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dechonet.com MCP server

com.dechonet/mcpdechonet.comstreamable-httpv1.9.0Scanned

34 security tools for AI agents: phishing links, exposure maps, DNS, SSL, PQC, history, pivots.

34 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 25 change things and 8 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 25 write, 8 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 33
  • Can send data out · 6
  • 5 findings, 1 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the dechonet.com MCP server can do

The dechonet.com MCP server is published by dechonet.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 34 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (crypto_check_before_sign) and create or change data (25 tools: http_security, email_auth, port_scan, subdomain_discovery and 21 more), but cannot delete data. 8 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (dns_lookup and asn_lookup); 33 tools bring in text other people can write (dns_lookup, ssl_check, http_security and 30 more); 6 tools can send data out of your system (http_security, check_before_action, crypto_check_before_sign and 3 more). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 5 findings, 1 of them high severity (annotation-conflict and sensitive-path). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 5 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.9.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

34 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • crypto_check_before_signBefore an agent signs or sends from a crypto wallet: send the destination address (to), the page that asked (url) and/or the wallet request it is about to approve (request: the EIP…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "crypto_check_before_sign" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before an agent signs or sends from a crypto wallet: send the destination address (to), the page that asked (url) and/or the wallet request it is about to approve (request: the EIP-1193 method and params). The address is checked for its chain and checksum, the US Treasury OFAC sanctions list, the addresses the FBI published in its alerts, whether Tether froze USDT at it, and pages DechoNet judged dangerous that showed it; the page goes through the phishing link check and the official exchange, wallet and dApp list; the request is read for what approving it would allow (unlimited token approval, approval for a whole NFT collection, Permit/Permit2 signatures, Seaport orders, raw eth_sign, transfers). Verdicts: danger, suspicious, no_signals. no_signals means none of the checks found a warning sign and is not a statement that the transaction is harmless; 'unchecked' lists what was not looked at (balances, token contracts, simulation). Nothing sent is stored. Rate-limited.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check Before Signing or Sending (Crypto)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 25Claude Code: ask
  • check_before_actionCheck the page an agent is about to log in, pay, download from or submit to: whether the address impersonates a brand, how new the domain is, whether DechoNet or a licensed feed ha…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check the page an agent is about to log in, pay, download from or submit to: whether the address impersonates a brand, how new the domain is, whether DechoNet or a licensed feed has already flagged it, and — opened from Seoul (and Tokyo for Japan-targeted pages) as a phone — what the page turns into, including text it hides from people but an AI agent would read (instructions to ignore its rules, hand over secrets or keep the user out of it raise the answer to suspicious). For a payment, the caller can report the page structure as host names only (where forms submit, which origins frames come from, whether the card fields sit on the page itself or in a frame and that frame's origin): card fields outside a known payment provider (Stripe, PayPal, Braintree, Adyen, Square, Checkout.com, Toss Payments, KG Inicis, NHN KCP, NICE Payments, Naver Pay, Korean card issuers and banks) are reported as suspicious — a fake card window inside a real shop shows up only this way. Paths, queries, field values and page text are not accepted, and the structure is not stored. Verdicts: danger, suspicious, unreachable, official, no_signals. no_signals means none of the checks found a warning sign and is not a statement that the page is safe; 'unchecked' lists what was not looked at. Rate-limited. Returns signals with their source and a signed observation record (host and verdict only).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check a Page Before Logging In or Paying
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • crypto_dapp_checkOpen a crypto page — a dApp, airdrop, claim or mint link — and report what it asks a wallet to do.