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ai·rete·rag MCP server

com.ai-rete-rag/ai-rete-rag-mcpai-rete-rag.comstreamable-httpv0.12.1Scanned

Author rules from policy docs, then decide: a Rete engine gives the verdict, an LLM explains why.

10 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 3 change things and 5 only read.

Tools: 2 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ai·rete·rag MCP server can do

The ai·rete·rag MCP server is published by ai-rete-rag.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: delete_domain and put_rules) and create or change data (3 tools: decide, ingest_text and import_policy_rules). 5 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (list_documents).

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (long-description and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 0.12.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
  • delete_domainPermanently delete your own copy of a domain: its rule set and every ingested document.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete_domain" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The description says "Permanently delete".
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Permanently delete your own copy of a domain: its rule set and every ingested document. This frees its slot in your plan's domain limit. Decision audit records are kept for the audit trail. A domain created later under the same name starts empty, with a fresh history. The shared demo domains are never affected: deleting `loan` removes only your own copy of it. Args: domain: The domain to delete. confirm: Must repeat the domain name exactly; any other value is refused.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • put_rulesCreate or replace a domain's rule set from YAML (self-serve rule authoring).1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "put_rules" says "put": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 2,712 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...aml: The full rule set as YAML text. dry_run: Validate only, without saving."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create or replace a domain's rule set from YAML (self-serve rule authoring). The first save to a new domain claims it for your account (plan limits apply). Saving to a built-in demo domain saves your own copy of it, seeded from the demo; the shared demo others see is unchanged. Rules are validated before saving — set dry_run=true to validate without persisting. The response reports ok/errors, the parsed rules, and any overlap warnings. YAML format — a list of rules. Flat form (conditions are AND-ed): - name: "Approve" salience: 10 conditions: - type: loan field: credit_score op: ">=" value: 700 action: verdict: "APPROVED" reason: "Credit score meets threshold" Tree form — `when:` holds nested all/any/not condition groups, and an action may assert derived facts that other rules consume (forward chaining; the rule graph derives from these automatically): - name: "Sepsis Screen" salience: 30 when: all: - {type: clinical, field: temperature_f, op: ">=", value: 101.5} - any: - {type: clinical, field: wbc_count, op: ">", value: 12.0} - {type: clinical, field: bands_pct, op: ">", value: 10} action: verdict: "URGENT_ALERT" assert: - {type: sepsis_flag, fields: {severity: high}} - name: "Escalate" salience: 40 when: all: - {type: sepsis_flag, field: severity, op: "==", value: high} - {type: clinical, field: age, op: ">=", value: 65} action: verdict: "ADMIT_ICU" Use either `conditions:` or `when:` per rule, never both. `not` passes when the inner condition does not hold (including when the field is absent). Produce/consume cycles between rules are rejected at validation. An action may also carry `retrieval_scope: { <key>: <value> }` to narrow which documents retrieval searches (Pattern 01). A rule may also carry `citation:` — the policy sentence it encodes. It is stored with the rule and shown beside it in decision audits, so a verdict can be defended with the source language, not just the rule name: - name: "Decline Late Returns" salience: 20 citation: "Returns are accepted within 30 days of delivery." when: all: - {type: retail, field: days_since_delivery, op: ">", value: 30} action: verdict: "DENIED" A rule saved without its `citation` has no link from its decisions back to the policy clause that justifies it. Args: domain: Domain to author (an owned domain, or a new name to claim). rules_yaml: The full rule set as YAML text. dry_run: Validate only, without saving.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • decideMake a deterministic, auditable decision in a domain.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 2,615 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...verdict is provisional; when it is empty, more facts cannot change the verdict."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Make a deterministic, auditable decision in a domain. The verdict comes from the domain's rule set (Rete engine, never the LLM), so it is reproducible and compliant. The explanation is generated from the domain's ingested policy documents. Without an API key only the shared demo domains are available, and the response carries `next_step`: how to get a free key for your own rules. Args: domain: Rule-set domain, e.g. "loan", "fraud", "clinical". query: Natural-language question or decision request. facts: Structured facts for working memory, e.g. {"credit_score": 710, "annual_income": 85000}, keyed by the field names the domain's rules test. Facts read from photos, document scans, voice notes or video belong here too; explicit facts always win over anything extracted server-side. fact_sources: Where each fact in `facts` came from, e.g. {"monthly_income": "payslip.jpg", "claim_usd": "voice note 1"}. Stored in the decision's audit record so a reviewer can tell typed facts from ones read off evidence. Facts without a source are recorded as "request". as_of: Read the domain's policy documents as of this day, as YYYY-MM-DD (default: today), so a case can be decided under the policy in force on the day it was filed; the rules themselves are always the current ones. unstructured_text: Optional free text (an application, a case note, a voice-note transcript, what a photo or video shows); facts are extracted from it automatically and merged. response_mode: "verdict_only" (fastest), "verdict_with_explanation", or "full_audit" (every rule evaluation + retrieved chunks, available on every plan including the free tier). rule_firings come back in causal order: a rule that matched a fact asserted by an earlier firing appears after it, with the derived facts listed under `asserted_facts`. filter_retrieval_with_rules: Pattern 01 — run the rules first and let a fired rule's `retrieval_scope` action narrow which documents the retrieval searches before it runs. extract_from_retrieval: Pattern 02 — parse the retrieved documents into facts and assert them into working memory, so rules fire on what was actually read (not just the facts you passed). The result's `missing_parameters` lists rule inputs that were not supplied but could still change the verdict, most decisive first. When it is non-empty the verdict is provisional; when it is empty, more facts cannot change the verdict.