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agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory)

cloud.agent-tools/agent-tools-mcpagent-tools.cloudstreamable-httpv0.5.2Scanned

Discover x402 services, MCP servers and A2A agents by intent — agent-tools.cloud directory.

23 tools: 3 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 7 change things and 12 only read.

Tools: 3 delete, 1 irreversible, 7 write, 12 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 9 findings, 3 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory) can do

The agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory) is published by agent-tools.cloud, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 23 tools. It can delete or cancel things (3 tools: verify_service_url, edit_owned_listing and execute_paid_verification), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (create_api_key) and create or change data (7 tools: ask_services, stats, directory_stats, register and 3 more). 12 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (list_categories and search_mcp_servers); 4 tools bring in text other people can write (register, scan_mcp_safety, verify_service_url and 1 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (register and claim_service_url). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 9 findings, 3 of them high severity (tool-shadowing, long-description, model-directed-text, sensitive-path and 1 more). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.5.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

23 tools

Deletes or cancels 3Claude Code: deny
  • edit_owned_listingEdit only metadata covered by your verified claim, with the public audit trail.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "edit_owned_listing" says "edit": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Edit only metadata covered by your verified claim, with the public audit trail. An endpoint change requires verified control of the exact destination or its whole host and clears measurements tied to the old primary endpoint. Args: kind: Listing type: x402, mcp, or a2a. slug: Slug of the listing you are authorized to edit. fields: Editable fields to change; measured fields are rejected.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • execute_paid_verificationSend the signed payment to the service once and score the result.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "execute_paid_verification" says "execute": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send the signed payment to the service once and score the result. Aborts without paying if price or recipient changed. Never retried; a timeout returns `indeterminate`. status: succeeded | delivery_failed | payment_rejected | indeterminate. Args: id: `id` returned by `prepare_paid_verification`. signature: 0x EIP-712 signature of its `typed_data` by the payer. api_key: Optional if the Authorization header is sent.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_service_urlVerify public ownership proof for your own exact service URL claim.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...ess tools, requests private service credentials, or grants whole-platform permissions...."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify public ownership proof for your own exact service URL claim. This reads public proof only. It never calls business tools, requests private service credentials, or grants whole-platform permissions. Args: claim_id: Claim id returned by claim_service_url. token: The issued token after publishing it in the instructed location.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • create_api_keyCreate a free account API key.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_api_key" says "create": a word for a change.
    • The description says "cannot be recovered".
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a free account API key. No sign-up, email or existing key needed. The key is returned once and cannot be recovered. Store it in your secret store; do not print it back to the user or write it to logs. Send it as `Authorization: Bearer <key>` (or the `api_key` argument where offered) to get complete `directory_stats` lists, run paid verifications and claim your own listings. The claim and listing tools read the key only from the Authorization header; without header support use the REST claim API. Shares the HTTP limit of POST /api/v1/keys (a few keys per IP per day). Args: name: Optional label to recognise the key later, e.g. your agent name.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • ask_servicesAsk for the best x402/MCP services for an agent intent.