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "crypto_dapp_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Open a crypto page — a dApp, airdrop, claim or mint link — and report what it asks a wallet to do. DechoNet opens it in an isolated Chromium (Seoul) with a test wallet that holds nothing (EVM, Solana and TRON): it presses the page's "Connect wallet" button once (or one "Claim" button when there is none) and the test wallet in a wallet picker once; it types nothing and submits no form, and the test wallet connects with a burn address and refuses every signature and transaction. Reported: each wallet request in order with what approving it would allow (unlimited token approvals, setApprovalForAll, Permit/Permit2 signatures, transfers, Solana transactions, TRON approvals and account-permission changes), drainer-kit code markers in the page scripts, a connect button that sends the visitor to another site, and the phishing link check verdict of the same link (including whether it is the brand's own domain). Verdicts: danger, suspicious, official, no_signals, unreachable. no_signals means none of these were seen and is not a statement that the page is harmless: drainers that wait for a second press, show nothing to an automated browser or ask only after a sign-in can go unseen, and on new drainer samples few were caught by wallet requests alone (figures on dechonet.com/methodology); 'unchecked' lists what was not looked at. Every call opens the page (no cached answer), so it takes longer than the other checks, and it has a per-minute rate limit and a daily limit shared by all callers. Only the host, the verdict and the kinds of request are kept (90 days); no API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: dApp & Link Check (Crypto)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • crypto_exchange_checkCheck whether a domain or link is the official address of a crypto exchange, wallet or dApp — Korean exchanges (Upbit, Bithumb, Coinone, GOPAX, DigitalX/Korbit) and major global ex…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a domain or link is the official address of a crypto exchange, wallet or dApp — Korean exchanges (Upbit, Bithumb, Coinone, GOPAX, DigitalX/Korbit) and major global exchanges, wallets and dApps — compared with the addresses the companies publish themselves (the Korean exchanges' council member list, app store developer websites, verified GitHub organisations). Verdicts: official, danger (not official and the phishing check found impersonation evidence), not_official (uses a name but is not an official address — the name alone is not impersonation), not_exchange. A domain that uses a name also gets its registration date, the first certificate DechoNet saw for it, and a phishing check of its front page (which may render it). Read-only; no API key; rate-limited.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Official Crypto Exchange Address Check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • domain_changesReport what has changed for a domain over time — the security regressions and drift that DechoNet's daily monitoring has recorded across every watch on the domain (SSL grade, heade…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report what has changed for a domain over time — the security regressions and drift that DechoNet's daily monitoring has recorded across every watch on the domain (SSL grade, headers, DNS, OWASP posture, impersonation exposure, etc.). Use this to answer "what changed on my domain since yesterday/last week?" — a question that requires persistent snapshots and therefore cannot be reconstructed from a single live lookup. It is the first check to run when a domain looked at before comes up again. Two sources: (a) the daily watch timeline if the domain is under DechoNet monitoring, and (b) even without a watch, the difference between the last two stored lookups of each tool — so a second lookup already yields a comparison. The point-in-time tools (security_scan, owasp_check, ssl_check) give the current state instead. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns the monitored tools, a newest-first change timeline, lookup-to-lookup changes, and a link to manage monitoring.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Domain Change History
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • email_authAssess a domain's email authentication and deliverability posture: MX records, SPF, DMARC, DKIM (probes 15 common selectors), BIMI, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, and DANE, plus a blacklist che…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Assess a domain's email authentication and deliverability posture: MX records, SPF, DMARC, DKIM (probes 15 common selectors), BIMI, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, and DANE, plus a blacklist check across all MX hosts, returning a 0-100 deliverability score. Use this for a full sending/receiving readiness review of a domain. Use dns_lookup instead if you only need raw TXT/MX records, or email_header_analysis to diagnose a specific message that was already sent. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns a text report: score, per-mechanism KPIs, issues, and actions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Email Authentication Check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • email_header_analysisParse raw email headers to reconstruct the delivery path (each Received hop in order), extract SPF/DKIM/DMARC authentication results, measure per-hop delays, and flag unencrypted (…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Parse raw email headers to reconstruct the delivery path (each Received hop in order), extract SPF/DKIM/DMARC authentication results, measure per-hop delays, and flag unencrypted (non-TLS) hops. Use this to diagnose a specific message that was already delivered — spoofing, delays, or where mail was lost. Use email_auth instead to assess a domain's sending configuration before sending. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. INPUT is the full raw header block. OUTPUT is a text report containing: the ordered hop route, per-mechanism auth results (pass/fail), detected inter-hop delays, the encryption status of each hop, and whether the first sending address is on the Tor Project exit list or in a VPN provider range (information only).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Email Header Analysis
