AllVisas MCP server
com.allvisas/visasallvisas.comstreamable-httpv1.61.1Scanned
Every visa in the world, each statement quoted from the official government source.
5 tools: 1 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AllVisas MCP server can do
The AllVisas MCP server is published by allvisas.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_visa), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (search_visas, check_visa, list_countries and 2 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (get_route).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.61.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_visaFor a short visit (tourism or business): what a passport needs to enter a destination — no visa, an electronic travel authorisation (ETA), an eVisa, a visa on arrival or a visa — r…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it For a short visit (tourism or business): what a passport needs to enter a destination — no visa, an electronic travel authorisation (ETA), an eVisa, a visa on arrival or a visa — read from the destination's own official list, with the verbatim sentence, the official URL and the date it was read. Says plainly when we have not read the destination's list, or when the list does not name the passport.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
get_countryAll visa and residence routes of one country (by name, ISO code or slug), each with its category, summary, review status and page URL.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_country" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it All visa and residence routes of one country (by name, ISO code or slug), each with its category, summary, review status and page URL.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
get_routeOne visa route by its AllVisas page URL or path: requirements, fees, rights and risks, each with the official source URL, the verbatim quote it rests on or the legal provision, and…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_route" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it One visa route by its AllVisas page URL or path: requirements, fees, rights and risks, each with the official source URL, the verbatim quote it rests on or the legal provision, and when the source was read or the statement reviewed.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
list_countriesEvery country published on AllVisas, with its code and page URL.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_countries" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Every country published on AllVisas, with its code and page URL.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
search_visasSearch every country and visa route on AllVisas by name, other-language name, summary or country.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_visas" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search every country and visa route on AllVisas by name, other-language name, summary or country. Returns countries and routes with their page URLs and the current review status of each route.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://allvisas.com/api/mcp/: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including check_visa (write), check_address (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.61.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http visas https://allvisas.com/api/mcp/claude mcp add --transport http visas https://allvisas.com/api/mcp/Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__visas__search_visas",
"mcp__visas__list_countries",
"mcp__visas__get_country"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__visas__check_visa",
"mcp__visas__get_route"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as visas. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__visas__search_visas untrusted-input
- mcp__visas__check_visa untrusted-input
- mcp__visas__list_countries untrusted-input
- mcp__visas__get_country untrusted-input
- mcp__visas__get_route untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.allvisas/visas/verify?hash=7c13e0fdaf01f543278eae132bd97422f4b220fb14d791b5cab7d4b992813e13" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 7c13e0fdaf01, from Nov 20, 2026, 12:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.allvisas/visas/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.allvisas/visas)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 12:17 UTC.
AllVisas MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AllVisas MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AllVisas MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AllVisas MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AllVisas MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 1 write, 4 read. check_visa, search_visas, list_countries, get_country and get_route.
Does the AllVisas MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AllVisas MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_route.
Has the AllVisas MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.