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Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server

com.agent-manifest/amp-mcpagent-manifest.comssev0.1.5Scanned

Fetch, validate, and permission-check Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) manifests for API discovery.

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server can do

The Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server is published by agent-manifest.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_agent_permissions), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.1.5.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • check_agent_permissionsGiven an intended HTTP action (method + path or full URL) and a manifest, determine whether the action aligns with declared endpoints, authentication, payment onboarding, rate limi…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.intends_unauthenticated.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.intends_unauthenticated.description: "...the agent plans to call the API without credentials."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Given an intended HTTP action (method + path or full URL) and a manifest, determine whether the action aligns with declared endpoints, authentication, payment onboarding, rate limits, and language in agent_notes.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • fetch_manifest_by_domainResolve an API origin from a domain (e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_manifest_by_domain" says "fetch": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve an API origin from a domain (e.g. "bakebase.agent-manifest.com"), try standard AMP discovery URLs, and return parsed manifest JSON plus metadata.
  • validate_manifest_syntaxValidate a manifest JSON string or object against the official AMP JSON Schema for its spec_version (agentmanifest-0.2 or agentmanifest-0.3).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate_manifest_syntax" says "validate": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate a manifest JSON string or object against the official AMP JSON Schema for its spec_version (agentmanifest-0.2 or agentmanifest-0.3). Returns errors or a success_token.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:33 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
202
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
yes
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.agent-manifest.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including check_agent_permissions (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info
  • The input schema at properties.intends_unauthenticated.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.intends_unauthenticated.description: "...the agent plans to call the API without credentials."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport sse amp https://mcp.agent-manifest.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport sse amp https://mcp.agent-manifest.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__amp__fetch_manifest_by_domain",
      "mcp__amp__validate_manifest_syntax"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__amp__check_agent_permissions"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as amp. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.agent-manifest/amp-mcp/verify?hash=caf62e272a4b9545ce846077a67fdf1b65b829b8642f34d52eb20d14b9870bd9" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash caf62e272a4b, from Nov 10, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agent-manifest/amp-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.agent-manifest/amp-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.agent-manifest/amp-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agent-manifest/amp-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:48 UTC.

Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. check_agent_permissions, fetch_manifest_by_domain and validate_manifest_syntax.

Does the Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Agent Manifest Protocol (AMP) MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.