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Vitena Directory MCP server

care.vitena/directoryvitena.carestreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Search Vitena's public directory of bookable health and wellness professionals

3 tools: 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 3
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Vitena Directory MCP server can do

The Vitena Directory MCP server is published by vitena.care, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

3 tools read private data (list_directory_filters, search_providers and get_provider); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (list_directory_filters, search_providers and get_provider).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_providerReturns the full public profile of one professional by their slug (the value returned as 'slug' by search_providers): services offered, specializations, spoken languages, locations…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_provider" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "contact": it reads contacts.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the full public profile of one professional by their slug (the value returned as 'slug' by search_providers): services offered, specializations, spoken languages, locations, working hours, contact details and whether online booking is available.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_directory_filtersReturns the valid filter values currently available in the Vitena provider directory: specialization codes (with human labels), spoken-language codes, and the countries that curren…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_directory_filters" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "list_directory_filters" says "list" and "directory": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "directory": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the valid filter values currently available in the Vitena provider directory: specialization codes (with human labels), spoken-language codes, and the countries that currently have listed professionals. Call this FIRST when you intend to filter a search by specialization — that argument only matches exact codes from this list, so guessing a specialty name will silently return no results. Note that CITY is NOT in this list and does not need to be: search_providers resolves a free-text city, district or region name against a gazetteer, so pass the name the user actually said.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • search_providersSearches the public Vitena directory of health and wellness professionals who accept appointments (dietitians, dentists, physiotherapists, psychologists, beauty and aesthetics prac…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_providers" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "directory": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Searches the public Vitena directory of health and wellness professionals who accept appointments (dietitians, dentists, physiotherapists, psychologists, beauty and aesthetics practitioners, child development specialists). Every filter is optional; with no filters it returns the first page of all publicly listed professionals. When the user names a specific professional or practice, pass that as 'name'. Results are public profile data only. Each result includes a profileUrl that can be given to the user for booking.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data3
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:31 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http directory https://api.vitena.care/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http directory https://api.vitena.care/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__directory__list_directory_filters",
      "mcp__directory__search_providers",
      "mcp__directory__get_provider"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as directory. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__directory__list_directory_filters private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__directory__search_providers private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__directory__get_provider private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/care.vitena/directory/verify?hash=d43b5fbf3ec2d17f2259c69f8cf03f22b9ebb5953b9d769e1759074c26c373bf" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d43b5fbf3ec2, from Nov 12, 2026, 07:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/care.vitena/directory/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for care.vitena/directory
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/care.vitena/directory.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/care.vitena/directory)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:46 UTC.

Vitena Directory MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Vitena Directory MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the Vitena Directory MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Vitena Directory MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Vitena Directory MCP server have?

3 tools: 3 read. list_directory_filters, search_providers and get_provider.

Does the Vitena Directory MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Vitena Directory MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Vitena Directory MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.