Compute Connector MCP server
com.botrecipe/computebotrecipe.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Low on memory? Your bot sends heavy jobs to cloud sandboxes on your own provider keys. Flat fee.
8 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 5 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Compute Connector MCP server can do
The Compute Connector MCP server is published by botrecipe.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: delete_provider_key) and create or change data (5 tools: check_memory, run_job, save_provider_key, provider_setup and 1 more). 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
delete_provider_keyPro, owner only: delete a saved provider key by name.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "delete_provider_key" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
Description, as the server wrote it Pro, owner only: delete a saved provider key by name. Jobs on that key stop working at once.
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
check_memoryBefore a heavy job, send how much memory the machine your agent runs on has free (free -m, os.freemem()) and what you are about to run.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Before a heavy job, send how much memory the machine your agent runs on has free (free -m, os.freemem()) and what you are about to run. Get a memory warning and a verdict: run_local, or offload with the provider to use. Free watch-only logs would_offload for the weekly report; nothing runs.
provider_setupStep-by-step setup for one provider: where to get the key, what to pass to save_provider_key, links to its docs and price page, and for Modal or Workers Sandbox the bridge code to …No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Step-by-step setup for one provider: where to get the key, what to pass to save_provider_key, links to its docs and price page, and for Modal or Workers Sandbox the bridge code to deploy on your own account.
run_jobPro: run a shell command in a fresh cloud sandbox on your own provider account (vercel (Vercel Sandbox, default), e2b, daytona, modal, workers (Workers Sandbox)) and get the exit c…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "run_job" says "run": a word for a change.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.cmd), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it Pro: run a shell command in a fresh cloud sandbox on your own provider account (vercel (Vercel Sandbox, default), e2b, daytona, modal, workers (Workers Sandbox)) and get the exit code and the last 16 KB of stdout and stderr back. Send small input files with it. The sandbox is created for the job and stopped right after, so nothing idles on your bill. Free watch-only logs would_offload and runs nothing.
save_provider_keyPro, owner only: save one provider key, sealed with AES-256-GCM before it reaches the database.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "save_provider_key" says "save": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Pro, owner only: save one provider key, sealed with AES-256-GCM before it reaches the database. Providers: vercel (Vercel Sandbox, default), e2b, daytona, modal, workers (Workers Sandbox). Vercel needs team_id and project_id; Modal and Workers Sandbox need bridge_url (see provider_setup). The key is checked with a read-only call first and is never returned or logged. Free stores nothing.
weekly_reportPlain-English summary of the last 7 days: memory checks, low-memory warnings, jobs that would have been offloaded (free) or ran (Pro) by provider, minutes and failures.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Plain-English summary of the last 7 days: memory checks, low-memory warnings, jobs that would have been offloaded (free) or ran (Pro) by provider, minutes and failures. Read-only; sends nothing. Needs an API key.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
list_providersEvery provider this connects to, how each one runs, and (with your key) the provider keys you saved: name, provider, fingerprint, default, last used.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_providers" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Every provider this connects to, how each one runs, and (with your key) the provider keys you saved: name, provider, fingerprint, default, last used. Never shows a key.
usage_and_upgradeShow today's usage for your key or IP and the $9/month upgrade link.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "show": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Show today's usage for your key or IP and the $9/month upgrade link. Free tier: 500 calls/day. Not metered.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 6
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (1 destructive, 5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://compute.cloudforbots.com/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_provider_key (destructive), check_memory (write), run_job (write), save_provider_key (write), provider_setup (write) and 1 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http compute https://compute.cloudforbots.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http compute https://compute.cloudforbots.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__compute__list_providers",
"mcp__compute__usage_and_upgrade"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__compute__check_memory",
"mcp__compute__run_job",
"mcp__compute__save_provider_key",
"mcp__compute__provider_setup",
"mcp__compute__weekly_report"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__compute__delete_provider_key"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as compute. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.botrecipe/compute/verify?hash=cba6fc66ecd5d58d495e0351f88ee97b43fdfa605bab3ccf5317914de15e3f8a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash cba6fc66ecd5, from Nov 17, 2026, 07:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.botrecipe/compute/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.botrecipe/compute)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:52 UTC.
Compute Connector MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Compute Connector MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Compute Connector MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_provider_key.
Can the Compute Connector MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Compute Connector MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 1 destructive, 5 write, 2 read. delete_provider_key, check_memory, run_job, save_provider_key, provider_setup, weekly_report, list_providers and usage_and_upgrade.
Does the Compute Connector MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Compute Connector MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Compute Connector MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.