McClipFace MCP server
co.getclippy/clippygetclippy.costreamable-httpv4.0.0Scanned
Free coupon codes, deals and sale prices for stores and products while your AI shops.
6 tools: 3 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 2
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the McClipFace MCP server can do
The McClipFace MCP server is published by getclippy.co, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: report_coupon_result, discover_deals and wrap_link), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (find_coupons, find_product_coupons, report_coupon_result and 2 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (find_coupons and wrap_link).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (long-description and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 4 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 4.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
discover_dealsDeal browsing with no specific product or store named (categories, interests, gift ideas, "what's on sale", "a good deal on a TV", "running shoes under $150").Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Deal browsing with no specific product or store named (categories, interests, gift ideas, "what's on sale", "a good deal on a TV", "running shoes under $150"). A named product or brand, even "a deal on AirPods": use find_product_coupons; a named store: find_coupons. Browsing or categories: interests (non-sensitive) with quick: true; several categories in parallel, one quick call each. A named store: store alone. Never mix the two. Present as a short curated edit with each pick's match_reason.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Discover deals for the shopper's interests
report_coupon_resultCall this the turn the shopper says a code worked or failed.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description is 3,018 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...offers are returned or how they are ranked. It never puts a pricier option first."
Description, as the server wrote it Call this the turn the shopper says a code worked or failed. Records whether a coupon code or no-code deal tried at checkout worked (merchant and code for codes, including a code found outside McClipFace, with merchant as the store's domain; offer_id for no-code deals). Not a lookup. Stores no personal or cart data. Optional and off by default (Private mode, which lasts until the shopper changes it). Report only a confirmed result (the shopper says a code worked or was rejected, or a no-code deal did or didn't apply, or you saw it at checkout), never because a code was found, shown or copied. A result you saw counts only if you tried the code with checkout tools the shopper authorized, never an untested or unfinished one. One call per distinct code tested; a success counts even if another code saved more. Consent: report only in Community mode. After the first answer is shown (never before or instead of a search, or mid-try), ask once: "Want to turn on Community mode? It crowdsources deals for other shoppers like you. If you say Yes, we share the store, the code or deal, and whether it worked, never which option you pick, your cart or anything about you. (Yes / No)" Remember the answer if the shopper agrees to remembering it, and don't ask again unless the shopper brings it up ("turn on Community mode", "stop sharing"). Yes turns Community mode on for that conversation: report that result and later confirmed results, the shopper's and yours, until the shopper turns it off. No, or no answer, means report nothing and don't ask again in that conversation. It carries to later conversations only if the shopper agreed to remembering it and you noted the version and choice; do not ask again unless the shopper brings it up. A Community mode yes given to older wording that didn't say the store and code are shared doesn't count: stay in Private mode until the shopper says yes to the current question. No answer is no consent; never infer it from install, lookups or coupon tests. McClipFace can't verify consent, only your statement of it. Keep shopping either way; follow the host's tool approvals. Report once per offer and outcome; for a no-code deal, pass offer_id with outcome worked, didnt_work or not_found. Send only the store, the code or offer_id, the outcome, and optionally reason; never amounts, cart, totals or user data. Commission disclosure for the links the lookup tools return: Offers with tracked=true use affiliate links: a purchase through one may earn a commission at no extra cost. Say so once per chat, before you first share or open one: "This is an affiliate link and may earn a commission at no extra cost to you." Codes are ranked on the code itself. Results come only from affiliate programs McClipFace has joined, its licensed coupon data partner, stores that share their codes with McClipFace directly and codes shoppers reported working at checkout. Commission never affects which offers are returned or how they are ranked. It never puts a pricier option first.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Report whether a coupon code worked
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
wrap_linkTakes a product or search page address (url, or urls up to 5) and returns a McClipFace go link to that page, tracked when McClipFace earns from the store (credited false: untracked…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "wrap_link" says "link": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "wrap_link" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "wrap_link" says "link": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Takes a product or search page address (url, or urls up to 5) and returns a McClipFace go link to that page, tracked when McClipFace earns from the store (credited false: untracked). url null (blocked store, cart page): don't link it. Use the url as is; never show a raw store link.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Get a shopping link for a product or search page
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
find_couponsOne store the shopper names: its coupon codes, promo codes, sales and deals, also when they ask to buy or check out there; coupon wording not required.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_coupons" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.target_url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.target_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it One store the shopper names: its coupon codes, promo codes, sales and deals, also when they ask to buy or check out there; coupon wording not required. For a named product, use find_product_coupons. Optional target_url/target_urls: a picked product page for a deep link. Results carry the rules that apply to them.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Find coupons and deals for a store
