Agentfonts MCP server
com.agentfonts/agentfontsagentfonts.comstreamable-httpv0.5.0Scanned
Find, price and license fonts from foundries; agents pay per licence in USDC via x402 on Base.
5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agentfonts MCP server can do
The Agentfonts MCP server is published by agentfonts.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: search_fonts, quote_license and buy_license), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (preview_font and buy_license).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 0.5.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
buy_licenseBuy a font licence.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Buy a font licence. Call without payment to get x402 payment requirements (USDC), then again with the signed payment. Spends money: confirm price and licensee with the user first.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Buy font licence
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
quote_licensePrice a licence (USD and USDC) and return machine-readable licence terms.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Price a licence (USD and USDC) and return machine-readable licence terms. Free, nothing is reserved.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
search_fontsSearch the font catalogue by style, tags, required glyphs and price.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_fonts" says "search": a word for reading.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.script), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "search_fonts" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true}; The name "search_fonts" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the font catalogue by style, tags, required glyphs and price. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_familyA font family: every style with its base price, bundle offers (whole family, variable fonts, collection) and the foundry's licence types with their dimensions and price tiers.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_family" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it A font family: every style with its base price, bundle offers (whole family, variable fonts, collection) and the foundry's licence types with their dimensions and price tiers. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
preview_fontDetails for one font: styles, scripts, metrics, missing glyphs for a sample text and a specimen URL.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "preview_font" says "preview": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Details for one font: styles, scripts, metrics, missing glyphs for a sample text and a specimen URL. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agentfonts.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including search_fonts (write), quote_license (write), buy_license (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnsearch_fonts
The server marks "search_fonts" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true}; The name "search_fonts" says "search": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.5.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agentfonts https://agentfonts.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agentfonts https://agentfonts.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agentfonts__preview_font",
"mcp__agentfonts__get_family"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agentfonts__search_fonts",
"mcp__agentfonts__quote_license",
"mcp__agentfonts__buy_license"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentfonts. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__agentfonts__preview_font untrusted-input
- mcp__agentfonts__buy_license untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.agentfonts/agentfonts/verify?hash=b81b1fb14af6b03eb11ef6bd710a3201781c399976f2e74b8d910c7fc2f8885d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b81b1fb14af6, from Nov 12, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentfonts/agentfonts/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentfonts/agentfonts)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 12, 2026, 21:17 UTC.
Agentfonts MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agentfonts MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agentfonts MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agentfonts MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Agentfonts MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. search_fonts, quote_license, buy_license, preview_font and get_family.
Does the Agentfonts MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agentfonts MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Agentfonts MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.