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • exposure_mapMap what an organisation exposes to the internet beyond its home page: subdomains from Certificate Transparency logs (plus hosts DechoNet has already observed), each opened once fr…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Map what an organisation exposes to the internet beyond its home page: subdomains from Certificate Transparency logs (plus hosts DechoNet has already observed), each opened once from outside and sorted into developer/ops tools, directory listings, admin screens, VPN/remote-access logins, staging servers, default install pages, login pages and so on — the forgotten assets AI-driven attack tools look for first. Use this when a user wants to know their attack surface or after a breach in their sector. Returns counts per category, a verdict (bad/warn/ok) and what to do. Public view only: the per-host list and a sensitive-file check are shown to the verified domain owner on the web report (DNS TXT), never through this tool. Read-only and passive beyond a single first-page request per host; no logins or path guessing; requires no API key; rate-limited (heavier than other tools — up to ~1 minute).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Exposed Admin Page Check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • golive_checkCheck whether a domain is ready to launch or migrate — a go/no-go verdict over five essentials: DNS resolves to an IP, has propagated consistently across global resolvers, SSL/TLS …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a domain is ready to launch or migrate — a go/no-go verdict over five essentials: DNS resolves to an IP, has propagated consistently across global resolvers, SSL/TLS is ready, the site is reachable over HTTPS, and the domain registration is not about to expire. Use this right before flipping DNS to a new server, or to confirm a migration has landed. It answers "can I switch over yet?"; use security_scan for a security posture grade or the individual tools for depth. Any failing essential yields not_ready; only cautions yields caution; all clear yields ready. Read-only (a passive multi-probe, though it does resolve and fetch the domain); requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns the verdict, per-check statuses, and a shareable report link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Go-Live Readiness Checklist
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • http_securityFollow a URL's HTTP redirect chain and audit response security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, COOP, CORP, COEP, Permissions-Policy), grading A+ to F on the six core headers (…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Follow a URL's HTTP redirect chain and audit response security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, COOP, CORP, COEP, Permissions-Policy), grading A+ to F on the six core headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy; COOP/CORP/COEP are reported but not graded) and flagging information leaks such as server-version disclosure. Use this for HTTP-layer/header posture. Use ssl_check instead for certificate or TLS-handshake issues, or security_scan for a full domain report. Read-only (an HTTP GET-style probe that sends no payload); requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns a text report: grade, header findings, redirect trace, issues, and actions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: HTTP Security Headers Audit
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • impersonation_exposureAssess how exposed a domain is to brand impersonation and phishing, PASSIVELY: live typosquat/lookalike domains (homoglyph, omission, transposition, TLD swap) that actually resolve…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Assess how exposed a domain is to brand impersonation and phishing, PASSIVELY: live typosquat/lookalike domains (homoglyph, omission, transposition, TLD swap) that actually resolve, operational subdomains (dev/staging/admin) exposed in CT logs, and whether a wildcard certificate exists — returning an A+ (low exposure) to F (high exposure) grade. Framing: a registered lookalike domain is not proof of impersonation — it may be a legitimate third party or the owner's own — so report it as exposure to verify, not as an accusation against that domain. Fully passive: public DNS delegation checks plus public CT-log queries, sending nothing to the target or the lookalike domains, so it is safe and lawful to run. Use lookalike_domains or subdomain_discovery for the raw per-tool detail. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns a text report: grade, counts, per-category findings, and a shareable report link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Brand Impersonation Exposure
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • ip_infoReport information about the caller's own public IP as seen by the server: IPv4/IPv6 address, ISP, ASN, approximate geolocation, and proxy/VPN heuristics.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report information about the caller's own public IP as seen by the server: IPv4/IPv6 address, ISP, ASN, approximate geolocation, and proxy/VPN heuristics. Takes no input — it reflects the egress IP of THIS MCP server's network, which is usually NOT the end user's IP. Use this to discover the server's outbound IP or test connectivity. To inspect a specific, known IP instead, use asn_lookup or reverse_dns. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: My IP Info
