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alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server

com.alalanet/guardalalanet.comstreamable-httpv1.5.5Scanned

Check packages, repositories, skills and MCP servers before agents install or connect. Signed.

7 tools: 6 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 6 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 5 findings, 2 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

6 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server can do

The alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server is published by alalanet.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: check_artifact, check_repo_config, check_service, connect_check and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (check_repo_config, check_service, connect_check and 2 more); 3 tools can send data out of your system (check_service, connect_check and verify_tools).

The fixed checks matched 5 findings, 2 of them high severity (sensitive-path, credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.5.5.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • check_artifactBefore installing a skill, MCP server or package: give the sha256 of the exact file.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before installing a skill, MCP server or package: give the sha256 of the exact file. Read-only and free. Returns who signed a release with this hash, their standing, and conflicts (the same name@version signed with another hash = possible tampering). Advice: unknown_hash, signed_by_new_publisher, signed_by_established, signed_by_alalanet, caution_conflicting.

    Annotations the server declares

    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Who signed this skill / MCP package?
  • check_repo_configBefore opening a GitHub repository you were sent (a take-home task, a review, a demo, a fork): its agent configuration can start MCP servers, run hooks and tasks, widen permissions…Reads text others write3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to ".env".

      Matched text

      description: "...and Copilot settings, hooks and tasks; .env; package-registry settings; CLAUDE.md,..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...lugin marketplaces and enabled plugins, credential helpers and shell prefixes, repository..."

      What this check looks for
    • High

      The input schema at properties.files.description refers to ".env".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.files.description: "...rvers are looked up, never probed; from .env only CODEX_HOME, model-API, proxy and p..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before opening a GitHub repository you were sent (a take-home task, a review, a demo, a fork): its agent configuration can start MCP servers, run hooks and tasks, widen permissions and plant instructions once opened. Pass repo (owner/repo or a GitHub URL) and optional ref, or files for a local or private checkout. alalanet reads, never runs, what agents and editors load: MCP configs at any depth; Claude, Cursor, VS Code, devcontainer, Gemini, Zed, Codex and Copilot settings, hooks and tasks; .env; package-registry settings; CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursorrules and the rules, agents, commands and skills folders (every path: https://alalanet.com/skill.md). It finds code that runs when the folder opens (tasks, hooks, skills, MCP servers, inline too), broad permissions (also a skill's own grants, acceptEdits), plugin marketplaces and enabled plugins, credential helpers and shell prefixes, repository MCP servers enabled unasked, the model API, a proxy, the package registry or CODEX_HOME pointed elsewhere, invisible Unicode and bidi controls, injection and concealment phrases, committed secrets (never echoed); each MCP server and hook package goes through install_check. Returns allow / hold / block with reasons per file, findings and the MCP servers' verdicts, signed and logged (kind 4315). What could not be read or checked holds (check_incomplete:<what>). Free, no account: one check plus one per MCP server and per distinct hook package (at most 8 each); cached 10 minutes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Is it safe to open this repository in an agent?
  • check_serviceCall before connecting to a remote MCP server, and whenever a call to it fails.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_service" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call before connecting to a remote MCP server, and whenever a call to it fails. Give url (any https URL of an MCP server; unknown ones are probed now) or id from an earlier answer. Returns alive, advice (ok / ok_requires_auth: working; unverified_yet: not fully checked yet; caution_tools_changed, caution_suspicious_tool_description: confirm with the user first; avoid_down, avoid_not_working_as_listed: do not connect), trust_score (0-100, open formula at https://alalanet.com/trust) with flags, checked_at, last_alive_at, uptime 24h/7d/30d, the tool-set diff (tools_diff, tools_changed_at), tool descriptions that look like hidden instructions (tool_description_flags), the digest of its initialize instructions, and on caution_* or avoid_* up to 3 working MCP servers on other hosts. Answers from recent checks (100 a day free); live=true probes now and adds a signed, logged attestation (5 a day free). Read-only for the caller; an unknown URL joins the public catalogue.

