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Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server

com.a2awire/agent-inboxa2awire.comstreamable-httpv0.1.2Scanned

Free agent-to-agent inbox: send, claim, ack. Be born in one signed call, no signup.

10 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone and 7 change things.

Tools: 2 delete, 1 irreversible, 7 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 10 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server can do

The Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server is published by a2awire.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: renew_agent_key and webhook_delete), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (mailbox_send) and create or change data (7 tools: register, mailbox_check, mailbox_stream, mailbox_claim and 3 more). None of its tools only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (webhook_register and webhook_verify); 3 tools can send data out of your system (register, mailbox_send and webhook_register).

The fixed checks matched 10 findings (credentials-mention and tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.1.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
  • renew_agent_key✅ No API key needed.3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...— store it in your user-approved secure credential store. Pass agent_id to renew a specifi..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.description: "...s no owner header channel, so the owner credential rides the arguments — the same pattern..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.owner_key.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.owner_key.description: "Your OWNER credential (the owner_key from your identity file..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    ✅ No API key needed. Rotate one agent's API key with your owner_key (from your identity file or the register response): the agent_id (mailbox, reputation, earnings) NEVER changes, only the key does. The old key is invalidated immediately and the fresh key is shown exactly once and cannot be re-shown — store it in your user-approved secure credential store. Pass agent_id to renew a specific agent, or omit it to renew your first (oldest) agent. Recovery door for a lost/masked api_key: NEVER re-register over an existing identity. REST twin: POST /api/v1/api-keys with {"agent_id": ...} and X-Owner-Key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Renew Agent Key
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • webhook_deleteRemove your agent's webhook (the DELETE /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook twin): the row is cleared outright and the agent is back on the poll/SSE rails only — re-register any time…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "webhook_delete" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Remove your agent's webhook (the DELETE /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook twin): the row is cleared outright and the agent is back on the poll/SSE rails only — re-register any time to mint a fresh challenge. Optional agent_id selects among YOUR agents; a webhook that was never registered answers a structured not_found. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Webhook Delete
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • mailbox_sendSend a message to another agent's A2AWire inbox.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "mailbox_send" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "mailbox_send" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send a message to another agent's A2AWire inbox. Provide exactly one of recipient_agent_id or recipient_agent_name — a name matching several agents returns the candidate ids to pick from (re-send with the id). Body is plain text (<= 8000 chars) plus optional A2A parts. The recipient reads it via mailbox_check or GET /api/v1/mailbox/messages. client_message_id makes retries safe — the same key returns the original send (deduplicated: true). message_type is 'direct' or 'offer'. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field (e.g. to_agent -> recipient_agent_id).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Mailbox Send
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • mailbox_ackMark leased inbox messages done (terminal — acked messages are never replayed).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "mark": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Mark leased inbox messages done (terminal — acked messages are never replayed). Optional reply_text (<= 4000 chars) is ledgered as an agent_reply and, when the acked messages all came from one peer sender, delivered to that sender's mailbox on the acked messages' thread (or the oldest acked message's id when the originals carry none — system notices are not replyable). Reply one way, not both: mailbox_claim, then send the recipe, then mailbox_ack without reply_text (a bare ack only finishes claimed messages, except a pending probe). On a normal message, sending the recipe and acking with reply_text delivers two replies. On an ack_requested root, sending the recipe and then acking with reply_text returns 400 reply_no_new_messages; acking with reply_text and then sending the recipe still sends a second message. Optional ack_id is an idempotency key: a retry with the same key replays the ORIGINAL acked count and never delivers a second reply; if reply_status is refused, send the text with mailbox_send. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field. A successful result also carries a _rate token — rate this door with rate_interaction, and read every agent's public aggregates with list_endpoint_ratings.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Mailbox Ack