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • lookalike_domainsGenerate the typosquat/lookalike variants of a domain that phishers actually register — homoglyph swaps (l→1, o→0, rn→m), TLD swaps (.com→.co), character omissions, transpositions,…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "lookalike_domains" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate the typosquat/lookalike variants of a domain that phishers actually register — homoglyph swaps (l→1, o→0, rn→m), TLD swaps (.com→.co), character omissions, transpositions, repetitions, hyphenations — and check which of them are currently registered (live NS delegation via DoH). Use this to assess brand-impersonation and phishing exposure for a domain the user is responsible for. A registered variant is NOT proof of abuse (it may be an unrelated legitimate site) — follow up with whois_lookup on each hit for its owner and registration date. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns generated/checked counts and the registered variants with the technique that produced each.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Lookalike Domain Check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • mcp_server_checkCheck a remote MCP server from outside before connecting it to an agent: whether it requires authentication (and publishes OAuth protected-resource metadata, RFC 9728), which of it…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a remote MCP server from outside before connecting it to an agent: whether it requires authentication (and publishes OAuth protected-resource metadata, RFC 9728), which of its tools act on the world (run commands, write or delete files, send messages, make payments, read secrets), whether its server instructions or tool and parameter descriptions contain text that steers an agent (tool poisoning), whether a web page on any site could call it (CORS and Origin), HTTPS, and tool annotations. Sends initialize and tools/list only — no tool is ever called; query strings are removed before anything is sent or stored. Public addresses only. Findings cover what the server shows from outside: what a tool does when called, the server code and tools behind a login are not checked and are listed as not checked. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns status, KPIs, issues, actions, what was not checked, and a shareable report link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: MCP Server Check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • owasp_checkAssess a domain's OWASP posture from EXTERNAL OBSERVATION only: the OWASP Secure Headers Project plus the externally observable OWASP Top 10:2025 subset — A04 Cryptographic Failure…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to ".env".

      Matched text

      description: "...u do not own. The sensitive-file check (.env, .git, server-status) runs only for the..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Assess a domain's OWASP posture from EXTERNAL OBSERVATION only: the OWASP Secure Headers Project plus the externally observable OWASP Top 10:2025 subset — A04 Cryptographic Failures (TLS/cert), A02 Security Misconfiguration (header/info leaks), and A03 Software Supply Chain Failures (outdated components via version disclosure) — returning an A+ to F grade. Scope: A01 (Access Control, incl. SSRF), A05 (Injection), A06 (Insecure Design), A07 (Authentication), A08, A09 and A10 (Exceptional Conditions) are not checked — they need authenticated access or active/injection testing, so the result lists them as out-of-scope rather than "pass". The result is an external-posture check, not a full OWASP Top 10 assessment. This is PASSIVE (a normal HTTPS request, the TLS certificate and a public CT-log lookup; no port scan, no path probing), so it is suitable for domains you do not own. The sensitive-file check (.env, .git, server-status) runs only for the verified domain owner on the web report (DNS TXT), never through this tool. Use http_security or ssl_check for depth on one layer. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns a text report: grade, per-category findings, the out-of-scope list, and a shareable report link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: OWASP Security Checkup
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • port_scanProbe a host for a fixed set of common TCP ports (HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, FTP, SMTP, DNS, and common databases) and report which are open, the service name, and the response time.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Probe a host for a fixed set of common TCP ports (HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, FTP, SMTP, DNS, and common databases) and report which are open, the service name, and the response time. BEHAVIOR: this makes an ACTIVE TCP connection to the target. It is non-intrusive — a connect probe only; it does not authenticate, send exploits, or transfer data — and changes nothing on the target (read-only), but the connection is visible in the target's logs, so only scan hosts you own or are explicitly authorized to test. Use this to confirm which services are exposed. Use ssl_check or http_security instead to assess a specific service's configuration. Requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns a per-port open/closed list with service names.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Open Port Scan