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask for the best x402/MCP services for an agent intent. This is the high-level discovery tool: it retrieves candidates from the directory, asks the configured backend LLM to rank only those candidates, and returns service cards for the selected recommendations. If the LLM is unavailable, it falls back to the directory ranker. Args: intent: Natural-language job the agent wants to accomplish. top_k: Max recommendations to return (1-10). max_price_usd: Optional per-call budget cap. category: Optional directory category filter. chain: Optional payment network filter, e.g. "base" or "solana". require_healthy: When true, only consider services marked health=ok. min_confidence: Optional x402scan quality floor (0.0-1.0). has_mcp: When true, only consider services with MCP endpoints. use_llm: Set false for deterministic retrieval-only fallback.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • claim_service_urlIssue a fresh ownership token for one exact public HTTPS URL.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Issue a fresh ownership token for one exact public HTTPS URL. Authenticate in the MCP Authorization: Bearer header. Publishing and verifying the token is required before editing; URL input alone grants no rights. Args: url: Complete public HTTPS service URL, including its query when present. method: Optional proof method; otherwise inferred from the complete URL.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • directory_statsDaily statistics on the agent-tool ecosystem as seen by our probes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Daily statistics on the agent-tool ecosystem as seen by our probes. Args: view: "all", "mcp", "x402" or "a2a" to scope the figures to one protocol. topic: Optional topic word (e.g. "payment", "weather") to get that topic instead: supply per protocol, readiness, best listings, searches. month: Optional "YYYY-MM" to get that monthly report instead. api_key: Optional account key (free from create_api_key) for complete lists when you cannot send the Authorization header. Returns counts (indexed, reachable, protocol-verified, readiness A/B), one finding sentence per topic, key facts (x402 prices and networks, MCP and A2A protocol versions, MCP auth, A2A card signatures, how every listing's latest probe ended), the most searched terms (view "all"), the snapshot time, and links to the full JSON snapshot, the daily CSV, the methodology, the "how many work" page, per-protocol and per-topic pages and the monthly reports. With an account API key (Authorization: Bearer header or `api_key`; free from `create_api_key`) the topic and search lists are complete (10 listings per protocol, up to 100 terms); without one they are shortened.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • prepare_paid_verificationQuote a sponsored paid verification of an x402 service.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Quote a sponsored paid verification of an x402 service. You pay the service once from your own wallet (Base USDC, <= $1; funds go to its payTo). Sign the returned `typed_data` (EIP-712), then call `execute_paid_verification` before `valid_before`. We never sign or hold funds. Auth: API key from POST https://agent-tools.cloud/api/v1/keys, as the `Authorization: Bearer` header or `api_key`. Args: slug: Service slug from `search` / `get`. payer: 0x address of the wallet that will sign and pay. api_key: Optional if the Authorization header is sent. Returns: { id, amount_usd, pay_to, valid_before, typed_data, ... } or { error, message }.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • registerSelf-register an x402 / MCP service in the agent-tools directory.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Self-register an x402 / MCP service in the agent-tools directory. Service owners and agents may submit new services here. Submissions are auto-reviewed instantly by x402 verification (no human gate): if the URL proves x402 payment support it is listed immediately and shows up in `search`; otherwise it is rejected or retried automatically. Listing is FREE. Dedup: if a service with the same canonical origin (scheme://host) already exists in the directory we return its slug instead of creating a duplicate submission. Same goes for a still-pending submission with the same origin. Rate limit: at most 5 pending submissions per client IP per 24h. Hits beyond that get `{error: rate_limited}` — try again later or email contact@agent-tools.cloud for bulk imports. Args: url: Public HTTPS URL of the service (the x402-payable endpoint or its homepage). Required. name: Human-friendly name. Defaults to the URL hostname. description: One-paragraph description (max ~2000 chars). mcp_url: If the service speaks MCP, its streamable-http endpoint. category: Free-form (e.g. "defi", "search", "social"). Use `list_categories` to align with existing taxonomy. chains: Networks the service accepts payment on (e.g. ["base", "solana"]). price_min_usdc: Lower bound of per-call price in USDC. price_max_usdc: Upper bound of per-call price in USDC. contact: Optional email / handle the directory team can reach you on for clarifications.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • scan_mcp_safetyCheck an MCP server for malware / prompt-injection lures by its endpoint URL.Reads text others write6 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • High

