DealerSlip MCP server
com.dealerslip/invoicedealerslip.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Draft UK vehicle sales invoices from supplied deal facts, with totals and a private review link.
1 tool: 1 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the DealerSlip MCP server can do
The DealerSlip MCP server is published by dealerslip.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: create_invoice), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool can send data out of your system (create_invoice).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
create_invoicePrepare a UK vehicle sales invoice draft from user-supplied facts and return calculated totals plus a private review link.Can send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_invoice" says "create": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.seller.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "create_invoice" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "create_invoice" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Prepare a UK vehicle sales invoice draft from user-supplied facts and return calculated totals plus a private review link. Ask for all required fields and explicit VAT treatment; do not invent facts, payments or terms. No account access or storage. Human review and download are required before issuing. The link contains invoice data; share only with its intended recipient.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:36 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://dealerslip.com/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including create_invoice (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warncreate_invoice
The server marks "create_invoice" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "create_invoice" says "create": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http invoice https://dealerslip.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http invoice https://dealerslip.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__invoice__create_invoice"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as invoice. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__invoice__create_invoice outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.dealerslip/invoice/verify?hash=eda76bd994632a1a6a115d34d5bd749f6a2b79ddd48bf0255b3a9a18d6555fff" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash eda76bd99463, from Nov 13, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.dealerslip/invoice/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.dealerslip/invoice)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:54 UTC.
DealerSlip MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the DealerSlip MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the DealerSlip MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the DealerSlip MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the DealerSlip MCP server have?
- 1 tool: 1 write. create_invoice.
Does the DealerSlip MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the DealerSlip MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): create_invoice.
Has the DealerSlip MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.