agenteconomy.cloud MCP server
cloud.agenteconomy/mcpagenteconomy.cloudstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
x402 seller trust for AI agents: verify on-chain revenue, check delivery, diagnose listings.
5 tools: 5 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
5 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the agenteconomy.cloud MCP server can do
The agenteconomy.cloud MCP server is published by agenteconomy.cloud, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: discover, verify, check, diagnose and 1 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools can send data out of your system (check and diagnose).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
checkPAID $0.25/call (x402, mcp-pricing-v1.1).Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it PAID $0.25/call (x402, mcp-pricing-v1.1). Level-1 payment-flow conformance against a live x402 endpoint: quote (402 + parseable v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED), requirements (accepts[] validity; payTo vs catalog/registration/expected_payto is a named finding), then a REAL probe purchase from our own wallet when an 'exact' entry on our rail advertises ≤ $0.05, and delivery-of-something. Above the cap or upto-only: depth 'quote_only' with the cap disclosed in gates. One signed payment_flow_conformance verdict out (verdict-v1.1.0).
diagnosePAID $1.00/call (x402, mcp-pricing-v1.1).Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it PAID $1.00/call (x402, mcp-pricing-v1.1). Seller-side funnel diagnosis for one x402 endpoint, as data: findability (catalog presence, listing age, description quality, capability-v1 category), conformance (check's real flow — quote, requirements, a REAL probe purchase when an 'exact' entry on our rail advertises ≤ $0.05, settle, deliver), category demand (verified earners, seller-deduped 30d revenue, median on-chain payment vs your price basis) and competition — then ONE primary blocker under a frozen disclosed precedence. One signed seller_diagnostic verdict out (verdict-v1.1.0).
discoverFREE (rate-limited: 10/min burst, 120/hour per IP).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE (rate-limited: 10/min burst, 120/hour per IP). Text of what you need in → sellers out with chain evidence (tier, verified revenue windows, real-buyer counts, on-chain-observed median price), the seller’s endpoint and payment details, their description and capability category (seller-asserted/auto-assigned claims, source-labeled), and their registered spec where one exists. Referral-only: you contract and pay the seller directly.
registerSupply-side registration: $5 / 30 days (x402, mcp-pricing-v1.1) for actions start and renew; actions challenge_response, status and update_spec are free.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Supply-side registration: $5 / 30 days (x402, mcp-pricing-v1.1) for actions start and renew; actions challenge_response, status and update_spec are free. You pay to be EXAMINED (EIP-191 ownership challenge + endpoint 402-conformance + registration-v1.0.0 schema validation) and can pay and fail — the fee buys the examination, never the outcome. Presence in discover is never gated by registration, and tier/rank/verdicts never move with it: registration adds claims-labeled data. SPEND-CAP WARNING: $5 = 5000000 micro-USDC is above the $1 default per-call cap many x402 clients ship — raise your client cap for start/renew or it will refuse to sign. Flow: start (submit spec, pay, receive a 72h challenge) → challenge_response (submit the payTo key’s EIP-191 signature; the audit runs) → registered while paid_through holds. renew re-audits and extends 30 days; renewal grace 7 days after paid_through — the mark itself drops at paid_through exactly.
verifyPAID $0.10/call (x402, mcp-pricing-v1.1).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it PAID $0.10/call (x402, mcp-pricing-v1.1). Seller address or slug in → one signed seller_trust verdict out: the frozen score-v1.0.0 predicate re-evaluated at issuance, the chain evidence it rests on, exclusions applied, and full provenance — recomputable by anyone. Ed25519-signed over RFC 8785 canonical JSON.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:32 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.agenteconomy.cloud/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including discover (write), verify (write), check (write), diagnose (write), register (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agenteconomy https://mcp.agenteconomy.cloud/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agenteconomy https://mcp.agenteconomy.cloud/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__agenteconomy__discover",
"mcp__agenteconomy__verify",
"mcp__agenteconomy__check",
"mcp__agenteconomy__diagnose",
"mcp__agenteconomy__register"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agenteconomy. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__agenteconomy__check outbound
- mcp__agenteconomy__diagnose outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/cloud.agenteconomy/mcp/verify?hash=1bf2fc320205c256a5ff7ec2c509b006c539e67bf23d7a246729439d3e939ff7" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 1bf2fc320205, from Nov 10, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/cloud.agenteconomy/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/cloud.agenteconomy/mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:46 UTC.
agenteconomy.cloud MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the agenteconomy.cloud MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the agenteconomy.cloud MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the agenteconomy.cloud MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the agenteconomy.cloud MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 5 write. discover, verify, check, diagnose and register.
Does the agenteconomy.cloud MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the agenteconomy.cloud MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check and diagnose.
Has the agenteconomy.cloud MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.