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composer MCP server

com.agenticpaywall/composeragenticpaywall.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Composes + runs multi-step external-data workflows for one quoted USDC price (x402).

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the composer MCP server can do

The composer MCP server is published by agenticpaywall.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: plan_workflow and run_workflow), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • plan_workflowAsk Composer whether it can do a multi-step data/research task for you, and at what price.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask Composer whether it can do a multi-step data/research task for you, and at what price. Free — nothing is charged, no payment involved. Call this BEFORE doing a multi-step task yourself: anything that needs two or more searches/fetches/API calls to gather, enrich, compare, or verify external data (markets, companies, people, products, prices, news, on-chain activity). Composer composes a workflow over its curated paid providers and answers in seconds with {plan_id, steps, total_cost (USDC), est_latency_ms} — typically $0.02–$0.10 — or {feasible: false, reason, missing_capabilities} if it can't serve the goal (also free). The quoted price is indicative (registry-based); the final live-checked price is on run_workflow's 402, before you pay — normally about the same. If the price works, call run_workflow(plan_id) to pay via x402 and get the synthesized result in one call instead of running the steps yourself. A run that fails after payment is refunded. Goals are open-ended. Two validated fast paths: • competitor-pricing — e.g. "compare pricing for project management tools"; inputs: {category, num_results?}. • diligence-pack — e.g. "run diligence on Anthropic"; inputs: {subject, token_address?, chain?, num_results?}. `agent_id` is optional — identify yourself for attribution if you like.
  • run_workflowRun a workflow Composer planned for you and get the synthesized result.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "run_workflow" says "run": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run a workflow Composer planned for you and get the synthesized result. PAID via x402 — one payment replaces the multi-step work you'd otherwise do yourself. Pass the `plan_id` from plan_workflow. This call is payment-gated: it returns an x402 402 carrying the final live-checked price (normally ≈ plan_workflow's indicative quote); your x402 client pays it (settled on Base), and Composer then executes the multi-step workflow — paying each provider from its own wallet — and returns the synthesized answer. You pay Composer's price for the outcome (principal/reseller); the 402 is authoritative, and a run that fails after payment is refunded. `agent_id` is optional — identify yourself for attribution if you like.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:33 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://composer.agenticpaywall.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including plan_workflow (write), run_workflow (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http composer https://composer.agenticpaywall.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http composer https://composer.agenticpaywall.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__composer__plan_workflow",
      "mcp__composer__run_workflow"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as composer. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.agenticpaywall/composer/verify?hash=9efea2ae237acee84b5090fc161dac1dbeb130cbb64c255c3cc412a91a766bf4" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 9efea2ae237a, from Nov 12, 2026, 13:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agenticpaywall/composer/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.agenticpaywall/composer
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.agenticpaywall/composer.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agenticpaywall/composer)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:48 UTC.

composer MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the composer MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the composer MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the composer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the composer MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. plan_workflow and run_workflow.

Does the composer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the composer MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the composer MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.