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Border MCP server

com.clawhard/borderclawhard.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Debug CORS: send the real preflight, get Chrome's exact error and the headers that fix it.

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 4 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Border MCP server can do

The Border MCP server is published by clawhard.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: border_check_cors and border_check_cors_headers), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (border_check_cors); 2 tools can send data out of your system (border_check_cors and border_check_cors_headers).

The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • border_check_corsUse when the user hits a CORS error ("blocked by CORS policy", "No 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' header", "preflight", "Failed to fetch" from a frontend) or is about to call a publ…Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...rol-Allow-Headers", "withCredentials", "credentials include"). Sends the browser's own pref..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.credentials.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.credentials.description: "...e when the request sends cookies: fetch credentials: "include", XHR or axios withCredential..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when the user hits a CORS error ("blocked by CORS policy", "No 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' header", "preflight", "Failed to fetch" from a frontend) or is about to call a public API from browser code (React, Next.js, Vue, a browser extension page) and asks whether it will work (signals: "CORS", "works in Postman but not in the browser", "preflight 401/404", "Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "withCredentials", "credentials include"). Sends the browser's own preflight (OPTIONS with Origin, Access-Control-Request-Method and -Headers) to the live API and, for GET and HEAD, the request itself with the Origin header, then applies the Fetch standard CORS rules as Chrome implements them. Returns verdict (allowed, blocked, preflight_passed, incomplete, same_origin, unreachable), the exact Chrome console error, which step fails (preflight or response) and why, whether a preflight is needed and why, the CORS headers the server sent, warnings (missing Vary: Origin, a server that echoes any origin with credentials, unreadable response headers, Authorization covered only by *), the exact response headers that fix it, and curl commands to reproduce. Example: {"url":"https://api.example.com/v1/items","origin":"http://localhost:3000","method":"POST","headers":["Content-Type: application/json","Authorization"],"credentials":true}. Limits: public http/https APIs on ports 80 and 443 only (localhost, private and staging servers go through border_check_cors_headers with pasted curl output); never sends POST, PUT, PATCH or DELETE (those get the preflight checked only) and never sends header values for Authorization or keys; a server can answer differently to a real browser session.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check whether a browser would allow a cross-origin API call (CORS)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • border_check_cors_headersUse when a CORS problem involves a server Border cannot reach (localhost, a dev or staging server, a private network, a custom port) or a POST, PUT, PATCH or DELETE whose real resp…Can send data out2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...age origin, method, request headers and credentials mode. Returns the same result as border..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.credentials.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.credentials.description: "...e when the request sends cookies: fetch credentials: "include", XHR or axios withCredential..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when a CORS problem involves a server Border cannot reach (localhost, a dev or staging server, a private network, a custom port) or a POST, PUT, PATCH or DELETE whose real response needs checking, and the raw response headers are available from curl -i or the browser DevTools Network tab (signals: "here is the OPTIONS response", "my local API returns these headers", "CORS works on localhost but not in production", "preflight response is"). Parses the pasted OPTIONS response and/or the actual response (status line plus headers; curl -i, curl -v, curl -iL with redirects, and DevTools copies are all read) and applies the Fetch standard CORS rules as Chrome implements them, for the given page origin, method, request headers and credentials mode. Returns the same result as border_check_cors: verdict, the exact Chrome console error, the failing step and reason, warnings, the response headers that fix it, and the curl commands to capture any missing response. Nothing is fetched. Example: {"url":"http://localhost:8000/api/login","origin":"http://localhost:5173","method":"POST","headers":["Content-Type: application/json"],"credentials":true,"preflight_response":"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: content-type"}. Limits: the verdict is only as complete as the pasted headers; a preflighted request needs both pastes for a full answer.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check pasted preflight and response headers against the CORS rules
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://border.clawhard.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including border_check_cors (write), border_check_cors_headers (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

4 info
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...rol-Allow-Headers", "withCredentials", "credentials include"). Sends the browser's own pref..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.credentials.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.credentials.description: "...e when the request sends cookies: fetch credentials: "include", XHR or axios withCredential..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...age origin, method, request headers and credentials mode. Returns the same result as border..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.credentials.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.credentials.description: "...e when the request sends cookies: fetch credentials: "include", XHR or axios withCredential..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http border https://border.clawhard.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http border https://border.clawhard.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__border__border_check_cors",
      "mcp__border__border_check_cors_headers"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as border. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__border__border_check_cors untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__border__border_check_cors_headers outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.clawhard/border/verify?hash=0974d511ef436f6fc79873e331124c4560836b86834897137eeef3e443a878d1" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 0974d511ef43, from Nov 12, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/border/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.clawhard/border
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.clawhard/border.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/border)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 12, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

Border MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Border MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Border MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Border MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Border MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. border_check_cors and border_check_cors_headers.

Does the Border MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Border MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): border_check_cors and border_check_cors_headers.

Has the Border MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.