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • import_policy_rulesConvert a written policy document into DRAFT decision rules (LLM-assisted).1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "import_policy_rules" says "import": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "import_policy_rules" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "import_policy_rules" says "import": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Convert a written policy document into DRAFT decision rules (LLM-assisted). Returns validated draft rules (when/action, including chained asserts where the policy stages its determinations), derived rule→rule edges, and overlap warnings. Each returned rule carries a `citation` field holding the policy sentence it encodes (also summarized in the top-level `citations` map). Coverage runs the other way too: `uncovered_sentences` lists policy sentences no rule's citation points back to (out of `policy_sentence_count`), and `unverified_citations` names rules whose quote is missing or not found verbatim in the policy. An uncovered sentence may need a rule; an unverified one may be a paraphrase that misstates the policy. `background_sentences` is the subset of uncovered sentences with no obligation language (definitions, preamble), split by a keyword heuristic. Nothing is saved: the drafts are returned for review only. Args: domain: Domain the rules are drafted for (an owned domain or a new name). policy_text: The policy document text (max ~50k characters).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • ingest_textAdd policy/reference text to a domain's knowledge base.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "add": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Add policy/reference text to a domain's knowledge base. The text is chunked and embedded; explanations for future decisions in this domain will cite it. Creating a new domain claims it for your account (plan limits apply). Ingesting into a built-in demo domain gives your account its own copy of that demo (it counts as one of your domains); the shared demo others see is unchanged. On team plans, only the domain admin (the member who created the domain, or the subscription owner) can add documents. Documents can be dated. A decision only cites documents in force on its date, so a replaced policy is never quoted for a new decision. To publish a new version, ingest it under a new `source` with `supersedes` naming the old one: the old document stops applying on the new one's `effective_from` (today if not given), and the new one starts that day. A document can be superseded only once; to replace a successor, supersede the successor. Args: domain: Domain to ingest into (existing or new). text: The policy or reference text. source: Optional source name shown in the document list. effective_from: First day this document applies, as YYYY-MM-DD (default: always). effective_until: First day it no longer applies, as YYYY-MM-DD (default: no end). supersedes: Source name of the document this one replaces.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • get_parametersList the input parameters a domain's rules decide on — the facts a decision in that domain uses.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_parameters" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the input parameters a domain's rules decide on — the facts a decision in that domain uses. Derived from your account's own copy of the rules, so it covers your custom domains too. Each parameter has its `field` name (the key to use in `facts`), `kind` (number / boolean / string), the `tests` rules make on it (e.g. >= 720 — match these units and scales), the `rules` and `verdicts` it can lead to, and `max_salience`. Parameters come most decisive first: those feeding the highest-salience rules, which win when several rules fire. Also returns every verdict the domain can reach.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • get_rule_sourceFetch a domain's complete rule set as editable YAML, plus whether you may edit it.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_rule_source" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a domain's complete rule set as editable YAML, plus whether you may edit it. The whole YAML file is returned as one fenced block; show it to the user in full, never just its first lines. For a built-in demo domain you get your own copy's rules once you have edited it, otherwise the shared demo's.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • get_usageShow this account's decision usage, plan, and remaining monthly quota.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_usage" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show this account's decision usage, plan, and remaining monthly quota.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • list_documentsList the documents ingested into a domain's knowledge base.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_documents" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "list_documents" says "list" and "document": it reads documents.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "document": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the documents ingested into a domain's knowledge base.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • list_rulesList the decision rules for one domain (or all domains).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_rules" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the decision rules for one domain (or all domains). Returns each rule's conditions — either a flat AND list (field / operator / value) or a `when` condition tree (nested all/any/not) — plus its verdict, salience, and any asserted facts (`action.assert`, the facts a rule produces for other rules to consume). `edges` lists the derived rule→rule dependencies: src asserts a fact type that dst's conditions test (forward chaining). Each rule may also carry `citation` — the policy sentence it encodes — which is what lets a decision be traced back to the source clause. Also includes overlap warnings and, through the conditions, the fact fields the domain's rules test.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:33 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (2 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://ai-rete-rag.com/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_domain (destructive), put_rules (destructive), decide (write), ingest_text (write), import_policy_rules (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 5

