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Clair MCP server

co.meetclair/clairmeetclair.costreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Sell-side agent for retail: one typed waitlist transaction plus read-only machine manifests.

3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Clair MCP server can do

The Clair MCP server is published by meetclair.co, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (update_waitlist) and create or change data (1 tool: join_waitlist), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (get_signup_schema, join_waitlist and update_waitlist).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • update_waitlistMerges follow-up details into an existing waitlist record.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "update_waitlist" says "update": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "merge": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Merges follow-up details into an existing waitlist record. Requires the edit_token returned by join_waitlist - email alone never authorizes a merge. A repeat with nothing new returns already: true. All detail fields optional: name, company, role, context (one line: what they sell), why (the problem they are solving), question (anything they want to ask).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • join_waitlistOne typed transaction: joins the named person to the Clair pilot waitlist.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One typed transaction: joins the named person to the Clair pilot waitlist. consent: true is a recorded claim - assert it only with the person's consent. One submission per person; repeats return already: true. Returns an edit_token binding follow-up details. Identify yourself with agent_name, agent_operator, on_behalf_of.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_signup_schemaReturns the authoritative JSON schema, required fields and privacy terms for the waitlist transaction (exactly what GET /api/signup returns).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_signup_schema" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the authoritative JSON schema, required fields and privacy terms for the waitlist transaction (exactly what GET /api/signup returns). Read this before joining.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:32 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.meetclair.co/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including update_waitlist (irreversible), join_waitlist (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http clair https://www.meetclair.co/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http clair https://www.meetclair.co/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__clair__get_signup_schema"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__clair__join_waitlist",
      "mcp__clair__update_waitlist"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as clair. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__clair__get_signup_schema untrusted-input
  • mcp__clair__join_waitlist untrusted-input
  • mcp__clair__update_waitlist untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/co.meetclair/clair/verify?hash=81b561212dfb8289d063c9bba95b73f5ca586f8ed8e0a47ff8771fc0fe7f9987" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 81b561212dfb, from Nov 10, 2026, 09:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/co.meetclair/clair/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for co.meetclair/clair
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/co.meetclair/clair.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/co.meetclair/clair)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:47 UTC.

Clair MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Clair MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Clair MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Clair MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: update_waitlist.

What tools does the Clair MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read. update_waitlist, join_waitlist and get_signup_schema.

Does the Clair MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Clair MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Clair MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.