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • pqc_readinessCheck whether a website's public TLS endpoint is ready for post-quantum cryptography: does it complete a TLS 1.3 handshake that offers only the hybrid X25519MLKEM768 key exchange (…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a website's public TLS endpoint is ready for post-quantum cryptography: does it complete a TLS 1.3 handshake that offers only the hybrid X25519MLKEM768 key exchange (ML-KEM), and does the organisation's own server provide it or a CDN edge in front of it. Also reports what the certificate chain is signed with (tracked, not scored: public CAs do not issue post-quantum certificates yet). Verdicts: ready (the origin server supports it), partial (a CDN edge provides it; the CDN-to-origin leg is invisible), not_ready (the hybrid-only handshake was refused), unknown (inconclusive — not the same as "no"). Scope: only the public endpoint on port 443. Internal systems, VPNs, code, and Korean PQC algorithms (no standard TLS codepoints yet) are not observable, so the result is an external indicator of migration progress, not a full PQC audit. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns the verdict, a 0-100 readiness score and grade, per-check statuses, and a shareable report link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Post-Quantum TLS Readiness
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • report_pageReport a page to DechoNet: phishing or brand impersonation, a fake payment window (card fields where a payment provider should be), hidden instructions aimed at AI agents, a malici…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report a page to DechoNet: phishing or brand impersonation, a fake payment window (card fields where a payment provider should be), hidden instructions aimed at AI agents, a malicious download, a DechoNet verdict that looks wrong (false_positive) or a danger it missed (missed), an MCP server whose tool descriptions steer agents (malicious_mcp — url is the MCP endpoint), or a network anomaly (network_anomaly — the certificate serial/issuer or addresses you saw for the host, in observed). Kept for 90 days: the host and the kind, with an anonymous reporter hash used to count independent reports; for malicious_mcp the endpoint path, for network_anomaly the observed values and the country of the connection. No query, page text or free text. This call only records the report and returns at once; it opens nothing. A report changes no verdict by itself: later, DechoNet's own hourly check visits the reported host (an outside site) with the same rules as phishing_link_check (mcp_server_check for malicious_mcp, dns_lookup and ssl_check for network_anomaly), and only what that check observes counts; hosts reported by several independent sources are checked first. Not read-only (it records the report); rate-limited.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Report a Page
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • security_scanOne-shot comprehensive audit of a domain, scored 0-100 with an A+ to F grade and a prioritized action list.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One-shot comprehensive audit of a domain, scored 0-100 with an A+ to F grade and a prioritized action list. Five scored areas: the web connection (TLS certificate and HTTP security headers, measured on www when only www has an address), mail spoofing defence (SPF/DKIM/DMARC; a domain that uses no mail is judged only on SPF -all and an enforced DMARC policy), domain registration and DNS, exposure (admin screens, developer tools and the like on hosts named in public certificate logs — counts only), and reputation (DechoNet verdict store and licensed phishing feeds). DNS propagation, reverse DNS and ASN are returned as reference information and not scored. A warning costs a quarter of its area and a critical half; data that could not be read in full is flagged, not charged, and an exposure or reputation lookup that fails is reported as not checked. Call the individual tools (e.g., ssl_check, email_auth, exposure_map) for depth on one area. BEHAVIOR: passive — public lookups and ordinary HTTPS requests only; open ports are NOT scanned (port_scan is the separate, active check). Takes up to about a minute (the exposure lookup). Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited (it makes multiple backend calls). Returns the score, per-area breakdown, reference areas, top actions, and per-area summaries.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Full Domain Security Scan
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • set_expectationsRecord what a domain should show from outside and check it now — HSTS or another header present, DMARC enforcing, an issue key no longer reported, an HTTP or TLS grade at or above …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "set_expectations" says "set": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Record what a domain should show from outside and check it now — HSTS or another header present, DMARC enforcing, an issue key no longer reported, an HTTP or TLS grade at or above a level, a certificate with enough days left, a DNS record present, absent or containing a value, HTTPS answering. DechoNet reads the domain fresh (not from cache) with its public dns / ssl / http / email tools, from its own servers and the Seoul observation point, and then re-checks the set every day. Each result is pass, fail or unknown; unknown (a tool or part of it did not answer) is never a pass. Without an API key the set is anonymous: no alerts, kept 30 days after its last check, reachable by id and status page. With an API key (Authorization: Bearer dn_…) the set belongs to that key's account, and a set that held and stops holding is reported in the account's daily mail. Not read-only (it stores the set); public checks only, so any domain is accepted. Typical use: after changing DNS, TLS, headers or mail settings, to