ticktape.cc MCP server
cc.ticktape/mcpticktape.ccstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Polymarket preflight verdicts: OK/CAUTION/VETO on orders, COPY/WATCH/VETO on wallets. x402-paid.
5 tools: 4 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings, 1 high
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the ticktape.cc MCP server can do
The ticktape.cc MCP server is published by ticktape.cc, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: preflight_trade, preflight_copy, leaderboard and credits_balance), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 2 findings, 1 of them high severity (annotation-conflict and model-directed-text). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
credits_balanceRemaining credit balance for your bearer token.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- High
The description contains "<secret>", a tag of the kind used to mark instructions for the model.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...uires Authorization: Bearer tk_<wallet>_<secret> on the MCP request; without a token it..."
Description, as the server wrote it Remaining credit balance for your bearer token. Free - requires Authorization: Bearer tk_<wallet>_<secret> on the MCP request; without a token it returns the credit-pack purchase terms instead.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check credits balance
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
leaderboardPolymarket wallets currently rated COPY or WATCH for copyability: simulated copier ROI net of 2026 taker fees and slippage, out-of-sample validation, sample sizes and reasons.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Polymarket wallets currently rated COPY or WATCH for copyability: simulated copier ROI net of 2026 taker fees and slippage, out-of-sample validation, sample sizes and reasons. Price: $0.02 per call via x402 or 1 credit with a bearer token; sandbox: true is free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Wallets worth copying
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
preflight_copyCOPY / WATCH / VETO verdict for copy-trading a Polymarket wallet, with the numbers behind it (fee-inclusive copier ROI from a fixed $5-entry / +2c-slippage simulation, win rate, en…1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "preflight_copy" says "copy": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "preflight_copy" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "preflight_copy" says "copy": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it COPY / WATCH / VETO verdict for copy-trading a Polymarket wallet, with the numbers behind it (fee-inclusive copier ROI from a fixed $5-entry / +2c-slippage simulation, win rate, entry-price buckets, category mix). Wallets not yet computed return QUEUED free of charge - typically ready in minutes (retry_after_seconds tells you when); worst case about an hour. Price: $0.10 per call via x402 or 5 credits with a bearer token; sandbox: true is free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Preflight copy-trading a wallet
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
preflight_tradePre-flight verdict (OK / CAUTION / VETO) for a Polymarket order before you send it: expected VWAP slippage, visible depth, 2026 taker-fee drag, safe size and book staleness, comput…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Pre-flight verdict (OK / CAUTION / VETO) for a Polymarket order before you send it: expected VWAP slippage, visible depth, 2026 taker-fee drag, safe size and book staleness, computed deterministically from the live CLOB book. Identify the market by token_id, or by slug + outcome. Price: $0.02 per call via x402 or 1 credit with a bearer token; sandbox: true is free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Preflight a Polymarket order
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
red_listPolymarket wallets a copier should refuse (VETO): negative fee-inclusive copier ROI or farming patterns, same method and window as the leaderboard.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "red_list" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Polymarket wallets a copier should refuse (VETO): negative fee-inclusive copier ROI or farming patterns, same method and window as the leaderboard. Price: $0.02 per call via x402 or 1 credit with a bearer token; sandbox: true is free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Wallets that lose copiers
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:31 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://ticktape.cc/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including preflight_trade (write), preflight_copy (write), leaderboard (write), credits_balance (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Highcredits_balance
The description contains "<secret>", a tag of the kind used to mark instructions for the model.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...uires Authorization: Bearer tk_<wallet>_<secret> on the MCP request; without a token it..."
- Warnpreflight_copy
The server marks "preflight_copy" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "preflight_copy" says "copy": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http ticktape https://ticktape.cc/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http ticktape https://ticktape.cc/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__ticktape__red_list"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__ticktape__preflight_trade",
"mcp__ticktape__preflight_copy",
"mcp__ticktape__leaderboard",
"mcp__ticktape__credits_balance"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ticktape. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/cc.ticktape/mcp/verify?hash=e79045ff286328bf9655f78b9fce9c8ea8755d31e15ff57879a0cb620a9981cb" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e79045ff2863, from Nov 12, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/cc.ticktape/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/cc.ticktape/mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:46 UTC.
ticktape.cc MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the ticktape.cc MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the ticktape.cc MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the ticktape.cc MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the ticktape.cc MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 4 write, 1 read. preflight_trade, preflight_copy, leaderboard, credits_balance and red_list.
Does the ticktape.cc MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the ticktape.cc MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the ticktape.cc MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.