SSearch MCP server
cc.ssearch/searchssearch.ccstreamable-httpv1.0.3Scanned
Free web search for AI agents. No API key required. Hosted MCP in active development.
8 tools: 1 change things and 7 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the SSearch MCP server can do
The SSearch MCP server is published by ssearch.cc, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: forward_canary), but cannot delete data. 7 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (search_documents and get_document); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (search_web and fetch_page); 1 tool can send data out of your system (fetch_page). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.3.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
forward_canaryDev-only transport proof.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...only delivery status. Never use a real credential."
Description, as the server wrote it Dev-only transport proof. Forward a fake canary transiently and return only delivery status. Never use a real credential.
Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
fetch_pageFetch and extract readable page text; optionally fall back to Common Crawl.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "fetch_page" says "fetch": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "crawl": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch and extract readable page text; optionally fall back to Common Crawl.
get_contextRetrieve only the stored passages in a search result that are relevant to the information you need.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_context" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve only the stored passages in a search result that are relevant to the information you need.
get_documentRetrieve the broader stored text for a known SSearch document ID.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_document" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "get_document" says "get" and "document": it reads documents.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "document": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve the broader stored text for a known SSearch document ID.
search_documentsSearch SSearch-owned stored full-text documents.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_documents" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "search_documents" says "search" and "document": it reads documents.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "document": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it Search SSearch-owned stored full-text documents. Successful misses can be promoted into the live index.
search_planShow the normalized local search plan for a query.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_plan" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Show the normalized local search plan for a query.
search_sourcesDescribe the local SSearch corpus and search backends.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_sources" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Describe the local SSearch corpus and search backends.
search_webSearch SSearch.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_web" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe name "search_web" says "search" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Search SSearch. Set wait_for_coverage to search owned documents and, only if needed, external discovery on a miss.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__search__fetch_page"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:31 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.ssearch.cc/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including forward_canary (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infoforward_canary
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...only delivery status. Never use a real credential."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http search https://api.ssearch.cc/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http search https://api.ssearch.cc/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__search__search_web",
"mcp__search__search_documents",
"mcp__search__get_context",
"mcp__search__get_document",
"mcp__search__search_plan",
"mcp__search__search_sources"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__search__fetch_page",
"mcp__search__forward_canary"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as search. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__search__search_web untrusted-input
- mcp__search__search_documents private-data
- mcp__search__get_document private-data
- mcp__search__fetch_page untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/cc.ssearch/search/verify?hash=cfaf7de1071bf2399525b4a9632d4c3cd239b01e0b4861afdc54ae69ebdceb35" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash cfaf7de1071b, from Nov 12, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/cc.ssearch/search/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/cc.ssearch/search)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:46 UTC.
SSearch MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the SSearch MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the SSearch MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the SSearch MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the SSearch MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 1 write, 7 read. forward_canary, search_web, search_documents, get_context, get_document, fetch_page, search_plan and search_sources.
Does the SSearch MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the SSearch MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): fetch_page.
Has the SSearch MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.