    Annotations the server declares

    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Check an MCP server before connecting
  • connect_checkBefore adding a remote MCP server to a client, or when it fails to connect: give its url.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before adding a remote MCP server to a client, or when it fails to connect: give its url. One live read (initialize with protocols 2025-06-18 and 2025-11-25, tools/list, the 401 and OAuth metadata, the host's IPv4) and per client (claude_code, claude_ai, chatgpt, codex_cli, cursor, vscode, windsurf, gemini_cli, zed, cline) ok, warn or fail with reasons, plus the tool list's weight in tokens. Rules from each client's documentation and source code as of 2026-11-08: a prediction, not a test inside the client. One of your daily live checks; cached 10 minutes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Will this MCP server connect from my client?
  • install_checkChecks something before it is installed, e.g.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "install_check" says "install": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "install_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "install_check" says "install": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks something before it is installed, e.g. when a README, a document or another agent suggests it: an npm or PyPI package, a Go module, an install command, a GitHub repository or skill, a ClawHub skill, a VS Code Marketplace or Open VSX extension, or an MCP config entry (forms: see target). alalanet checks public sources: OSV malicious-package and vulnerability records, names that imitate official MCP servers (typosquats, also across ecosystems), packages that do not exist (invented names), brand-new packages and repos, install scripts, maintainer changes between versions, provenance, the Go module proxy and checksum database (retracted, deprecated, checksums that disagree), ClawHub scan verdicts and copied skill names, skills.sh audits, extensions Microsoft removed (malware, impersonation), look-alike extensions and unverified Open VSX copies of verified Marketplace ones; remote MCP servers get the full check_service. Returns allow / hold / block with reasons (known_malicious, name_like_official, not_on_npm, not_on_pypi, not_on_go_proxy, version_retracted, runs_install_script, maintainers_changed, new_package, new_repo, known_vulnerabilities, version_yanked, not_on_clawhub, slug_like_popular, skills_sh_audit_fail, provenance_dropped, removed_from_marketplace, name_like_popular, launch_not_readable ...), facts and advice, signed into the public log (kind 4310); unsigned line facts in info (requirements_file_not_read, sourced_file_not_read). A line alalanet cannot read (custom registry, git/URL source, stdin or $(...) arguments, several packages, other commands) holds. allow means no known problem was found, not that the code was read. Free, no account.

    Annotations the server declares

    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Is it safe to install this package, repo, skill or MCP server?
  • verify_toolsChecks the tools you received from a remote MCP server against alalanet's history of it: changed after you approved them, or different from what it serves everyone?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks the tools you received from a remote MCP server against alalanet's history of it: changed after you approved them, or different from what it serves everyone? Pass url and the tools array of your tools/list result (or a digest from an earlier answer). Read-only and free. If your set differs from alalanet's last read, alalanet reads the server again first (fetched_now; one of your daily live checks). Returns verdict matches_current (what it serves now), served_before (an older set; first_seen, last_seen), never_served (review before trusting it) or no_history, the diff from the current set (added, removed, changed, gained_authority), description flags in what you sent, and the digest history linked to the signed log entries of each change. Names and descriptions are third-party text.

    Annotations the server declares

    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Are these the tools this MCP server really serves?
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_attestationProof of something alalanet stated (an install verdict, a server check, a tool-set change): pass its event id (64 hex) from an earlier result.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_attestation" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Proof of something alalanet stated (an install verdict, a server check, a tool-set change): pass its event id (64 hex) from an earlier result. Read-only and free. Returns the signed Nostr event (event_json, the exact signed bytes), the signer key, its RFC 6962 inclusion proof under a signed C2SP checkpoint, and how_to_verify: check the signature, the proof up to root_hash and the checkpoint signature with log_key, offline, without trusting alalanet.

    Annotations the server declares

    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Get a signed receipt with its log proof

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 15, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including check_artifact (write), check_repo_config (write), check_service (write), connect_check (write), install_check (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 high2 warn1 info
  • The description refers to ".env".

    Matched text

    description: "...and Copilot settings, hooks and tasks; .env; package-registry settings; CLAUDE.md,..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.files.description refers to ".env".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.files.description: "...rvers are looked up, never probed; from .env only CODEX_HOME, model-API, proxy and p..."

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "check_service" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "install_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "install_check" says "install": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...lugin marketplaces and enabled plugins, credential helpers and shell prefixes, repository..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools6 changed.~6 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.5.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http guard https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard
claude mcp add --transport http guard https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__guard__get_attestation"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__guard__check_artifact",
      "mcp__guard__check_repo_config",
      "mcp__guard__check_service",
      "mcp__guard__connect_check",
      "mcp__guard__install_check",
      "mcp__guard__verify_tools"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as guard. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__guard__check_repo_config untrusted-input
  • mcp__guard__check_service untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__guard__connect_check untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__guard__install_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__guard__verify_tools untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.alalanet/guard/verify?hash=640bfe3d46ad92207c3389f4a1b0c2a8c1fa12c46cd4e916f7618669207b5483" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 640bfe3d46ad, from Nov 20, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.alalanet/guard/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.alalanet/guard
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.alalanet/guard.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.alalanet/guard)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings (2 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server have?

7 tools: 6 write, 1 read. check_artifact, check_repo_config, check_service, connect_check, install_check, verify_tools and get_attestation.

Does the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_service, connect_check and verify_tools.

Has the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.