untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ca.swiftsign/mcp/verify?hash=c49d431e1d1fd5cc36399a9e0b9af79d919ffbca4cc7198001bc800016d242c7" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c49d431e1d1f, from Nov 10, 2026, 07:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ca.swiftsign/mcp/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ca.swiftsign/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ca.swiftsign/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ca.swiftsign/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:46 UTC.

swiftsign.ca MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the swiftsign.ca MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the swiftsign.ca MCP server delete data?

Yes. 4 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: swiftsign_send_envelope, swiftsign_confirm_send, swiftsign_send_from_template and swiftsign_void_envelope.

Can the swiftsign.ca MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the swiftsign.ca MCP server have?

10 tools: 4 destructive, 3 write, 3 read. swiftsign_send_envelope, swiftsign_confirm_send, swiftsign_send_from_template, swiftsign_void_envelope, swiftsign_download_signed_pdf, swiftsign_upgrade, swiftsign_create_embedded_url, swiftsign_check_status and 2 more.

Does the swiftsign.ca MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the swiftsign.ca MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): swiftsign_send_envelope, swiftsign_confirm_send and swiftsign_send_from_template.

Has the swiftsign.ca MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.