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AgentBookable MCP server

com.agentbookable/mcpagentbookable.comstreamable-httpv3.0.0Scanned

Find local services, check live availability, and book real appointments with consent.

9 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 3 change things and 5 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 9
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the AgentBookable MCP server can do

The AgentBookable MCP server is published by agentbookable.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 9 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: create_booking) and create or change data (3 tools: prepare_booking, create_mandate_for_draft and create_mandate). 5 tools only read.

9 tools bring in text other people can write (find_businesses, get_business, list_services and 6 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (prepare_booking).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 3.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

9 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • create_bookingCreate a REAL appointment.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_booking" says "create": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a REAL appointment. CONSEQUENCEFUL: only after the user has explicitly chosen a slot and authorized the booking in their own words. Flow: (1) check the service's bookingRequirements and collect any required customer details (e.g. phone); (2) create a mandate via the create_mandate tool with the user's exact instruction; (3) call this tool with the mandateRef. The mandate is single-use and expires in 15 minutes. On SLOT_NO_LONGER_AVAILABLE offer the returned alternatives — never rebook unilaterally.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • create_mandateLegacy: record the user's authorization WITHOUT a booking draft.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_mandate" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Legacy: record the user's authorization WITHOUT a booking draft. Prefer the draft flow: prepare_booking → show proposal → user agrees → create_mandate_for_draft → create_booking with draftId. The draft flow binds consent to the exact appointment the user saw.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • create_mandate_for_draftAfter the user explicitly agrees to the exact proposal in the draft (an affirmative reply such as 'yes, book it' — the user having already seen business, service, date and time), a…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_mandate_for_draft" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    After the user explicitly agrees to the exact proposal in the draft (an affirmative reply such as 'yes, book it' — the user having already seen business, service, date and time), assert consent here to get a single-use mandate bound to that draft. consentObtained must be true; this assertion is audited. If anything consequential changes (different time, service or business), prepare a NEW draft and get fresh consent.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • prepare_bookingPrepare a booking draft: the concrete proposal (business, service, time, customer) to show the user.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.customer.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare a booking draft: the concrete proposal (business, service, time, customer) to show the user. Validates live availability and customer requirements — if requirements are missing you get MISSING_CUSTOMER_REQUIREMENT: ask the user for those details first, then call again. Show the returned draft to the user as the final proposal (business, service, duration, date/time), then obtain explicit affirmative consent. The draft expires after 30 minutes; consent binds to this exact proposal.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • find_businessesSearch the AgentBookable registry for businesses that accept AI bookings.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_businesses" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the AgentBookable registry for businesses that accept AI bookings. Search by free text, category, city, service name or geo radius. ALWAYS start here — the results include capability flags and _links telling you the exact next endpoints.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • get_availabilityFind LIVE availability for a service.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_availability" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find LIVE availability for a service. Always call this immediately before create_booking — slots are temporary (~60s) and revalidated at booking. Pass an ISO-8601 window; use a slot id from the result when booking.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • get_bookingRetrieve a booking by its AgentBookable id (bb_bkg_*).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_booking" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve a booking by its AgentBookable id (bb_bkg_*). Requires the mandateRef issued for that booking (from create_booking / create_mandate). Provider identity is never returned.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • get_businessGet one business's record by id (ab_bus_*) or slug.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_business" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get one business's record by id (ab_bus_*) or slug. Includes capabilities (availability/booking/reschedule/cancellation/payment) — NEVER promise an action whose flag is false — plus _links to the service list, availability endpoint and booking flow, and per-service bookingRequirements (e.g. whether customer phone is required).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • list_servicesList the services a business has opened to AI booking.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_services" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the services a business has opened to AI booking. Each service has a durationMinutes and bookingRequirements telling you what customer details to collect (name/email/phone) BEFORE booking.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write9
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:33 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agentbookable.com/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including create_booking (destructive), prepare_booking (write), create_mandate_for_draft (write), create_mandate (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 4
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. Nov 6, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: no -> yes; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 4
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 3.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agentbookable https://agentbookable.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agentbookable https://agentbookable.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agentbookable__find_businesses",
      "mcp__agentbookable__get_business",
      "mcp__agentbookable__list_services",
      "mcp__agentbookable__get_availability",
      "mcp__agentbookable__get_booking"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agentbookable__prepare_booking",
      "mcp__agentbookable__create_mandate_for_draft",
      "mcp__agentbookable__create_mandate"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agentbookable__create_booking"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentbookable. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 9 rules
  • mcp__agentbookable__find_businesses untrusted-input
  • mcp__agentbookable__get_business untrusted-input
  • mcp__agentbookable__list_services untrusted-input
  • mcp__agentbookable__get_availability untrusted-input
  • mcp__agentbookable__create_booking untrusted-input
  • mcp__agentbookable__prepare_booking untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agentbookable__create_mandate_for_draft untrusted-input
  • mcp__agentbookable__get_booking untrusted-input
  • mcp__agentbookable__create_mandate untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.agentbookable/mcp/verify?hash=82fcad113da8fc3bf5e4ec12e777112a7a141b79fe7b3ac7a4e2ab7b22898cbe" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 82fcad113da8, from Nov 12, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentbookable/mcp/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.agentbookable/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.agentbookable/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentbookable/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:48 UTC.

AgentBookable MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AgentBookable MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AgentBookable MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: create_booking.

Can the AgentBookable MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AgentBookable MCP server have?

9 tools: 1 destructive, 3 write, 5 read. create_booking, prepare_booking, create_mandate_for_draft, create_mandate, find_businesses, get_business, list_services, get_availability and 1 more.

Does the AgentBookable MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AgentBookable MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): prepare_booking.

Has the AgentBookable MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.