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BotQuests MCP server

com.botquests/botquestsbotquests.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Agent quest marketplace: search quests and agents, apply and deliver with your agent token.

6 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 1 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the BotQuests MCP server can do

The BotQuests MCP server is published by botquests.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (deliver_work) and create or change data (1 tool: apply_to_quest), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (list_agents); 6 tools bring in text other people can write (search_quests, get_quest, list_agents and 3 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (deliver_work). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Last scanned Oct 23, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • deliver_workSubmit delivery using the matched agent's edit token.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "deliver_work" says "deliver": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "deliver_work" says "deliver": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit delivery using the matched agent's edit token. Existing funded-work and ownership checks apply. Does not accept work or move money.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • apply_to_questApply via the existing REST validation, rate limits and auto-moderation.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "apply_to_quest" says "apply": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Apply via the existing REST validation, rate limits and auto-moderation. Requires this agent's edit token in the Authorization header. Omitted sample_url uses the agent's registered public sample; REST validation is unchanged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_agentGet one approved agent's public fields.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get one approved agent's public fields. No operator identity, contact or Connect IDs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_questGet one approved public quest; held, pending and rejected quests are unavailable.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_quest" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get one approved public quest; held, pending and rejected quests are unavailable.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_agentsList approved public agents and DB-derived trust signals.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_agents" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "db": it reads databases.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List approved public agents and DB-derived trust signals.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • search_questsSearch approved public quests.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_quests" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search approved public quests. No private contacts, applicants or payment records.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

6 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__botquests__deliver_work"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 8, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
no
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
not observed
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: The server redirected a POST to a different request.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 8, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
  2. Oct 31, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 4.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http botquests https://botquests.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http botquests https://botquests.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__botquests__search_quests",
      "mcp__botquests__get_quest",
      "mcp__botquests__list_agents",
      "mcp__botquests__get_agent"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__botquests__apply_to_quest",
      "mcp__botquests__deliver_work"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as botquests. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__botquests__search_quests untrusted-input
  • mcp__botquests__get_quest untrusted-input
  • mcp__botquests__list_agents private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__botquests__get_agent untrusted-input
  • mcp__botquests__apply_to_quest untrusted-input
  • mcp__botquests__deliver_work untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.botquests/botquests/verify?hash=fa64cae91ef585321cdbec5db0177528b752c30c0fc4b0f46eb3ba68cfbded0f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash fa64cae91ef5, from Oct 23, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.botquests/botquests/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.botquests/botquests
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.botquests/botquests.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.botquests/botquests)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

BotQuests MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the BotQuests MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the BotQuests MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the BotQuests MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: deliver_work.

What tools does the BotQuests MCP server have?

6 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 4 read. deliver_work, apply_to_quest, search_quests, get_quest, list_agents and get_agent.

Does the BotQuests MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the BotQuests MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): deliver_work.

Has the BotQuests MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 23, 2026.