BasePic MCP server
com.basepic/basepicbasepic.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Upload, edit and share images by link: free image hosting for AI agents, no API key.
4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the BasePic MCP server can do
The BasePic MCP server is published by basepic.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: delete_image) and create or change data (2 tools: upload_image and edit_image). 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (upload_image); 1 tool can send data out of your system (upload_image).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
delete_imageDelete an image from BasePic.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "delete_image" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Delete an image from BasePic. Needs the delete_key returned when it was uploaded or created by edit_image. Its links stop working.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Delete image
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
edit_imageEdit an uploaded image: rotate, flip, crop (pixels or aspect ratio), resize (width/height, percent, megapixels), grayscale (black & white), sepia, brightness, contrast, warm, cool,…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "edit_image" says "edit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Edit an uploaded image: rotate, flip, crop (pixels or aspect ratio), resize (width/height, percent, megapixels), grayscale (black & white), sepia, brightness, contrast, warm, cool, invert, blur, sharpen — applied in order. Optionally change the format (jpeg/png/webp) or make the file at most max_kb kilobytes (1 KB = 1,000 bytes). Creates a NEW image with its own page_url, image_url and download_url; the original stays unchanged.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Edit image
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
upload_imageUpload an image to BasePic and get links: page_url (short link to share), image_url (direct image) and download_url.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "upload_image" says "upload": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Upload an image to BasePic and get links: page_url (short link to share), image_url (direct image) and download_url. Give either a public "url" (an image, or a post on X/Instagram/Facebook) or "image_base64". Returns an id for edit_image and a delete_key. Images up to 50 MB. The image is private: only people with the link can see it. A file on your disk: a path or file:// link does not work as url — if you can run commands, upload it with curl -F "image=@photo.jpg" https://basepic.com/api/v1/images instead (same JSON answer; its id works with edit_image).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Upload image
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_imageGet the links and details (size, dimensions, type) of an image on BasePic by its id.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_image" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the links and details (size, dimensions, type) of an image on BasePic by its id.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get image
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:34 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://basepic.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_image (destructive), upload_image (write), edit_image (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:delete_imageDeletes or cancelsinputSchema
- Changed:edit_imageChanges thingsinputSchema
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:edit_imageChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:upload_imageChanges thingsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http basepic https://basepic.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http basepic https://basepic.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__basepic__get_image"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__basepic__upload_image",
"mcp__basepic__edit_image"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__basepic__delete_image"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as basepic. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__basepic__upload_image untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.basepic/basepic/verify?hash=cbdda1d94642992bd976d1d72f5552e6b67dc5598553affa073adcc47dd7927c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash cbdda1d94642, from Nov 12, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.basepic/basepic/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.basepic/basepic)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:51 UTC.
BasePic MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the BasePic MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the BasePic MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_image.
Can the BasePic MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the BasePic MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 destructive, 2 write, 1 read. delete_image, upload_image, edit_image and get_image.
Does the BasePic MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the BasePic MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): upload_image.
Has the BasePic MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.