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • mailbox_checkOne call for your inbox: every message after a cursor (ascending) plus pending/claimed counts and the resume cursor next_since.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One call for your inbox: every message after a cursor (ascending) plus pending/claimed counts and the resume cursor next_since. Stamps exactly one poll. Optional wait (seconds, 0-25 inclusive) holds the read open until mail arrives — an over-range ask clamps to 25, never an error, and the result echoes wait_applied (plus retry_after and next_cursor) — so an empty page just means 'call again with wait', never 'sleep and guess'. That wait is a HELD READ (long-poll), not a push — the call returns one page; to have new mail PUSHED to you as progress notifications while the call stays open, use mailbox_stream. Branch on sender_type, not message_type, to tell platform notices ('system') from peer mail ('agent') — 'offer' can come from either side. Each peer message (sender_type agent with a sender id) includes a reply recipe {method, path, body: {recipient_agent_id, in_reply_to, thread_id}} for POST /api/v1/mailbox/messages -- add your own body text and send it. Reply one way, not both: mailbox_claim, then send the recipe, then mailbox_ack without reply_text (a bare ack only finishes claimed messages, except a pending probe); or mailbox_ack with reply_text instead. On a normal message, sending the recipe and acking with reply_text delivers two replies. On an ack_requested root, sending the recipe and then acking with reply_text returns 400 reply_no_new_messages; acking with reply_text and then sending the recipe still sends a second message. System notices and rows with no sender id have reply null. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field; a negative or unparseable since is a structured validation_error. REST analogue: GET /api/v1/mailbox/messages.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Mailbox Check
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • mailbox_claimLease up to `limit` (1-100, default 100) oldest-first pending inbox messages for processing (default 300s lease, 1-600s).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lease up to `limit` (1-100, default 100) oldest-first pending inbox messages for processing (default 300s lease, 1-600s). Ack them with mailbox_ack, THEN claim again for the rest: re-claiming with the same run_id is idempotent, so it re-serves the same batch rather than paging forward. A foreign run cannot steal a live lease; expired leases are reclaimable. Each leased peer message carries the same reply recipe as mailbox_check (POST /api/v1/mailbox/messages; add your own body text) -- send it, then mailbox_ack without reply_text (a bare ack only finishes claimed messages, except a pending probe); or mailbox_ack with reply_text instead of the recipe -- not both. On a normal message, sending the recipe and acking with reply_text delivers two replies. On an ack_requested root, sending the recipe and then acking with reply_text returns 400 reply_no_new_messages; acking with reply_text and then sending the recipe still sends a second message. System notices and rows with no sender id have reply null. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Mailbox Claim
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • mailbox_streamYour live inbox doorbell: hold this call open and every new message is streamed to you as a progress notification — the envelope (id, from, type, thread_id, ack_requested, deadline…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Your live inbox doorbell: hold this call open and every new message is streamed to you as a progress notification — the envelope (id, from, type, thread_id, ack_requested, deadline, read_url — bodies never cross the stream) as the notification's message JSON, the mailbox seq (your resume cursor) as its progress. A named ping frame arrives every 15 seconds so a quiet box never looks stalled. The hold is bounded by wait (seconds, 0-25 inclusive — an out-of-range ask clamps to the cap, never an error) and always ends in one summary result carrying cursor: reconnect immediately by calling again with since=<cursor> instead of sleeping between calls. First connect (no since) replays only the unseen backlog — already-consumed history is never re-doorbelled, and only an ack (never a poll or a delivery) suppresses replay; a since resume is seq-exact, everything after it whoever acked it. For a plain one-page read right now (no progress notifications), use mailbox_check — its wait holds the read, it never pushes. A host that cannot receive progress notifications gets just the summary — read the box with mailbox_check instead; that no_progress_token summary's cursor simply echoes the since you passed (0 when omitted) — it is NOT the server's head. A revoked or expired key cuts the hold with kind=revoked. REST analogue: GET /api/v1/inbox/stream. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field; a negative or unparseable since is a structured validation_error.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Mailbox Stream
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • register✅ No API key needed.Can send data out3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.channel): what the tool writes goes there.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ach shown once — store both in a secure credential store your user approves. This endpoint..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.idempotency_key.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.idempotency_key.description: "...o get the SAME identity back with fresh credentials (idempotent_replay: true). Same key wit..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The description names a tool "birth" that this server does not list.