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn2 info
  • The server marks "import_policy_rules" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "import_policy_rules" says "import": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • Infodecide

    The description is 2,615 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...verdict is provisional; when it is empty, more facts cannot change the verdict."

    What this check looks for
  • The description is 2,712 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...aml: The full rule set as YAML text. dry_run: Validate only, without saving."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 5.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 5
  2. Tools1 added, 9 changed.+1 added~9 changedView diff
  3. Tools6 changed.~6 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.12.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http ai-rete-rag https://ai-rete-rag.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http ai-rete-rag https://ai-rete-rag.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__ai-rete-rag__list_rules",
      "mcp__ai-rete-rag__get_parameters",
      "mcp__ai-rete-rag__list_documents",
      "mcp__ai-rete-rag__get_rule_source",
      "mcp__ai-rete-rag__get_usage"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__ai-rete-rag__decide",
      "mcp__ai-rete-rag__ingest_text",
      "mcp__ai-rete-rag__import_policy_rules"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__ai-rete-rag__delete_domain",
      "mcp__ai-rete-rag__put_rules"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ai-rete-rag. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__ai-rete-rag__list_documents private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.ai-rete-rag/ai-rete-rag-mcp/verify?hash=fad833f2905a7b14fe88eb15b0de6d4334b47dc6f1fc22144616341cfbe4fe71" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash fad833f2905a, from Nov 21, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ai-rete-rag/ai-rete-rag-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.ai-rete-rag/ai-rete-rag-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.ai-rete-rag/ai-rete-rag-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ai-rete-rag/ai-rete-rag-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

ai·rete·rag MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ai·rete·rag MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ai·rete·rag MCP server delete data?

Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_domain and put_rules.

Can the ai·rete·rag MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ai·rete·rag MCP server have?

10 tools: 2 destructive, 3 write, 5 read. delete_domain, put_rules, decide, ingest_text, import_policy_rules, list_rules, get_parameters, list_documents and 2 more.

Does the ai·rete·rag MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ai·rete·rag MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the ai·rete·rag MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.