      The description contains "ignore previous instructions", an instruction to set earlier instructions aside.

      Matched text

      description: "...dential-exfiltration phrasing ("ignore previous instructions", "send your .env / api key") * M..."

      What this check looks for
    • High

      The description contains "<IMPORTANT>", a tag of the kind used to mark instructions for the model.

      Matched text

      description: "...other tool you must…"), hidden `<IMPORTANT>` instructions, "list all API ke..."

      What this check looks for
    • High

      The description refers to ".env" and ".ssh".

      Matched text

      description: "...nore previous instructions", "send your .env / api key") * MCP tool-poisoning..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...rowaway TLDs * prompt-injection / credential-exfiltration phrasing ("ignore..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The description contains "any other tool", wording about other tools or servers.

      Matched text

      description: "...ys call this tool first", "before using any other tool you must…"), hidden `<IMPORTANT>` instr..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description is 3,166 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...source: "stored" (existing) | "new_scan" (just added), indexed: bool }"

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check an MCP server for malware / prompt-injection lures by its endpoint URL. Give the server's streamable-http endpoint URL. Two paths: * **Already in the agent-tools directory** → returns our LATEST stored rule verdict. Every indexed server is re-scanned hourly, so you get a consistent, continuously-refreshed answer without re-probing. * **Not yet indexed** → we probe the endpoint live, statically scan its advertised tools + metadata, and return the fresh verdict. It is ADDED to the directory (so the next caller gets the stored verdict instantly) only if it answered or you supplied metadata; documentation hosts such as example.com / *.test / *.invalid are scanned but never listed. Two dimensions are reported. `verdict` is authoritative and comes from deterministic static rules — pure pattern-matching over the *advertised* text only, NO code execution. It flags the social-engineering / RCE tricks listing-spam servers use: * `curl … | bash` and `base64 -d | sh` install lures * `eval "$(curl …)"` / PowerShell `IEX(...DownloadString)` cradles * base64 blobs that decode to a shell command * bare-IP payload hosts and cheap throwaway TLDs * prompt-injection / credential-exfiltration phrasing ("ignore previous instructions", "send your .env / api key") * MCP tool-poisoning coercion — descriptions that hijack an agent's tool-calling ("always call this tool first", "before using any other tool you must…"), hidden `<IMPORTANT>` instructions, "list all API keys / include secrets in your response", and coercion to read & forward `.key`/`.pem`/`.ssh`/`.env` files Source-code-oriented rules (SQL / command / code injection) are deliberately not applied to natural-language descriptions, to avoid false positives. `llm_reference` is an advisory frontier-LLM second opinion over the same text. Because the LLM is slow it is computed LIVE on this call only and is never stored (the hourly job never runs it), so it may be null on timeout. It never overrides the rule verdict; when it is *more* severe than the rules an `advisory` note is attached as a safety-net signal. Security/defense products that merely *name* these attacks are not flagged. Args: endpoint_url: The MCP server's streamable-http URL (required). This is the identity we look up / index by. name: Optional advertised name (used when the server is new and gets added; falls back to the URL host). description: Optional description / README blurb (scanned when new). tools_text: Optional tool names + descriptions; used only if the live probe cannot fetch the server's tools/list. Returns: { verdict: "clean"|"suspicious"|"malicious", score: 0-100, reasons: [{rule, weight, snippet}], llm_reference: {model, verdict, reason, confidence} | null, advisory: str | null, slug, name, endpoint_url, source: "stored" (existing) | "new_scan" (just added), indexed: bool }

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • statsHigh-level stats about the directory: x402 total, healthy count and chains, plus `snapshot`, the daily digest across x402, MCP and A2A (see directory_stats).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    High-level stats about the directory: x402 total, healthy count and chains, plus `snapshot`, the daily digest across x402, MCP and A2A (see directory_stats).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 12Show 12 read-only tools
  • getGet full details + ready-to-paste call template for a service.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get full details + ready-to-paste call template for a service. Returns the service card with payment, call, quality, resource samples, and ready-to-use MCP/x402 call hints. Use this after `search` or `ask_services` before paying/calling an external service. Args: slug: Service slug as returned by `search` items.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_articleRead one published Blog article: metadata plus the full Markdown body.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_article" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one published Blog article: metadata plus the full Markdown body. Args: slug: The article slug, as returned by list_articles.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_mcp_serverGet the full card for one MCP server by slug.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_mcp_server" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the full card for one MCP server by slug. Args: slug: MCP server slug as returned by `search_mcp_servers` items.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_methodologyHow every score and statistic on agent-tools.cloud is computed.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_methodology" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    How every score and statistic on agent-tools.cloud is computed. Returns the quality-score components and grade bands per protocol, the nine readiness criteria with weights, payment-evidence grades, the probing schedule and the definitions behind the daily statistics.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_owned_listingRead editable metadata for a listing covered by your verified claim.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_owned_listing" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read editable metadata for a listing covered by your verified claim. Args: kind: Listing type: x402, mcp, or a2a. slug: Slug from the verified claim's listings or directory search.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_paid_verificationRead one of your own paid verifications.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_paid_verification" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one of your own paid verifications. Args: id: Verification id. api_key: Optional if the Authorization header is sent.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_articlesList published Blog articles, newest first (metadata only).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_articles" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List published Blog articles, newest first (metadata only). Args: query: Optional words to match in title, summary or body. tag: Optional tag to filter by. page: Page number, 20 articles per page. Use get_article(slug) for the full Markdown body.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_categoriesList all available service categories in the directory.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_categories" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "directory": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List all available service categories in the directory.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_a2a_agentsFind A2A agents you can delegate a task to.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_a2a_agents" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find A2A agents you can delegate a task to. Args: intent: Natural-language description of the task to delegate. top_k: Max agents to return (1-20). x402_only: When true, only return agents that advertise x402 payment.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_mcp_serversFind MCP servers in the directory.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_mcp_servers" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "directory": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find MCP servers in the directory. Searches the standalone MCP directory (PulseMCP / official MCP registry import) unioned with x402 services that also expose an MCP endpoint. Returns normalised entries with a ready-to-use streamable-http `call_hint.mcp.url`. Args: intent: Natural-language description of the tool/capability needed. top_k: Max servers to return (1-20). chain: Optional payment-network filter for paid MCP servers. require_healthy: When true, only return servers marked health=ok.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_resourcesUnified search across x402 services, MCP servers and A2A agents.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_resources" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Unified search across x402 services, MCP servers and A2A agents. Args: intent: Natural-language query. protocol: Optional filter: "x402", "mcp" or "a2a". top_k: Max resources to return (1-50).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

