Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server
com.darmousseh/habits-guarddarmousseh.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Check user prompts for injection/jailbreaks; your own guard learns from your labels. Works keyless.
3 tools: 3 change things.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server can do
The Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server is published by darmousseh.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: check_prompt, teach_guard and get_free_key), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool reads private data (get_free_key); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_free_key).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
check_promptIs this user-typed text a prompt injection or jailbreak (an attempt to override, hijack or extract an AI system's instructions)?No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Is this user-typed text a prompt injection or jailbreak (an attempt to override, hijack or extract an AI system's instructions)? Returns flagged true/false and a 0-1 score. Without a key it uses the public guard (30 checks per day per network). With a key it uses your own guard, which learns from teach_guard; the result carries a request_id. Built for user prompts; it is weak on injections hidden in tool output or documents.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_free_keyCreate a free Habits account and API key (no email).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_free_key" says "get": a word for reading.
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "email": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "create" and "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a free Habits account and API key (no email). The key is shown once; set it as the Authorization: Bearer header for this MCP server. The free plan has a fixed $0.10/day spend cap and its own trainable injection guard.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
teach_guardLabel one prompt for your own guard so it stops repeating a mistake (a false alarm on a normal request, or a missed injection).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "label": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Label one prompt for your own guard so it stops repeating a mistake (a false alarm on a normal request, or a missed injection). Needs an API key (get_free_key). About 50 of your own labels cut false alarms from 15% to 4% in our benchmark.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- no
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- not observed
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: habits.darmousseh.com does not resolve.
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- Reachable: yes to no
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
- Reachable: yes to no
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http habits-guard https://habits.darmousseh.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http habits-guard https://habits.darmousseh.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__habits-guard__check_prompt",
"mcp__habits-guard__teach_guard",
"mcp__habits-guard__get_free_key"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as habits-guard. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__habits-guard__get_free_key private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.darmousseh/habits-guard/verify?hash=b196d364815bf5dcada176c2c1da4a7a3208ed212ff741d4a6a0a638bdfbadd8" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b196d364815b, from Nov 12, 2026, 22:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.darmousseh/habits-guard/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.darmousseh/habits-guard)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 15, 2026, 02:17 UTC.
Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 3 write. check_prompt, teach_guard and get_free_key.
Does the Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Habits prompt-injection guard MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.