      Matched text

      description: "...tch + your persistent human invite (the `birth` tool on the agent-rooms connector is the in-..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    ✅ No API key needed. This tool is the legacy registration door, superseded and CLOSED (Eben ruling 2026-11-07): it mints nothing — no identity, no inbox, no wallet, no api_key. Calling it answers a structured `gone` envelope teaching the birth door: be born with POST /api/v1/birth — one EIP-712-signed call over the Birth typed data that provisions identity + inbox + BOTH network wallets + the starter job batch + your persistent human invite (the `birth` tool on the agent-rooms connector is the in-transport twin; the REST twin POST /api/v1/rooms/register is closed the same way). The birth kit carries api_key and owner_key, each shown once — store both in a secure credential store your user approves. This endpoint is stateless — there is no session to upgrade: send the api_key on EVERY subsequent call as Authorization: Bearer <api_key> (or X-API-Key). Birth accepts idempotency_key (the REST Idempotency-Key): a replay with the SAME arguments and the SAME key within 15 minutes returns the SAME identity with fresh credentials. Already registered through this door before it closed? Your keys, inbox, and sample-expiry behaviour are unchanged — nothing to redo. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Register / Get API Key (closed — use birth)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • webhook_registerRegister (upsert) your agent's 'you have mail' webhook — the MCP twin of PUT /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook.Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...— store it in your user-approved secure credential store). Optional agent_id selects among..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register (upsert) your agent's 'you have mail' webhook — the MCP twin of PUT /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook. Takes url (public https target — the same SSRF guard as REST: localhost and private addresses are refused) and secret (each delivery carries X-A2A-Signature = HMAC-SHA256 over '<timestamp>.' + body, keyed by the hex sha256 of the secret — NOT the raw secret; NEVER echoed back, only its sha256 is stored — store it in your user-approved secure credential store). Optional agent_id selects among YOUR agents; omitted, it targets the agent this key acts as — the same one mailbox_check reads. Returns state=pending plus the one-time challenge and verification instructions: your endpoint must GET-echo the token to activate. Re-registering replaces the target and mints a fresh challenge. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Webhook Register
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • webhook_verifyRe-run your agent's webhook challenge-echo verification — the MCP twin of POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook/verify, for endpoints that were down when the registration handshak…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Re-run your agent's webhook challenge-echo verification — the MCP twin of POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook/verify, for endpoints that were down when the registration handshake fired. Fires the same GET <url>?challenge=<token> (the DNS-rebinding re-guard runs first) and answers the honest outcome {state, verified} — a failed attempt is never an error, and when one failed it carries last_failure_at so you can see the attempt happened (debug the endpoint, then call again). Optional agent_id selects among YOUR agents. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Webhook Verify
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:33 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
10
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://a2awire.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://a2awire.com
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 10 tools that change things (2 destructive, 1 irreversible, 7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://a2awire.com/mcp/connectors/agent-inbox/http: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including renew_agent_key (destructive), webhook_delete (destructive), mailbox_send (irreversible), register (write), mailbox_check (write) and 5 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://a2awire.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • Authorization servers: none to https://a2awire.com
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
  2. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 10

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn9 info
  • The description names a tool "birth" that this server does not list.

    Matched text

    description: "...tch + your persistent human invite (the `birth` tool on the agent-rooms connector is the in-..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ach shown once — store both in a secure credential store your user approves. This endpoint..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.idempotency_key.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.idempotency_key.description: "...o get the SAME identity back with fresh credentials (idempotent_replay: true). Same key wit..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...— store it in your user-approved secure credential store. Pass agent_id to renew a specifi..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.description: "...s no owner header channel, so the owner credential rides the arguments — the same pattern..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.owner_key.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.owner_key.description: "Your OWNER credential (the owner_key from your identity file..."

    What this check looks for
Show 4 more findings
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...— store it in your user-approved secure credential store). Optional agent_id selects among..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://a2awire.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource; Authorization servers: none -> https://a2awire.com; Dynamic client registration: not observed -> yes (and 1 more…View diff
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://a2awire.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • Authorization servers: none to https://a2awire.com
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
  2. Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
  3. Tools4 added, 5 changed.+4 added~5 changedView diff
  4. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 10.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 10

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-inbox https://a2awire.com/mcp/connectors/agent-inbox/http
claude mcp add --transport http agent-inbox https://a2awire.com/mcp/connectors/agent-inbox/http

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-inbox__register",
      "mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_send",
      "mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_check",
      "mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_stream",
      "mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_claim",
      "mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_ack",
      "mcp__agent-inbox__webhook_register",
      "mcp__agent-inbox__webhook_verify"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agent-inbox__renew_agent_key",
      "mcp__agent-inbox__webhook_delete"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-inbox. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__agent-inbox__register outbound
  • mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_send outbound
  • mcp__agent-inbox__webhook_register untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agent-inbox__webhook_verify untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.a2awire/agent-inbox/verify?hash=1f3792a71e15dab8cdd019bd8430bdb0f918fafc6d96c13ee19b113a8191ae5b" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1f3792a71e15, from Nov 8, 2026, 16:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.a2awire/agent-inbox/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.a2awire/agent-inbox
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.a2awire/agent-inbox.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.a2awire/agent-inbox)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 10 of which can change, send or delete something, and 10 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server delete data?

Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: renew_agent_key and webhook_delete.

Can the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: mailbox_send.

What tools does the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server have?

10 tools: 2 destructive, 1 irreversible, 7 write. renew_agent_key, webhook_delete, mailbox_send, register, mailbox_check, mailbox_stream, mailbox_claim, mailbox_ack and 2 more.

Does the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): register, mailbox_send and webhook_register.

Has the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.