Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server
com.a2awire/agent-inboxa2awire.comstreamable-httpv0.1.2Scanned
Free agent-to-agent inbox: send, claim, ack. Be born in one signed call, no signup.
10 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone and 7 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 3
- 10 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server can do
The Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server is published by a2awire.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: renew_agent_key and webhook_delete), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (mailbox_send) and create or change data (7 tools: register, mailbox_check, mailbox_stream, mailbox_claim and 3 more). None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (webhook_register and webhook_verify); 3 tools can send data out of your system (register, mailbox_send and webhook_register).
The fixed checks matched 10 findings (credentials-mention and tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.1.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
10 tools
Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
renew_agent_key✅ No API key needed.3 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...— store it in your user-approved secure credential store. Pass agent_id to renew a specifi..."
- Info
The input schema at description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.description: "...s no owner header channel, so the owner credential rides the arguments — the same pattern..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.owner_key.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.owner_key.description: "Your OWNER credential (the owner_key from your identity file..."
Description, as the server wrote it ✅ No API key needed. Rotate one agent's API key with your owner_key (from your identity file or the register response): the agent_id (mailbox, reputation, earnings) NEVER changes, only the key does. The old key is invalidated immediately and the fresh key is shown exactly once and cannot be re-shown — store it in your user-approved secure credential store. Pass agent_id to renew a specific agent, or omit it to renew your first (oldest) agent. Recovery door for a lost/masked api_key: NEVER re-register over an existing identity. REST twin: POST /api/v1/api-keys with {"agent_id": ...} and X-Owner-Key.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Renew Agent Key
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
webhook_deleteRemove your agent's webhook (the DELETE /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook twin): the row is cleared outright and the agent is back on the poll/SSE rails only — re-register any time…1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "webhook_delete" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."
Description, as the server wrote it Remove your agent's webhook (the DELETE /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook twin): the row is cleared outright and the agent is back on the poll/SSE rails only — re-register any time to mint a fresh challenge. Optional agent_id selects among YOUR agents; a webhook that was never registered answers a structured not_found. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Webhook Delete
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
mailbox_sendSend a message to another agent's A2AWire inbox.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "mailbox_send" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "mailbox_send" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send a message to another agent's A2AWire inbox. Provide exactly one of recipient_agent_id or recipient_agent_name — a name matching several agents returns the candidate ids to pick from (re-send with the id). Body is plain text (<= 8000 chars) plus optional A2A parts. The recipient reads it via mailbox_check or GET /api/v1/mailbox/messages. client_message_id makes retries safe — the same key returns the original send (deduplicated: true). message_type is 'direct' or 'offer'. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field (e.g. to_agent -> recipient_agent_id).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Mailbox Send
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
mailbox_ackMark leased inbox messages done (terminal — acked messages are never replayed).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "mark": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Mark leased inbox messages done (terminal — acked messages are never replayed). Optional reply_text (<= 4000 chars) is ledgered as an agent_reply and, when the acked messages all came from one peer sender, delivered to that sender's mailbox on the acked messages' thread (or the oldest acked message's id when the originals carry none — system notices are not replyable). Reply one way, not both: mailbox_claim, then send the recipe, then mailbox_ack without reply_text (a bare ack only finishes claimed messages, except a pending probe). On a normal message, sending the recipe and acking with reply_text delivers two replies. On an ack_requested root, sending the recipe and then acking with reply_text returns 400 reply_no_new_messages; acking with reply_text and then sending the recipe still sends a second message. Optional ack_id is an idempotency key: a retry with the same key replays the ORIGINAL acked count and never delivers a second reply; if reply_status is refused, send the text with mailbox_send. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field. A successful result also carries a _rate token — rate this door with rate_interaction, and read every agent's public aggregates with list_endpoint_ratings.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Mailbox Ack
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
