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ATK Security Checks MCP server

com.atkvn/security-checksatkvn.comstreamable-httpv0.3.1Scanned

PQ TLS + cert checks; Wazuh rules tested on a real manager; PHP2Shell CVE check + fix steps

5 tools: 4 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ATK Security Checks MCP server can do

The ATK Security Checks MCP server is published by atkvn.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: check_post_quantum_tls, check_tls_certificate, test_wazuh_rule and check_php2shell), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (audit_wazuh_rules); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_post_quantum_tls and check_tls_certificate); 1 tool can send data out of your system (check_post_quantum_tls). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.3.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • check_php2shellIs this PHP install exposed to PHP2Shell, the two critical unauthenticated RCE flaws patched on 21 Oct 2026 (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619)?No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Is this PHP install exposed to PHP2Shell, the two critical unauthenticated RCE flaws patched on 21 Oct 2026 (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619)? Paste local evidence collected on the server: `php -v`, `php -i` or `php-fpm -i`, `cat /etc/os-release`, `dpkg -l 'php*'` or `rpm -qa 'php*'`. Returns patched / vulnerable / check_vendor_backport, the exact changelog command that decides distribution builds, upgrade commands, config mitigations until patched, and a tested Wazuh rule pack for crash and OOM signals. Free. Nothing is fetched from your servers.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • check_post_quantum_tlsDoes this public hostname negotiate hybrid post-quantum key exchange (X25519MLKEM768)?Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_post_quantum_tls" says "post": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "check_post_quantum_tls" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_post_quantum_tls" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_post_quantum_tls" says "post": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Does this public hostname negotiate hybrid post-quantum key exchange (X25519MLKEM768)? Returns TLS version, hybrid yes/no and a one-line verdict. Free. One TLS handshake per probe, no scanning.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • check_tls_certificateCertificate issuer, expiry date, days left, and whether the chain verifies for the hostname from a strict client (catches missing intermediate certificates and name mismatches).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Certificate issuer, expiry date, days left, and whether the chain verifies for the hostname from a strict client (catches missing intermediate certificates and name mismatches). Free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • test_wazuh_ruleRuns log lines through a real wazuh-manager 4.14.9 (fresh logtest session) with your custom rules and decoders: which decoder and rule matched, whether YOUR rule fired, and load wa…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "test_wazuh_rule" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Runs log lines through a real wazuh-manager 4.14.9 (fresh logtest session) with your custom rules and decoders: which decoder and rule matched, whether YOUR rule fired, and load warnings such as 7617/7619. Logtest engine: frequency/timeframe rules and some live-only behaviour are out of scope. Free: 1 log line with your files (3 with the stock ruleset only), summary. 10 lines with decoded fields and full alerts: POST https://atkvn.com/agent/v1/wazuh-testfire (x402, USD 0.10).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • audit_wazuh_rulesFinds Wazuh custom rules that pass wazuh-analysisd -t but are dropped at load (load order across ruleset/rules and etc/rules, missing parents, duplicate or colliding ids).Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a file (input.files), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Finds Wazuh custom rules that pass wazuh-analysisd -t but are dropped at load (load order across ruleset/rules and etc/rules, missing parents, duplicate or colliding ids). Input: list of {filename, xml}. Supported versions: 4.14.7, 4.14.9. Free: counts + 2 findings. Full report: pass api_key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__security-checks__check_post_quantum_tls"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 23, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://atkvn.com/agent/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including check_post_quantum_tls (write), check_tls_certificate (write), test_wazuh_rule (write), check_php2shell (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "check_post_quantum_tls" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_post_quantum_tls" says "post": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "test_wazuh_rule" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 added.+2 addedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http security-checks https://atkvn.com/agent/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http security-checks https://atkvn.com/agent/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__security-checks__audit_wazuh_rules"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__security-checks__check_post_quantum_tls",
      "mcp__security-checks__check_tls_certificate",
      "mcp__security-checks__test_wazuh_rule",
      "mcp__security-checks__check_php2shell"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as security-checks. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__security-checks__check_post_quantum_tls untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__security-checks__check_tls_certificate untrusted-input
  • mcp__security-checks__audit_wazuh_rules private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.atkvn/security-checks/verify?hash=2f80f366ef7e15abf7647bc5f1149720f2f6fed025a98f4244195e476a720bd7" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 2f80f366ef7e, from Nov 8, 2026, 19:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.atkvn/security-checks/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.atkvn/security-checks
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.atkvn/security-checks.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.atkvn/security-checks)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 08:17 UTC.

ATK Security Checks MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ATK Security Checks MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ATK Security Checks MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ATK Security Checks MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ATK Security Checks MCP server have?

5 tools: 4 write, 1 read. check_post_quantum_tls, check_tls_certificate, test_wazuh_rule, check_php2shell and audit_wazuh_rules.

Does the ATK Security Checks MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ATK Security Checks MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_post_quantum_tls.

Has the ATK Security Checks MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 23, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.