state the intended result and be told if it is ever reverted. Returns the set id, status page, per-check results with where to fix what does not hold (for the platform the site runs on), and signed observation receipts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Set Outside Expectations (daily re-check)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • subdomain_discoveryEnumerate the subdomains of a domain from Certificate Transparency logs — fully passive (no packets are sent to the target; CT logs are public records of every TLS certificate ever…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Enumerate the subdomains of a domain from Certificate Transparency logs — fully passive (no packets are sent to the target; CT logs are public records of every TLS certificate ever issued). Flags operational-looking names (dev, staging, admin, vpn, legacy) and wildcard certificates, because forgotten subdomains are a common takeover path. Use this as the first recon step to map a domain's attack surface. Use dns_lookup to check whether a discovered name still resolves, or lookalike_domains for typosquat variants of the domain name itself. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns the subdomain count, risky-name count, wildcard flag, and the hostname list.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Subdomain Discovery
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • subnet_calcCompute IPv4 subnet details from CIDR notation entirely locally — no network call: network and broadcast addresses, usable host range, total usable hosts, subnet mask, and wildcard…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compute IPv4 subnet details from CIDR notation entirely locally — no network call: network and broadcast addresses, usable host range, total usable hosts, subnet mask, and wildcard mask. /31 and /32 are handled per RFC 3021 (point-to-point / single host). Use this for IPv4 address planning. It does not query DNS or contact any host, so it is purely computational. Requires no API key and is NOT rate-limited (computed in-process). Returns the calculated fields as text.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: IPv4 Subnet Calculator
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_expectationsCheck expectations from outside now, with fresh reads: either a stored set by id (from set_expectations — its state is updated and an anonymous set is kept another 30 days), or a d…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check expectations from outside now, with fresh reads: either a stored set by id (from set_expectations — its state is updated and an anonymous set is kept another 30 days), or a domain plus a list of checks once, storing nothing. Same checks and outcomes as set_expectations (pass / fail / unknown, unknown is never a pass), each tool read once with a signed observation receipt. Typical use: right after a change, to see whether it is visible from outside yet — DNS and CDN changes can take minutes to hours to show. Rate-limited (a few checks per minute).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify Outside Expectations Now
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wallet_address_checkCheck one crypto wallet address: which chain it belongs to (EVM, TRON, Bitcoin, Solana — from the format alone), whether its checksum is valid (EIP-55, Base58Check, bech32/bech32m)…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check one crypto wallet address: which chain it belongs to (EVM, TRON, Bitcoin, Solana — from the format alone), whether its checksum is valid (EIP-55, Base58Check, bech32/bech32m), whether it is on the US Treasury OFAC SDN sanctions list (read daily) or among the addresses the FBI published in an alert (the Binance theft of October 2026, 628 addresses), whether Tether has frozen USDT at it (Ethereum and TRON addresses, read from the USDT contract), and how many pages DechoNet's phishing check judged dangerous showed it. Listed means on that day's list, not a finding about the owner; not listed is not a statement that the address is clean (most scam addresses are on no list). Balances, transaction history and the owner are not looked at — see 'Not checked'. The address is not stored. Use crypto_check_before_sign to judge an address together with the page that asked and the wallet request. Read-only; no API key; rate-limited.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Wallet Address Check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • watch_domainStart (or reuse) a daily DechoNet watch on a domain so that changes are recorded over time — SSL grade/issuer/expiry, DNS records, HTTP security headers, domain registration, and o…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Start (or reuse) a daily DechoNet watch on a domain so that changes are recorded over time — SSL grade/issuer/expiry, DNS records, HTTP security headers, domain registration, and optionally OWASP posture and impersonation exposure. Use this once when the user cares about a domain beyond a one-off check (their own domain, a client, a vendor, a target under investigation). After this, domain_changes answers "what changed since last time?" from real daily snapshots. Not read-only (it creates a watch record) but idempotent: watching an already-watched domain returns the existing watch. No account, no email, no PII — a watch is keyed by domain+tool and its history page is a public unguessable URL you can share with the user. Rate-limited (a few watches per minute).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Watch a Domain (daily re-check)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 8Show 8 read-only tools
