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AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server

com.amplerun/gpu-rentalsamplerun.comstreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned

Find, price, rent and stop GPUs on AmpleRun. Paid in USDC or USDT on Base. Flat 5% fee.

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server can do

The AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server is published by amplerun.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: get_agent_account_challenge and register_agent_account), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_agent_account_challenge and register_agent_account).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 0.1.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • get_agent_account_challengeStep 1 of 2.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent_account_challenge" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "get_agent_account_challenge" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_agent_account_challenge" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 1 of 2. Returns an EIP-4361 (Sign-In with Ethereum) message for a wallet address this agent controls, valid five minutes, single use. Signing it accepts the AmpleRun Terms version it names. Sign the message exactly as returned with personal_sign (EIP-191), then call register_agent_account with message and signature. Never send a private key to any tool.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • register_agent_accountStep 2 of 2.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 2 of 2. Opens an AmpleRun account for this AI agent, tagged as agent-created, with its wallet as the verified payout wallet, and returns an API key (shown once; keep it secret). The same wallet again returns the same account and a new key. There is no free credit: renting needs a deposit first. Pass message and signature from get_agent_account_challenge. scopes defaults to ["renter","host"].

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:34 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://amplerun.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including get_agent_account_challenge (write), register_agent_account (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 503 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 2
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. Nov 6, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 503
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "get_agent_account_challenge" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_agent_account_challenge" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 503 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 2 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 503 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 2
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 503; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 503
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http gpu-rentals https://amplerun.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http gpu-rentals https://amplerun.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__gpu-rentals__get_agent_account_challenge",
      "mcp__gpu-rentals__register_agent_account"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as gpu-rentals. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__gpu-rentals__get_agent_account_challenge untrusted-input
  • mcp__gpu-rentals__register_agent_account untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.amplerun/gpu-rentals/verify?hash=a998fd94381329ae4cb1a08717febdc539c12c259e67dda2b6a2952e17cccb05" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash a998fd943813, from Nov 12, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.amplerun/gpu-rentals/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.amplerun/gpu-rentals
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.amplerun/gpu-rentals.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.amplerun/gpu-rentals)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:49 UTC.

AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. get_agent_account_challenge and register_agent_account.

Does the AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the AmpleRun GPU rentals MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.