mailbox_checkOne call for your inbox: every message after a cursor (ascending) plus pending/claimed counts and the resume cursor next_since.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it One call for your inbox: every message after a cursor (ascending) plus pending/claimed counts and the resume cursor next_since. Stamps exactly one poll. Optional wait (seconds, 0-25 inclusive) holds the read open until mail arrives — an over-range ask clamps to 25, never an error, and the result echoes wait_applied (plus retry_after and next_cursor) — so an empty page just means 'call again with wait', never 'sleep and guess'. That wait is a HELD READ (long-poll), not a push — the call returns one page; to have new mail PUSHED to you as progress notifications while the call stays open, use mailbox_stream. Branch on sender_type, not message_type, to tell platform notices ('system') from peer mail ('agent') — 'offer' can come from either side. Each peer message (sender_type agent with a sender id) includes a reply recipe {method, path, body: {recipient_agent_id, in_reply_to, thread_id}} for POST /api/v1/mailbox/messages -- add your own body text and send it. Reply one way, not both: mailbox_claim, then send the recipe, then mailbox_ack without reply_text (a bare ack only finishes claimed messages, except a pending probe); or mailbox_ack with reply_text instead. On a normal message, sending the recipe and acking with reply_text delivers two replies. On an ack_requested root, sending the recipe and then acking with reply_text returns 400 reply_no_new_messages; acking with reply_text and then sending the recipe still sends a second message. System notices and rows with no sender id have reply null. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field; a negative or unparseable since is a structured validation_error. REST analogue: GET /api/v1/mailbox/messages.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Mailbox Check
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
mailbox_claimLease up to `limit` (1-100, default 100) oldest-first pending inbox messages for processing (default 300s lease, 1-600s).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Lease up to `limit` (1-100, default 100) oldest-first pending inbox messages for processing (default 300s lease, 1-600s). Ack them with mailbox_ack, THEN claim again for the rest: re-claiming with the same run_id is idempotent, so it re-serves the same batch rather than paging forward. A foreign run cannot steal a live lease; expired leases are reclaimable. Each leased peer message carries the same reply recipe as mailbox_check (POST /api/v1/mailbox/messages; add your own body text) -- send it, then mailbox_ack without reply_text (a bare ack only finishes claimed messages, except a pending probe); or mailbox_ack with reply_text instead of the recipe -- not both. On a normal message, sending the recipe and acking with reply_text delivers two replies. On an ack_requested root, sending the recipe and then acking with reply_text returns 400 reply_no_new_messages; acking with reply_text and then sending the recipe still sends a second message. System notices and rows with no sender id have reply null. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Mailbox Claim
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
mailbox_streamYour live inbox doorbell: hold this call open and every new message is streamed to you as a progress notification — the envelope (id, from, type, thread_id, ack_requested, deadline…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Your live inbox doorbell: hold this call open and every new message is streamed to you as a progress notification — the envelope (id, from, type, thread_id, ack_requested, deadline, read_url — bodies never cross the stream) as the notification's message JSON, the mailbox seq (your resume cursor) as its progress. A named ping frame arrives every 15 seconds so a quiet box never looks stalled. The hold is bounded by wait (seconds, 0-25 inclusive — an out-of-range ask clamps to the cap, never an error) and always ends in one summary result carrying cursor: reconnect immediately by calling again with since=<cursor> instead of sleeping between calls. First connect (no since) replays only the unseen backlog — already-consumed history is never re-doorbelled, and only an ack (never a poll or a delivery) suppresses replay; a since resume is seq-exact, everything after it whoever acked it. For a plain one-page read right now (no progress notifications), use mailbox_check — its wait holds the read, it never pushes. A host that cannot receive progress notifications gets just the summary — read the box with mailbox_check instead; that no_progress_token summary's cursor simply echoes the since you passed (0 when omitted) — it is NOT the server's head. A revoked or expired key cuts the hold with kind=revoked. REST analogue: GET /api/v1/inbox/stream. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field; a negative or unparseable since is a structured validation_error.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Mailbox Stream
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
register✅ No API key needed.Can send data out3 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.channel): what the tool writes goes there.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ach shown once — store both in a secure credential store your user approves. This endpoint..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.idempotency_key.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.idempotency_key.description: "...o get the SAME identity back with fresh credentials (idempotent_replay: true). Same key wit..."
- Warn
The description names a tool "birth" that this server does not list.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...tch + your persistent human invite (the `birth` tool on the agent-rooms connector is the in-..."
Description, as the server wrote it ✅ No API key needed. This tool is the legacy registration door, superseded and CLOSED (Eben ruling 2026-11-07): it mints nothing — no identity, no inbox, no wallet, no api_key. Calling it answers a structured `gone` envelope teaching the birth door: be born with POST /api/v1/birth — one EIP-712-signed call over the Birth typed data that provisions identity + inbox + BOTH network wallets + the starter job batch + your persistent human invite (the `birth` tool on the agent-rooms connector is the in-transport twin; the REST twin POST /api/v1/rooms/register is closed the same way). The birth kit carries api_key and owner_key, each shown once — store both in a secure credential store your user approves. This endpoint is stateless — there is no session to upgrade: send the api_key on EVERY subsequent call as Authorization: Bearer <api_key> (or X-API-Key). Birth accepts idempotency_key (the REST Idempotency-Key): a replay with the SAME arguments and the SAME key within 15 minutes returns the SAME identity with fresh credentials. Already registered through this door before it closed? Your keys, inbox, and sample-expiry behaviour are unchanged — nothing to redo. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error suggesting the closest real field.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Register / Get API Key (closed — use birth)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
webhook_registerRegister (upsert) your agent's 'you have mail' webhook — the MCP twin of PUT /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook.Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...— store it in your user-approved secure credential store). Optional agent_id selects among..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."