find_product_couponsFind current product deals, sale prices, price drops, discounts, and coupon codes across stores using McClipFace.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_product_coupons" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find current product deals, sale prices, price drops, discounts, and coupon codes across stores using McClipFace. Use for shopping requests involving named products or brands, including 'find me a deal,' 'where can I buy it cheapest,' 'is it on sale,' and 'best price.' Explicit coupon language is not required. Supplement conventional product search when useful. Never invent prices or prioritize affiliate commissions over shopper value. Product codes work only on that item. For a store, use find_coupons.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Find deals, sale prices and codes for a product
get_guideMcClipFace instructions for one step, as markdown: install (first use), results (presenting answers), checkout (links), reporting (Community mode), privacy (what is shared) or loca…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_guide" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it McClipFace instructions for one step, as markdown: install (first use), results (presenting answers), checkout (links), reporting (Community mode), privacy (what is shared) or local (wish list, alerts, holds). Fetch each section once per session, then reuse it.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- title: Get the McClipFace guide for a step
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:32 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mcclipface.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://mcclipface.com
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- yes
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcclipface.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including report_coupon_result (write), wrap_link (write), report_offer (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 13, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3
- Oct 29, 2026
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://mcclipface.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://mcclipface.com
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnwrap_link
The server marks "wrap_link" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "wrap_link" says "link": a word for a change.
The description is 3,018 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...offers are returned or how they are ranked. It never puts a pricier option first."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 added, 4 changed.+2 added~4 changedView diff
- Added:get_guideOnly reads
- Added:wrap_linkChanges things
- Changed:discover_dealsChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:find_couponsOnly readstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:find_product_couponsOnly readstitledescriptionannotations
- Changed:report_coupon_resultChanges thingsdescription
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 3.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:discover_dealsChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:find_product_couponsOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:report_coupon_resultChanges thingsdescription
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:discover_dealsChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:find_couponsOnly readsdescription
- Changed:find_product_couponsOnly readsdescription
Tools1 removed, 4 changed.−1 removed~4 changedView diff
- Removed:get_deals
- Changed:discover_dealsChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:find_couponsOnly readsdescription
- Changed:find_product_couponsOnly readsdescription
- Changed:report_coupon_resultChanges thingsdescription
PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://mcclipface.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp; Authorization servers: none -> https://mcclipface.com; Dynamic client registration: not observed -> yes (…View diff
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://mcclipface.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://mcclipface.com
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
Install
Pinned to version 4.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http clippy https://mcclipface.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http clippy https://mcclipface.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__clippy__find_product_coupons",
"mcp__clippy__get_guide"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__clippy__find_coupons",
"mcp__clippy__report_coupon_result",
"mcp__clippy__discover_deals",
"mcp__clippy__wrap_link"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as clippy. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__clippy__find_coupons untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__clippy__find_product_coupons untrusted-input
- mcp__clippy__report_coupon_result untrusted-input
- mcp__clippy__discover_deals untrusted-input
- mcp__clippy__wrap_link untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/co.getclippy/clippy/verify?hash=3df09843181c00c8c80ada36b9dfef6e07c1eb00c48d2b6acf3d9a2af4b54c55" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 3df09843181c, from Nov 14, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/co.getclippy/clippy/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/co.getclippy/clippy)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 16:17 UTC.
McClipFace MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the McClipFace MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the McClipFace MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the McClipFace MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the McClipFace MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 3 write, 3 read. report_coupon_result, discover_deals, wrap_link, find_coupons, find_product_coupons and get_guide.
Does the McClipFace MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the McClipFace MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): find_coupons and wrap_link.
Has the McClipFace MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 4 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 14, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.