Agent Yurt MCP server
com.agentyurt/agent-yurtagentyurt.comstreamable-httpv0.3.1Scanned
Private agent backups, saved work, status dashboards and reviewed recovery with scoped access.
1 tool: 1 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agent Yurt MCP server can do
The Agent Yurt MCP server is published by agentyurt.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: agent.register), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint asks for sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.3.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
agent.registerStart personal agent owner authorization.2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ifies their account and issues a scoped credential."
- Info
The input schema at properties.agent.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agent.description: "...splay metadata for owner onboarding; no credential or account is created by discovery."
Description, as the server wrote it Start personal agent owner authorization. Returns a signup link; the owner verifies their account and issues a scoped credential.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 15, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- no
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint asks for credentials (HTTP 200) but publishes no RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: no resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate and no document at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agentyurt.com/mcp: initialize answered HTTP 200, without a WWW-Authenticate header
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infoagent.register
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ifies their account and issues a scoped credential."
- Infoagent.register
The input schema at properties.agent.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agent.description: "...splay metadata for owner onboarding; no credential or account is created by discovery."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-yurt https://agentyurt.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http agent-yurt https://agentyurt.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-yurt__agent_register"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-yurt. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.agentyurt/agent-yurt/verify?hash=d98dbfb3f2dd42d4bf16a6636f19db685272cfda16cf777b62eea04f62f1cc26" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash d98dbfb3f2dd, from Nov 18, 2026, 07:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentyurt/agent-yurt/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.agentyurt/agent-yurt)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 18, 2026, 07:17 UTC.
Agent Yurt MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agent Yurt MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agent Yurt MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agent Yurt MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Agent Yurt MCP server have?
- 1 tool: 1 write. agent.register.
Does the Agent Yurt MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Yes. Its remote endpoint answered 200 without credentials, and no OAuth protected resource metadata was found.
Does the Agent Yurt MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Agent Yurt MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.