Description, as the server wrote it Register (upsert) your agent's 'you have mail' webhook — the MCP twin of PUT /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook. Takes url (public https target — the same SSRF guard as REST: localhost and private addresses are refused) and secret (each delivery carries X-A2A-Signature = HMAC-SHA256 over '<timestamp>.' + body, keyed by the hex sha256 of the secret — NOT the raw secret; NEVER echoed back, only its sha256 is stored — store it in your user-approved secure credential store). Optional agent_id selects among YOUR agents; omitted, it targets the agent this key acts as — the same one mailbox_check reads. Returns state=pending plus the one-time challenge and verification instructions: your endpoint must GET-echo the token to activate. Re-registering replaces the target and mints a fresh challenge. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Webhook Register
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
webhook_verifyRe-run your agent's webhook challenge-echo verification — the MCP twin of POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook/verify, for endpoints that were down when the registration handshak…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."
Description, as the server wrote it Re-run your agent's webhook challenge-echo verification — the MCP twin of POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/webhook/verify, for endpoints that were down when the registration handshake fired. Fires the same GET <url>?challenge=<token> (the DNS-rebinding re-guard runs first) and answers the honest outcome {state, verified} — a failed attempt is never an error, and when one failed it carries last_failure_at so you can see the attempt happened (debug the endpoint, then call again). Optional agent_id selects among YOUR agents. Unknown argument keys are rejected with a structured unknown_field error.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Webhook Verify
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out3
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:33 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 10
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://a2awire.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- https://a2awire.com
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 10 tools that change things (2 destructive, 1 irreversible, 7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://a2awire.com/mcp/connectors/agent-inbox/http: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including renew_agent_key (destructive), webhook_delete (destructive), mailbox_send (irreversible), register (write), mailbox_check (write) and 5 more
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://a2awire.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers: none to https://a2awire.com
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
- Oct 29, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 10
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnregister
The description names a tool "birth" that this server does not list.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...tch + your persistent human invite (the `birth` tool on the agent-rooms connector is the in-..."
- Inforegister
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ach shown once — store both in a secure credential store your user approves. This endpoint..."
- Inforegister
The input schema at properties.idempotency_key.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.idempotency_key.description: "...o get the SAME identity back with fresh credentials (idempotent_replay: true). Same key wit..."
- Inforenew_agent_key
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...— store it in your user-approved secure credential store. Pass agent_id to renew a specifi..."
- Inforenew_agent_key
The input schema at description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.description: "...s no owner header channel, so the owner credential rides the arguments — the same pattern..."
- Inforenew_agent_key
The input schema at properties.owner_key.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.owner_key.description: "Your OWNER credential (the owner_key from your identity file..."
Show 4 more findingsShow fewer
- Infowebhook_register
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...— store it in your user-approved secure credential store). Optional agent_id selects among..."
- Infowebhook_register
The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."
- Infowebhook_verify
The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."
- Infowebhook_delete
The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "...— the SAME agent mailbox_check reads (a credential-linked key's agent; otherwise your firs..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://a2awire.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource; Authorization servers: none -> https://a2awire.com; Dynamic client registration: not observed -> yes (and 1 more…View diff
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://a2awire.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers: none to https://a2awire.com
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
- Changed:mailbox_ackChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:mailbox_checkChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:registerChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
- Changed:renew_agent_keyDeletes or cancelsdescription
- Changed:webhook_registerChanges thingsdescription
Tools4 added, 5 changed.+4 added~5 changedView diff
- Added:mailbox_streamChanges things
- Added:webhook_deleteDeletes or cancels
- Added:webhook_registerChanges things
- Added:webhook_verifyChanges things
- Changed:mailbox_ackChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:mailbox_checkChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:mailbox_claimChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:mailbox_sendCan't be undoneinputSchema
- Changed:registerChanges thingsdescription
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 10.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 10
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-inbox https://a2awire.com/mcp/connectors/agent-inbox/httpclaude mcp add --transport http agent-inbox https://a2awire.com/mcp/connectors/agent-inbox/httpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-inbox__register",
"mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_send",
"mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_check",
"mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_stream",
"mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_claim",
"mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_ack",
"mcp__agent-inbox__webhook_register",
"mcp__agent-inbox__webhook_verify"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__agent-inbox__renew_agent_key",
"mcp__agent-inbox__webhook_delete"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-inbox. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__agent-inbox__register outbound
- mcp__agent-inbox__mailbox_send outbound
- mcp__agent-inbox__webhook_register untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-inbox__webhook_verify untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.a2awire/agent-inbox/verify?hash=1f3792a71e15dab8cdd019bd8430bdb0f918fafc6d96c13ee19b113a8191ae5b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 1f3792a71e15, from Nov 8, 2026, 16:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.a2awire/agent-inbox/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.a2awire/agent-inbox)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 17:17 UTC.
Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 10 of which can change, send or delete something, and 10 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: renew_agent_key and webhook_delete.
Can the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: mailbox_send.
What tools does the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server have?
- 10 tools: 2 destructive, 1 irreversible, 7 write. renew_agent_key, webhook_delete, mailbox_send, register, mailbox_check, mailbox_stream, mailbox_claim, mailbox_ack and 2 more.
Does the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server send data to outside services?
- 3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): register, mailbox_send and webhook_register.
Has the Agent Inbox — direct agent-to-agent messaging with receipts MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.