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Agent Preflight MCP server

com.agent-preflight/agent-preflightagent-preflight.comstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

Budgeted agent preflight: allow|block|reuse|defer|advise. Never executes destination tools. Free MCP

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Agent Preflight MCP server can do

The Agent Preflight MCP server is published by agent-preflight.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_request and preflight_tool_call), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (preflight_tool_call); 1 tool can send data out of your system (check_request).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_requestValidate an HTTP API request body against a supplied JSON Schema before sending it.Can send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_request" says "request": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.request.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_request" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "check_request" says "request": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate an HTTP API request body against a supplied JSON Schema before sending it. This tool does not execute the request. Use it when an agent needs to determine whether a proposed JSON body satisfies its expected schema. Optional economics adds proceed/abort advice from expected waste versus a $0.002 check.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • preflight_tool_callFree MCP decision for generic search:web_search or browse:fetch proposals only.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "preflight_tool_call" says "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "browse": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "preflight_tool_call" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "preflight_tool_call" says "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free MCP decision for generic search:web_search or browse:fetch proposals only. Returns structuredContent and JSON text, never destination results. Caller supplies cost estimates, post-consultation budget and history, executes tools and retrieves resultReference itself. Reuse requires explicit permission, positive TTL and matching nonempty goal hashes; history must belong to the caller. estimated fees/savings are hypothetical, not receipts; confidence is not calibrated. Paid HTTP is a separate $0.002 per settled POST interface. Full contract: https://agent-preflight.com/docs

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:33 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.agent-preflight.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_request (write), preflight_tool_call (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "check_request" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "check_request" says "request": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "preflight_tool_call" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "preflight_tool_call" says "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-preflight https://api.agent-preflight.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent-preflight https://api.agent-preflight.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-preflight__check_request",
      "mcp__agent-preflight__preflight_tool_call"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-preflight. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__agent-preflight__check_request outbound
  • mcp__agent-preflight__preflight_tool_call untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.agent-preflight/agent-preflight/verify?hash=dbca31f6a32145c0e0b1f32c6189950e53bc7b8e38b9b47b248702efa03a925f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash dbca31f6a321, from Nov 12, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agent-preflight/agent-preflight/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.agent-preflight/agent-preflight
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.agent-preflight/agent-preflight.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agent-preflight/agent-preflight)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:48 UTC.

Agent Preflight MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Agent Preflight MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Agent Preflight MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Agent Preflight MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Agent Preflight MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. check_request and preflight_tool_call.

Does the Agent Preflight MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Agent Preflight MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_request.

Has the Agent Preflight MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.