  • asn_lookupLook up Autonomous System (ASN) / BGP information for an IP address or AS number: the network operator, announced prefixes, abuse contact, and a classification (cloud, CDN, ISP, ho…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "asn_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "contact": it reads contacts.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up Autonomous System (ASN) / BGP information for an IP address or AS number: the network operator, announced prefixes, abuse contact, and a classification (cloud, CDN, ISP, hosting, or enterprise). For an IPv4 address it also reports whether the address is on the Tor Project exit list, as information that does not change the result. Use this to identify who runs a network or whether an IP is cloud/CDN-hosted. Use reverse_dns instead for the host-level PTR name of a single IP. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns operator, prefixes, classification, and abuse contact.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: ASN / BGP Lookup
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • dns_lookupQuery DNS records (A, AAAA, MX, TXT, NS, SOA, CAA) for a domain and validate email-related records, including DNSSEC presence and SPF/DMARC syntax, returning severity-rated diagnos…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "dns_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "query" and "email": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "query" and "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Query DNS records (A, AAAA, MX, TXT, NS, SOA, CAA) for a domain and validate email-related records, including DNSSEC presence and SPF/DMARC syntax, returning severity-rated diagnostics. Use this for a single authoritative answer about one domain. Use dns_propagation instead when you need to compare answers across multiple global resolvers (e.g., right after a change), or email_auth for a full SPF/DKIM/DMARC deliverability assessment. Read-only; requires no API key or authentication; subject to rate limiting. Returns a text report: status, KPI summary, detected issues, and recommended actions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: DNS Lookup
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • dns_propagationQuery one DNS record across 8+ global public resolvers (Google, Cloudflare, Quad9, OpenDNS, and more) simultaneously and report which resolvers return stale versus updated values.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "query": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Query one DNS record across 8+ global public resolvers (Google, Cloudflare, Quad9, OpenDNS, and more) simultaneously and report which resolvers return stale versus updated values. Use this after changing a record to confirm worldwide propagation. Use dns_lookup instead for a single authoritative answer with SPF/DMARC validation. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns per-resolver values and a consistency verdict.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: DNS Propagation Check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • domain_historyShow how a domain's (or IPv4 address's) infrastructure has changed over time from DechoNet's stored observations: nameservers, A/AAAA, MX, CNAME, certificate issuer, registrar, RDA…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "show": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show how a domain's (or IPv4 address's) infrastructure has changed over time from DechoNet's stored observations: nameservers, A/AAAA, MX, CNAME, certificate issuer, registrar, RDAP nameservers and status, and for an IP its ASN and PTR — each value with when it was first and last seen. Use this when the question is about the past ("when did the nameservers change?", "which IPs has it used?"); use dns_lookup or rdap_lookup for the current state. Coverage: only what DechoNet itself observed (lookups, watches, own discovery, and a daily re-resolution of the Korean-brand and phishing names it tracks) — not full passive DNS. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns per-kind value timelines and a coverage note.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Infrastructure History
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • infrastructure_pivotFind other domains DechoNet has seen with the same infrastructure value — a nameserver, IP address, MX host, certificate issuer or registrar — with first and last seen, to map rela…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find other domains DechoNet has seen with the same infrastructure value — a nameserver, IP address, MX host, certificate issuer or registrar — with first and last seen, to map related infrastructure (e.g. other phishing domains on the same rare nameserver). Use it after domain_history or dns_lookup gives you a distinctive value. Shared infrastructure (CDN edges, public CAs, large registrars and DNS hosts) returns a count only, since sharing it says nothing about ownership. Read-only; REQUIRES a free DechoNet API key (account page; remote: send Authorization: Bearer dn_…, npm: set DECHONET_API_KEY); up to 20 rows per call (higher for some keys); rate-limited. Coverage: only DechoNet's own observations.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Infrastructure Pivot
