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AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server

com.audiscape.agentguard/agentguardagentguard.audiscape.comstreamable-httpv3.0.0Scanned

Stops runaway AI agent loops and token burn. Checks each tool call before it runs. No signup.

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server can do

The AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server is published by agentguard.audiscape.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: guard_check_session, audit_domain and create_checkout_session), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_remediation_preview).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 3.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • audit_domainRun a live HTTP audit against a public domain and return score, grade and report URL.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run a live HTTP audit against a public domain and return score, grade and report URL.
  • create_checkout_sessionReturn a Stripe checkout link for the remediation pack for a domain.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_checkout_session" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return a Stripe checkout link for the remediation pack for a domain.
  • guard_check_sessionCall before each tool call your agent makes.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "guard_check_session" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call before each tool call your agent makes. Send the calls so far and the one you are about to make, get back allowed true or false with the reason. Catches identical and near-repeat loops (same file, URL or command), re-reads of finished items, failing-tool retry streaks and USD or token caps before spend. Free, no account, arguments are not stored, nothing is executed. Smallest valid call: {"calls":[],"next":{"tool":"bash"}}

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Loop and budget guard
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_remediation_previewReturn the remediation preview and scorecard URL for a domain.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_remediation_preview" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the remediation preview and scorecard URL for a domain.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 16, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
404
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 404.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 16, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "guard_check_session" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 404; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
  2. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 3.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agentguard https://agentguard.audiscape.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agentguard https://agentguard.audiscape.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agentguard__get_remediation_preview"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agentguard__guard_check_session",
      "mcp__agentguard__audit_domain",
      "mcp__agentguard__create_checkout_session"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentguard. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__agentguard__get_remediation_preview untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.audiscape.agentguard/agentguard/verify?hash=4bd8745b7fa7372bf900bb3930cfb55f2afc8274224f6330d7212fe50c830b9c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4bd8745b7fa7, from Nov 14, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.audiscape.agentguard/agentguard/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.audiscape.agentguard/agentguard
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.audiscape.agentguard/agentguard.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.audiscape.agentguard/agentguard)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 1, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server have?

4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. guard_check_session, audit_domain, create_checkout_session and get_remediation_preview.

Does the AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the AgentGuard by Audiscape MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 14, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.