Agent Loopr MCP server
com.agentloopr/websiteagentloopr.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Agent Loopr's services, case studies and booking link, for AI agents helping founders.
5 tools: 1 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agent Loopr MCP server can do
The Agent Loopr MCP server is published by agentloopr.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: agentloopr_book_call), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (agentloopr_get_company and agentloopr_list_services); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (agentloopr_list_case_studies).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
agentloopr_book_callGet the link where a person books a free call with Agent Loopr, and what to have ready.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "agentloopr_book_call" says "call": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "agentloopr_book_call" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "agentloopr_book_call" says "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the link where a person books a free call with Agent Loopr, and what to have ready. It returns a link only: it never books, holds or changes a meeting. A person always picks the time themselves.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
agentloopr_get_companyReturn Agent Loopr identity, when-to-use guidance, contact, markets served and NAP so an agent can describe the studio accurately.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "agentloopr_get_company" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "contact": it reads contacts.
Description, as the server wrote it Return Agent Loopr identity, when-to-use guidance, contact, markets served and NAP so an agent can describe the studio accurately.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
agentloopr_get_pageFetch the markdown representation of a public Agent Loopr page.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "agentloopr_get_page" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch the markdown representation of a public Agent Loopr page. Pass a root-relative path such as /, /services/saas, /about, or /case-studies/blue-nelumbo.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
agentloopr_list_case_studiesList published Agent Loopr case studies with client name, service line, outcome numbers and URL.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "agentloopr_list_case_studies" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it List published Agent Loopr case studies with client name, service line, outcome numbers and URL.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
agentloopr_list_servicesList Agent Loopr's services with URLs: SaaS Products, Agentic Systems, Vibe Code Rescue, and Business Brain (a team assistant built on a company's own files, with an international …Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "agentloopr_list_services" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "file": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it List Agent Loopr's services with URLs: SaaS Products, Agentic Systems, Vibe Code Rescue, and Business Brain (a team assistant built on a company's own files, with an international and an India page).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.agentloopr.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including agentloopr_book_call (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "agentloopr_book_call" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "agentloopr_book_call" says "call": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http website https://www.agentloopr.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http website https://www.agentloopr.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__website__agentloopr_get_company",
"mcp__website__agentloopr_list_services",
"mcp__website__agentloopr_list_case_studies",
"mcp__website__agentloopr_get_page"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__website__agentloopr_book_call"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as website. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__website__agentloopr_get_company private-data
- mcp__website__agentloopr_list_services private-data
- mcp__website__agentloopr_list_case_studies untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.agentloopr/website/verify?hash=886d9a3cd3d84d7eefa17b3d6af0fa947d26ee7b85809ef821adce5fe1fca12a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 886d9a3cd3d8, from Nov 21, 2026, 08:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentloopr/website/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentloopr/website)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 08:17 UTC.
Agent Loopr MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agent Loopr MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agent Loopr MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agent Loopr MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Agent Loopr MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 1 write, 4 read. agentloopr_book_call, agentloopr_get_company, agentloopr_list_services, agentloopr_list_case_studies and agentloopr_get_page.
Does the Agent Loopr MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agent Loopr MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Agent Loopr MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.