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Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server

com.askresident/residentaskresident.comstreamable-httpv0.5.0Scanned

Larchmont Village Oral Surgery (Los Angeles): practice info, services and staff follow-up requests.

7 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 5 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
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What the Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server can do

The Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server is published by askresident.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: send_appointment_request) and create or change data (1 tool: prepare_appointment_request). 5 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (fetch); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (fetch and send_appointment_request); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_appointment_request). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.5.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • send_appointment_requestSends a prepared LVOS staff-follow-up request.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_appointment_request" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "send_appointment_request" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sends a prepared LVOS staff-follow-up request. Requires the unchanged details from prepare_appointment_request, its idempotency_key and confirmation_token, and authorization_confirmed true reflecting the user's explicit permission. Saves an encrypted copy (deleted after 30 days) and emails LVOS staff, who contact the patient. Repeating with the same key returns the original receipt. Does not book, reserve or confirm an appointment.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • prepare_appointment_requestUse this when a user wants LVOS staff to contact them to arrange a consultation.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "prepare_appointment_request" says "request": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "prepare_appointment_request" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "prepare_appointment_request" says "request": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when a user wants LVOS staff to contact them to arrange a consultation. Validates the patient's first and last name, one contact method (phone or email), consultation type and an optional scheduling preference, and returns the normalized details, a disclosure of how they will be stored and emailed, an idempotency_key and a 15-minute confirmation_token. Stores nothing and sends nothing. Do not include date of birth, insurance, payment details or medical history.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • fetchUse this to read the full text of a document returned by search, with its source URL for citation.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "document": it reads documents.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this to read the full text of a document returned by search, with its source URL for citation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_available_appointmentsUse this when someone asks for open appointment times or how to book at LVOS.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_available_appointments" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when someone asks for open appointment times or how to book at LVOS. Currently always returns integration_unavailable with no slots, plus the FlexBook booking link, phone number and appointment types observed in the portal. No calendar is queried and nothing is booked. Use practice_id LVOS.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_provider_informationUse this when someone asks about Larchmont Village Oral Surgery (LVOS), an oral surgeon in Larchmont Village, Los Angeles: address, phone, office hours and time zone, services, the…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_provider_information" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when someone asks about Larchmont Village Oral Surgery (LVOS), an oral surgeon in Larchmont Village, Los Angeles: address, phone, office hours and time zone, services, the online booking link, or whether requests can be sent through Resident. Returns website-sourced facts; null fields are unknown. Use practice_id LVOS. Does not return appointment availability.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_servicesUse this when someone asks what oral surgery services LVOS offers, such as wisdom teeth removal, dental implants, full-arch implants, bone grafting, sinus lifts, biopsies, sedation…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_services" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when someone asks what oral surgery services LVOS offers, such as wisdom teeth removal, dental implants, full-arch implants, bone grafting, sinus lifts, biopsies, sedation or emergencies. Returns short descriptions and the practice's source pages. Not medical advice, treatment eligibility or availability. Use practice_id LVOS.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__resident__send_appointment_request"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.askresident.com: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including send_appointment_request (destructive), prepare_appointment_request (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "prepare_appointment_request" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "prepare_appointment_request" says "request": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.5.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http resident https://mcp.askresident.com
claude mcp add --transport http resident https://mcp.askresident.com

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__resident__get_provider_information",
      "mcp__resident__get_services",
      "mcp__resident__get_available_appointments",
      "mcp__resident__search",
      "mcp__resident__fetch"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__resident__prepare_appointment_request"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__resident__send_appointment_request"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as resident. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__resident__fetch private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__resident__send_appointment_request untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.askresident/resident/verify?hash=860e8c7f1ef59020d692e3e82759b231f3dbf699500135f3a259610c277ecee1" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 860e8c7f1ef5, from Nov 17, 2026, 00:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.askresident/resident/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.askresident/resident
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.askresident/resident.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.askresident/resident)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 00:17 UTC.

Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: send_appointment_request.

Can the Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server have?

7 tools: 1 destructive, 1 write, 5 read. send_appointment_request, prepare_appointment_request, get_provider_information, get_services, get_available_appointments, search and fetch.

Does the Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_appointment_request.

Has the Resident: Larchmont Village Oral Surgery MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.