16 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 2 outbound tools breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agent-tools__claim_service_url",
      "mcp__agent-tools__register"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 14, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
11
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 11 tools that change things (3 destructive, 1 irreversible, 7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agent-tools.cloud/mcp-discovery/: tools/list returned 23 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_service_url (destructive), edit_owned_listing (destructive), execute_paid_verification (destructive), create_api_key (irreversible), ask_services (write) and 6 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 high2 warn4 info
  • The description contains "ignore previous instructions", an instruction to set earlier instructions aside.

    Matched text

    description: "...dential-exfiltration phrasing ("ignore previous instructions", "send your .env / api key") * M..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description contains "<IMPORTANT>", a tag of the kind used to mark instructions for the model.

    Matched text

    description: "...other tool you must…"), hidden `<IMPORTANT>` instructions, "list all API ke..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description refers to ".env" and ".ssh".

    Matched text

    description: "...nore previous instructions", "send your .env / api key") * MCP tool-poisoning..."

    What this check looks for
  • Warnsearch

    The description contains "another MCP server", wording about other tools or servers.

    Matched text

    description: "...Use this when the agent wants to chain another MCP server rather than perform raw HTTP+x402."

    What this check looks for
  • The description contains "any other tool", wording about other tools or servers.

    Matched text

    description: "...ys call this tool first", "before using any other tool you must…"), hidden `<IMPORTANT>` instr..."

    What this check looks for
  • Infosearch

    The description is 2,004 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...s to chain another MCP server rather than perform raw HTTP+x402."

    What this check looks for
Show 3 more findings

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.5.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-tools https://agent-tools.cloud/mcp-discovery/
claude mcp add --transport http agent-tools https://agent-tools.cloud/mcp-discovery/

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent-tools__search",
      "mcp__agent-tools__get",
      "mcp__agent-tools__list_categories",
      "mcp__agent-tools__get_methodology",
      "mcp__agent-tools__list_articles",
      "mcp__agent-tools__get_article",
      "mcp__agent-tools__search_mcp_servers",
      "mcp__agent-tools__get_mcp_server",
      "mcp__agent-tools__search_a2a_agents",
      "mcp__agent-tools__search_resources",
      "mcp__agent-tools__get_owned_listing",
      "mcp__agent-tools__get_paid_verification"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-tools__ask_services",
      "mcp__agent-tools__stats",
      "mcp__agent-tools__directory_stats",
      "mcp__agent-tools__register",
      "mcp__agent-tools__scan_mcp_safety",
      "mcp__agent-tools__claim_service_url",
      "mcp__agent-tools__create_api_key",
      "mcp__agent-tools__prepare_paid_verification"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agent-tools__verify_service_url",
      "mcp__agent-tools__edit_owned_listing",
      "mcp__agent-tools__execute_paid_verification"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-tools. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 7 rules
  • mcp__agent-tools__list_categories private-data
  • mcp__agent-tools__search_mcp_servers private-data
  • mcp__agent-tools__register untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agent-tools__scan_mcp_safety untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-tools__claim_service_url outbound
  • mcp__agent-tools__verify_service_url untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-tools__execute_paid_verification untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/cloud.agent-tools/agent-tools-mcp/verify?hash=52163c1ca8f8a8ca9828646f9042b2a9f9a26822fabe693d4f3a2058fc3e95de" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 52163c1ca8f8, from Nov 14, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/cloud.agent-tools/agent-tools-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for cloud.agent-tools/agent-tools-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/cloud.agent-tools/agent-tools-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/cloud.agent-tools/agent-tools-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory): questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory) safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 23 tools, 11 of which can change, send or delete something, and 9 findings (3 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory) delete data?

Yes. 3 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: verify_service_url, edit_owned_listing and execute_paid_verification.

Can the agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory) do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: create_api_key.

What tools does the agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory) have?

23 tools: 3 destructive, 1 irreversible, 7 write, 12 read. verify_service_url, edit_owned_listing, execute_paid_verification, create_api_key, ask_services, stats, directory_stats, register and 15 more.

Does the agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory) need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory) send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): register and claim_service_url.

Has the agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory) changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.