docs.applivery.com MCP server
com.applivery.docs/mcpdocs.applivery.comstreamable-httpv2.4.0Scanned
Search and read the public Applivery docs (MDM & app distribution). Read-only, no auth.
4 tools: 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 3
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the docs.applivery.com MCP server can do
The docs.applivery.com MCP server is published by docs.applivery.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
3 tools read private data (search_docs, get_doc_page and list_doc_sections); 4 tools bring in text other people can write (search_docs, get_doc_page, get_api_endpoint and 1 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (get_doc_page and get_api_endpoint). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 2.4.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
get_api_endpointGet the machine-readable OpenAPI definition of one Applivery REST API endpoint: method, path, baseUrl, security, parameters, requestBody and responses — fully dereferenced, no $ref…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_api_endpoint" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the machine-readable OpenAPI definition of one Applivery REST API endpoint: method, path, baseUrl, security, parameters, requestBody and responses — fully dereferenced, no $refs. Pass the `url` or `slug` of an API reference page; find those with search_docs using docType 'api'. Use this instead of get_doc_page when you need to construct or validate an actual API request.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
get_doc_pageFetch the full Markdown content of a documentation page.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_doc_page" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "get_doc_page" says "get" and "doc": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch the full Markdown content of a documentation page. Pass either `url` (typically a URL returned by search_docs) or `slug` plus `locale`. Returns clean Markdown; very long pages are truncated at `maxChars` with a note.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
list_doc_sectionsList the top-level documentation sections and landing pages from the site's curated index (llms.txt).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_doc_sections" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "list_doc_sections" says "list" and "doc": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List the top-level documentation sections and landing pages from the site's curated index (llms.txt). Use for orientation, then drill in with search_docs or get_doc_page.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
search_docsSearch the Applivery documentation by keyword or phrase.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_docs" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "search_docs" says "search" and "doc": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the Applivery documentation by keyword or phrase. Returns matching pages with title, canonical URL, a highlighted snippet, docType ('guides' or 'api'), platform, breadcrumb and in-page headings. Use this first to discover pages, then read one with get_doc_page. For non-developer questions prefer docType 'guides'.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
24 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 2 outbound tools breaks every one.
- Reads private data3
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__docs__get_api_endpoint",
"mcp__docs__get_doc_page"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:34 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 2.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http docs https://docs.applivery.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http docs https://docs.applivery.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__docs__search_docs",
"mcp__docs__list_doc_sections"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__docs__get_doc_page",
"mcp__docs__get_api_endpoint"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as docs. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__docs__search_docs private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__docs__get_doc_page private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__docs__get_api_endpoint untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__docs__list_doc_sections private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.applivery.docs/mcp/verify?hash=5a9de937d7592446d0195dd3a755ad33d194f9ce1c0e93320d1f03f77b887824" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5a9de937d759, from Nov 10, 2026, 11:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.applivery.docs/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.applivery.docs/mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:51 UTC.
docs.applivery.com MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the docs.applivery.com MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the docs.applivery.com MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the docs.applivery.com MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the docs.applivery.com MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 read. search_docs, get_doc_page, get_api_endpoint and list_doc_sections.
Does the docs.applivery.com MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the docs.applivery.com MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_doc_page and get_api_endpoint.
Has the docs.applivery.com MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.