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AgentGrade MCP server

com.agentgrade/mcp-serveragentgrade.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Scan any website for AI agent readiness, payment protocols, and discovery endpoints

4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 3
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the AgentGrade MCP server can do

The AgentGrade MCP server is published by agentgrade.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: scan_url and scan_compact), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_history); 3 tools can send data out of your system (scan_url, scan_compact and get_history).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • scan_compactCompact scan returning only rails, capabilities, and a numeric score.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compact scan returning only rails, capabilities, and a numeric score. Optimized for agent decision-making.
  • scan_urlScan a URL for agent capabilities and payment protocols.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan a URL for agent capabilities and payment protocols. Returns full results including x402, MPP, L402, discovery, bazaar, MCP, plugins, OpenAPI, and more.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_historyGet scan history for a URL.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_history" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get scan history for a URL. Requires database to be configured.
  • validate_x402_jsonValidate x402.json content against expected schema.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate_x402_json" says "validate": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate x402.json content against expected schema. Returns errors, warnings, and suggestions. No network requests — pure validation.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:33 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agentgrade.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_url (write), scan_compact (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agentgrade https://agentgrade.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agentgrade https://agentgrade.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agentgrade__validate_x402_json"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agentgrade__scan_url",
      "mcp__agentgrade__scan_compact",
      "mcp__agentgrade__get_history"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentgrade. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__agentgrade__scan_url outbound
  • mcp__agentgrade__scan_compact outbound
  • mcp__agentgrade__get_history untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.agentgrade/mcp-server/verify?hash=8d860a31e7cb106a8e8045d5d30b777b2d6e9bafc8eb40217589358ce965639d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 8d860a31e7cb, from Nov 12, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentgrade/mcp-server/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.agentgrade/mcp-server
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.agentgrade/mcp-server.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentgrade/mcp-server)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:48 UTC.

AgentGrade MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AgentGrade MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AgentGrade MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the AgentGrade MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AgentGrade MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. scan_url, scan_compact, get_history and validate_x402_json.

Does the AgentGrade MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AgentGrade MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): scan_url, scan_compact and get_history.

Has the AgentGrade MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.