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ContractLens MCP server

com.appin60.contractlens-api/contractlenscontractlens-api.appin60.comstreamable-httpv1.3.0Scanned

EVM token risk checks, x402 payability check for sellers, address classifier and live gas.

5 tools: 5 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

5 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ContractLens MCP server can do

The ContractLens MCP server is published by contractlens-api.appin60.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: scan_contract, check_token, gas_now, address_info and 1 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool can send data out of your system (check_x402_payability).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.3.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • address_infoWhat is this address?No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What is this address? EOA, EIP-7702 delegated EOA, Safe multisig (threshold, owners), timelock, ERC-20 token, proxy or contract, with native balance. Use before sending funds to or trusting an address.
  • check_tokenFast (1-3 s) risk verdict for an ERC-20 token before buying it: LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH with reasons.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fast (1-3 s) risk verdict for an ERC-20 token before buying it: LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH with reasons. Who controls it (renounced, single key, Safe multisig, timelock), upgradeable proxy, admin powers in the bytecode (mint, blacklist, pause, adjustable tax, trading switch), source verification, DEX liquidity and pair age. Chains: 1 Ethereum, 8453 Base, 42161 Arbitrum, 10 Optimism, 137 Polygon, 56 BNB.
  • check_x402_payabilityFor x402 sellers: can a real buyer actually pay this endpoint?Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For x402 sellers: can a real buyer actually pay this endpoint? Sends one payment signed by a fresh unfunded key through the endpoint's server and facilitator. Payable endpoints fail only on balance; anything else is reported with the exact reason (schema, description over 500 chars, EIP-712 domain, price over the $1 default client cap, paywall not enforcing).
  • gas_nowLive EIP-1559 gas for a chain: base fee, slow/standard/fast tips, maxFeePerGas values and the cost of common actions.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Live EIP-1559 gas for a chain: base fee, slow/standard/fast tips, maxFeePerGas values and the cost of common actions. Chains: 1, 8453, 42161, 10, 137, 56.
  • scan_contractSecurity scan of a verified EVM smart contract: who controls it now (owner / proxy admin: renounced, single-key EOA or Safe multisig), every owner/role-gated function (mint, pause,…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Security scan of a verified EVM smart contract: who controls it now (owner / proxy admin: renounced, single-key EOA or Safe multisig), every owner/role-gated function (mint, pause, blacklist, upgrade, fees), proxy status, and Slither static-analysis findings ranked by impact. Use before approving, depositing into or buying a token. Chains: 1 Ethereum, 8453 Base, 42161 Arbitrum, 10 Optimism, 137 Polygon, 56 BNB.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:34 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://contractlens-api.appin60.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_contract (write), check_token (write), gas_now (write), address_info (write), check_x402_payability (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http contractlens https://contractlens-api.appin60.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http contractlens https://contractlens-api.appin60.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__contractlens__scan_contract",
      "mcp__contractlens__check_token",
      "mcp__contractlens__gas_now",
      "mcp__contractlens__address_info",
      "mcp__contractlens__check_x402_payability"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as contractlens. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__contractlens__check_x402_payability outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.appin60.contractlens-api/contractlens/verify?hash=3fd91fd026abc18a321452a13d5e61744d6bcc588fa6205ad6e085264fe82456" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 3fd91fd026ab, from Nov 12, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.appin60.contractlens-api/contractlens/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.appin60.contractlens-api/contractlens
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.appin60.contractlens-api/contractlens.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.appin60.contractlens-api/contractlens)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:51 UTC.

ContractLens MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ContractLens MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ContractLens MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ContractLens MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ContractLens MCP server have?

5 tools: 5 write. scan_contract, check_token, gas_now, address_info and check_x402_payability.

Does the ContractLens MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ContractLens MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_x402_payability.

Has the ContractLens MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.