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Image Tools MCP server

co.byondr/image-toolsbyondr.costreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Resize, compress, convert, crop, rotate and watermark images, one at a time or in a zip.

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

Its sign-in does not let Anlyon set up an OAuth client on its own, so there is no link to it here.

What the Image Tools MCP server can do

The Image Tools MCP server is published by byondr.co, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: process_images and create_upload), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (process_images); 1 tool can send data out of your system (process_images).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • create_uploadGet a one-hour signed upload URL for an image or a zip that is too large to send inline (over 3 MB; up to 100 MB here) or that already sits on disk.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_upload" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get a one-hour signed upload URL for an image or a zip that is too large to send inline (over 3 MB; up to 100 MB here) or that already sits on disk. PUT the raw bytes to upload_url with a Content-Length header, then pass file_id to process_images. Free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Create upload URL
    • idempotentHint: false
  • process_imagesResize, crop, rotate, flip, compress (to a file size with target_bytes), convert (jpeg, png, webp, avif), strip EXIF and GPS metadata from, and watermark (text, logo or both) one i…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "resize": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resize, crop, rotate, flip, compress (to a file size with target_bytes), convert (jpeg, png, webp, avif), strip EXIF and GPS metadata from, and watermark (text, logo or both) one image or a zip of up to 50 images (up to 500 files per zip; files that are not supported images are skipped and listed). Crops are in pixels by default; for a zip of different sizes use crop_unit "percent" or crop_aspect, which are worked out per image. Give exactly one source: file_id (from create_upload), url (public https) or data_base64 (up to 3 MB inline; use create_upload, up to 100 MB, or url above that). One image in returns one image; a zip returns a zip. AVIF output is scaled down to fit 1,200 px on the longest side and WebP output to 36 megapixels. Returns a 24-hour download_url with the size and format of every output, and for each output the kinds of metadata found in the input and left in the output (location, date, camera, serial number, ...) and whether the colour profile was kept; kinds only, never the values. keep_date and keep_copyright write back the EXIF date taken and copyright after stripping. Large zips can take up to a minute; use a client timeout of at least 120 s. Free. Daily quotas are counted per caller in output megapixels; see start.md.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Process images
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 27, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://byondr.co/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://byondr.co
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
no
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://byondr.co/image-tools/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including process_images (write), create_upload (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http image-tools https://byondr.co/image-tools/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http image-tools https://byondr.co/image-tools/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__image-tools__process_images",
      "mcp__image-tools__create_upload"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as image-tools. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__image-tools__process_images untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/co.byondr/image-tools/verify?hash=e40138492f3a571ee552a3c1dc87f14b443cc00ac43b2a9e0d8a48ea5b3723bd" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e40138492f3a, from Nov 9, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/co.byondr/image-tools/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for co.byondr/image-tools
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/co.byondr/image-tools.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/co.byondr/image-tools)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 27, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

Image Tools MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Image Tools MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Image Tools MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Image Tools MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Image Tools MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. process_images and create_upload.

Does the Image Tools MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Image Tools MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): process_images.

Has the Image Tools MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.