AgentAvow Trust MCP server
com.agentavow/agentavow-trustagentavow.comstreamable-httpv0.6.5Scanned
Signed, offline-verifiable safety scores for the MCP servers, packages & tools an agent connects to
8 tools: 6 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 7
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
6 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AgentAvow Trust MCP server can do
The AgentAvow Trust MCP server is published by agentavow.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: scan_repo, scan_package, scan_mcp_server, verify_trust and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
7 tools bring in text other people can write (scan_repo, scan_package, scan_mcp_server and 4 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.6.5.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
about_agentavowWhat AgentAvow is, which tool to use for what, how to read a verdict, and example scans.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it What AgentAvow is, which tool to use for what, how to read a verdict, and example scans. Call this for an overview or when getting started. No input, read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- title: About AgentAvow
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
check_interaction_safetyCheck whether it is safe to interact with another agent by trust threshold.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether it is safe to interact with another agent by trust threshold. Thresholds: delegate 0.6, trade 0.5, collaborate 0.4, follow 0.1. Returns is_safe, risk_level, the score, and a recommendation. Read-only, no auth.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check interaction safety
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
scan_mcp_serverScan a live MCP server's tool definitions for tool-poisoning, prompt-injection, invisible-unicode, and manifest-execution risks before your agent connects to it.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Scan a live MCP server's tool definitions for tool-poisoning, prompt-injection, invisible-unicode, and manifest-execution risks before your agent connects to it. Returns one of three answers with its reason (Safe to connect, Review before you connect, or Do not connect), a 0-100 trust score, findings, and a signed attestation. Read-only; calls the agentavow.com public API.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Scan an MCP server
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
scan_packageScan a published package (npm, PyPI, crates, Docker, or Hugging Face) with AgentAvow.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Scan a published package (npm, PyPI, crates, Docker, or Hugging Face) with AgentAvow. Returns one of three answers with its reason (Safe to connect, Review before you connect, or Do not connect), a 0-100 trust score, an adoption score from real usage (downloads per week), findings with remediation, and a signed attestation. Also reports published advisories that affect the scanned version, the maintainer's deprecation notice, repo-vs-artifact drift (files shipped that aren't in the source), and AgentAvow's behavioral sandbox results when available. Scans the latest version unless `version` (or a pin in the name) names one. Read-only; calls agentavow.com.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Scan a package
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
scan_repoScan a public GitHub repository with AgentAvow and return whether it is safe for an agent to connect to: one of three answers with its reason (Safe to connect, Review before you co…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Scan a public GitHub repository with AgentAvow and return whether it is safe for an agent to connect to: one of three answers with its reason (Safe to connect, Review before you connect, or Do not connect), a 0-100 trust score, an adoption score from real usage (stars), the findings behind it (with where and how to fix), and a signed, offline-verifiable attestation. Read-only, no account. Calls the AgentAvow public API at agentavow.com.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Scan a GitHub repo
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
verify_trustVerify an AgentAvow entity's trust score.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify an AgentAvow entity's trust score. Returns trust_score (0-1), trust_score_pct (0-100), trust_tier, and whether it meets a minimum threshold. Read-only, no auth. Use before interacting with an unknown agent.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify an entity's trust score
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_trust_badgeGet an embeddable AgentAvow trust badge (SVG) for an entity, with ready-to-paste Markdown and HTML.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_trust_badge" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "html": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Get an embeddable AgentAvow trust badge (SVG) for an entity, with ready-to-paste Markdown and HTML. The badge auto-updates as the score changes. Read-only, no auth.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get a trust badge
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
lookup_identityLook up an AgentAvow entity by W3C DID or display name.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_identity" says "lookup": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up an AgentAvow entity by W3C DID or display name. Returns the entity's id, name, type, trust score and tier. Read-only, no auth. Use to resolve an identity before checking its trust.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Look up an agent or tool
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write7
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:33 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 6
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agentavow.com/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_repo (write), scan_package (write), scan_mcp_server (write), verify_trust (write), check_interaction_safety (write) and 1 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.6.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agentavow-trust https://agentavow.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agentavow-trust https://agentavow.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agentavow-trust__lookup_identity",
"mcp__agentavow-trust__get_trust_badge"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agentavow-trust__scan_repo",
"mcp__agentavow-trust__scan_package",
"mcp__agentavow-trust__scan_mcp_server",
"mcp__agentavow-trust__verify_trust",
"mcp__agentavow-trust__check_interaction_safety",
"mcp__agentavow-trust__about_agentavow"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentavow-trust. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 7 rules
- mcp__agentavow-trust__scan_repo untrusted-input
- mcp__agentavow-trust__scan_package untrusted-input
- mcp__agentavow-trust__scan_mcp_server untrusted-input
- mcp__agentavow-trust__verify_trust untrusted-input
- mcp__agentavow-trust__check_interaction_safety untrusted-input
- mcp__agentavow-trust__lookup_identity untrusted-input
- mcp__agentavow-trust__get_trust_badge untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.agentavow/agentavow-trust/verify?hash=608252237ad616cb918b4833494592d7ca5c4e9bbba2faa083508a4c087ae784" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 608252237ad6, from Nov 10, 2026, 21:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentavow/agentavow-trust/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentavow/agentavow-trust)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 21:17 UTC.
AgentAvow Trust MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AgentAvow Trust MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AgentAvow Trust MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AgentAvow Trust MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AgentAvow Trust MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 6 write, 2 read. scan_repo, scan_package, scan_mcp_server, verify_trust, check_interaction_safety, about_agentavow, lookup_identity and get_trust_badge.
Does the AgentAvow Trust MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AgentAvow Trust MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the AgentAvow Trust MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.