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lcas MCP server

cloud.lcas/directorylcas.cloudstreamable-httpv1.7.0Scanned

Find ERC-8004 agents on Ethereum and Base whose MCP or A2A endpoints actually answer.

6 tools: 2 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the lcas MCP server can do

The lcas MCP server is published by lcas.cloud, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_agent and check_endpoint), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (search_agents and directory_status); 1 tool can send data out of your system (check_endpoint).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 3 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.7.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_agentReport card for one agent, written for its operator: what lcas found when it last read the registration file and checked each endpoint, as problems, warnings, tips and passes, each…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report card for one agent, written for its operator: what lcas found when it last read the registration file and checked each endpoint, as problems, warnings, tips and passes, each with a suggested fix. Use it to see why an agent is not listed or not working in lcas. Built from stored checks; nothing is re-checked.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • check_endpointWhat lcas has stored about one MCP, A2A or web endpoint URL, for a client about to connect to it: last check and 30-day history, when its tool list last changed, a tools_pin (save …Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What lcas has stored about one MCP, A2A or web endpoint URL, for a client about to connect to it: last check and 30-day history, when its tool list last changed, a tools_pin (save it when you approve the tools; a different pin later means lcas read a changed list), tools whose text matched the tool-poisoning scan, the live and guard tests, and the listed agents that declare the URL. No matches means no listed agent declares this URL, which says nothing about it. Built from stored checks; nothing is called.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • directory_statusWhich chains lcas indexes and how far each is synced.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "directory_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "directory_status" says "status" and "directory": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Which chains lcas indexes and how far each is synced.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • find_toolsFind single MCP tools or A2A skills that do something, across all agents.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_tools" says "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find single MCP tools or A2A skills that do something, across all agents. Only endpoints that passed lcas's last daily check. Ordered by reliability, not by a score: endpoints whose weekly live test passed first, then by days working in the last 30, then by how well the words match. Each result has the endpoint to connect to and its check history.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_agentDetails of one agent: each declared endpoint with lcas's check result, 30-day history and all-time working days, since when the current owner holds it, the weekly live test where o…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Details of one agent: each declared endpoint with lcas's check result, 30-day history and all-time working days, since when the current owner holds it, the weekly live test where one exists (one read-only tool called, or one skill example sent), its MCP tools or A2A skills, copies, feedback counts per tag, and money hints (tools that move funds, payment asked, owner wallet kind: wallet, Safe multisig or contract).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_agentsSearch the lcas directory of ERC-8004 agents.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_agents" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "directory": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the lcas directory of ERC-8004 agents. Returns newest first, one entry per group of copies, with which service types passed lcas's last check. Use get_agent for full details.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 16, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://lcas.cloud/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including check_agent (write), check_endpoint (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 16, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
  2. Nov 9, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 2.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
  2. Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 1.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1
  4. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
  5. Tools2 added, 2 changed.+2 added~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.7.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http directory https://lcas.cloud/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http directory https://lcas.cloud/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__directory__search_agents",
      "mcp__directory__find_tools",
      "mcp__directory__get_agent",
      "mcp__directory__directory_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__directory__check_agent",
      "mcp__directory__check_endpoint"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as directory. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__directory__search_agents private-data
  • mcp__directory__check_endpoint outbound
  • mcp__directory__directory_status private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/cloud.lcas/directory/verify?hash=c851953b63e3a774f0a3cda35994e86cfc64cf6dad748290bd9820cc26139546" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c851953b63e3, from Nov 10, 2026, 21:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/cloud.lcas/directory/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for cloud.lcas/directory
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/cloud.lcas/directory.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/cloud.lcas/directory)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 21:17 UTC.

lcas MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the lcas MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the lcas MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the lcas MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the lcas MCP server have?

6 tools: 2 write, 4 read. check_agent, check_endpoint, search_agents, find_tools, get_agent and directory_status.

Does the lcas MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the lcas MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_endpoint.

Has the lcas MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 3 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.