Brandloupe Index MCP server
com.brandloupe/brandloupebrandloupe.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Weekly data on 600k+ Shopify stores: launches, best sellers, prices, apps and similar stores.
4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Sign-in required, OAuth metadata published. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Brandloupe Index MCP server can do
The Brandloupe Index MCP server is published by brandloupe.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: weekly_changes and technology_usage), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (lookup_store and weekly_changes).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint asks for sign-in and publishes OAuth metadata.
Last scanned Oct 21, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
technology_usageHow many live Shopify stores run an app, theme or pixel, its share of its category, top countries, apps used with it and the most visited stores running it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it How many live Shopify stores run an app, theme or pixel, its share of its category, top countries, apps used with it and the most visited stores running it. Slugs: app key with hyphens (judge-me), theme name + '-theme' (dawn-theme), pixel key (meta).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
weekly_changesTotals and examples from the latest weekly crawl compared with the previous one: product launches, price drops of 10% or more, new discounts, best-seller climbs and apps stores add…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "crawl": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Totals and examples from the latest weekly crawl compared with the previous one: product launches, price drops of 10% or more, new discounts, best-seller climbs and apps stores added. Optionally for one category or country.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
find_storesUp to 10 live Shopify stores matching filters (category, country, apps they run or lack, pixels, theme), sorted by popularity, estimated US visits, recent launches or catalog size.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_stores" says "find": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Up to 10 live Shopify stores matching filters (category, country, apps they run or lack, pixels, theme), sorted by popularity, estimated US visits, recent launches or catalog size.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
lookup_storeOne Shopify store's profile from the latest crawl: newest products, best sellers, price range, catalog, apps, theme, pixels, estimated US traffic and similar stores (competitors).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_store" says "lookup": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "crawl": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it One Shopify store's profile from the latest crawl: newest products, best sellers, price range, catalog, apps, theme, pixels, estimated US traffic and similar stores (competitors).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:35 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 401
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- yes
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- https://api.brandloupe.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://api.brandloupe.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://api.brandloupe.com
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- yes
Posture changes
- Oct 29, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 401
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to yes
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: none to https://api.brandloupe.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://api.brandloupe.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://api.brandloupe.com
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 401; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 0 (and 7 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 401
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to yes
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: none to https://api.brandloupe.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://api.brandloupe.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://api.brandloupe.com
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http brandloupe https://api.brandloupe.com/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http brandloupe https://api.brandloupe.com/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__brandloupe__lookup_store",
"mcp__brandloupe__find_stores"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__brandloupe__weekly_changes",
"mcp__brandloupe__technology_usage"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as brandloupe. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__brandloupe__lookup_store untrusted-input
- mcp__brandloupe__weekly_changes untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.brandloupe/brandloupe/verify?hash=ba053866ac99ff2459095be9f4e57d502d129768cbc7d0ad7e6b7205b440c1b6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash ba053866ac99, from Oct 21, 2026, 18:46 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.brandloupe/brandloupe/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.brandloupe/brandloupe)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 10:17 UTC.
Brandloupe Index MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Brandloupe Index MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Brandloupe Index MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Brandloupe Index MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Brandloupe Index MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. weekly_changes, technology_usage, lookup_store and find_stores.
Does the Brandloupe Index MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Yes. Its remote endpoint answered 401 without credentials, and it publishes OAuth protected resource metadata (RFC 9728); its authorization server supports dynamic client registration.
Does the Brandloupe Index MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Brandloupe Index MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 21, 2026.