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • reverse_dnsResolve the PTR (reverse DNS) record for an IPv4 or IPv6 address and verify forward-confirmed reverse DNS (FCrDNS) by checking that the PTR hostname resolves back to the same IP.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "resolve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve the PTR (reverse DNS) record for an IPv4 or IPv6 address and verify forward-confirmed reverse DNS (FCrDNS) by checking that the PTR hostname resolves back to the same IP. Infers the hosting provider from PTR naming patterns. Use this to validate mail-server rDNS or identify a single IP's host. Use asn_lookup instead for network/BGP ownership of the IP. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns the PTR hostname, FCrDNS pass/fail, and a provider guess.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Reverse DNS (PTR) Lookup
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • ssl_checkInspect a host's served TLS/SSL certificate and connection: expiry date, issuer, SAN list, chain integrity, revocation (OCSP, then CRL; unknown when neither answers — not graded un…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "inspect": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Inspect a host's served TLS/SSL certificate and connection: expiry date, issuer, SAN list, chain integrity, revocation (OCSP, then CRL; unknown when neither answers — not graded unless revoked), TLS version, and HSTS, returning an A+ to F grade weighted by certificate validity (40%), TLS version (25%), chain trust (15%), and HSTS (20%). From Seoul it also lists the protocol versions and cipher suites the server accepts — including SSL 3.0, RC4, 3DES, export, NULL and anonymous suites and the Korean SEED/ARIA ciphers — with TLS compression, secure renegotiation, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, DH group size and TLS 1.3 key exchange groups; weak findings cap the grade as SSL Labs does (F, C or B). Use this to diagnose certificate or HTTPS-handshake problems for one host. Use http_security instead to audit response security headers, or security_scan for an all-in-one domain report. Read-only: one full TLS handshake plus opening ClientHello messages whose first answer is read; no application data and no vulnerability probes; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns a text report: grade, expiry/issuer KPIs, issues, and actions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: SSL Certificate Check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • whois_lookupRetrieve domain registration data via RDAP (with WHOIS fallback): registrar, creation/expiry/update dates, nameservers, and EPP status flags, highlighting risk states such as clien…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "whois_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve domain registration data via RDAP (with WHOIS fallback): registrar, creation/expiry/update dates, nameservers, and EPP status flags, highlighting risk states such as clientHold and pendingDelete. Use this for ownership, lifecycle, and expiry questions about a registered domain. Use dns_lookup instead for live DNS records, or reverse_dns/asn_lookup for IP-level ownership. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns registrar, key dates, nameservers, and status flags.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: WHOIS / RDAP Domain Lookup
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

396 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 2 private-data tools breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write33
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out6
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__dechonet__asn_lookup",
      "mcp__dechonet__dns_lookup"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:37 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
26
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 26 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 25 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://dechonet.com/mcp: tools/list returned 34 tools to an anonymous client, including crypto_check_before_sign (irreversible), http_security (write), email_auth (write), port_scan (write), subdomain_discovery (write) and 21 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 25 to 26
  2. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 22 to 25

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high4 warn
  • The description refers to ".env".

    Matched text

    description: "...u do not own. The sensitive-file check (.env, .git, server-status) runs only for the..."

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "lookalike_domains" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "crypto_check_before_sign" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "crypto_dapp_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "phishing_link_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "phishing_link_check" says "link": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added, 2 changed.+1 added~2 changedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 25 -> 26.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 25 to 26
  3. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
  4. Tools3 added.+3 addedView diff
  5. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 22 -> 25.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 22 to 25
  6. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:report_pageChanges thingsdescriptionannotations
  7. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.9.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http dechonet https://dechonet.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http dechonet https://dechonet.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__dechonet__dns_lookup",
      "mcp__dechonet__ssl_check",
      "mcp__dechonet__dns_propagation",
      "mcp__dechonet__reverse_dns",
      "mcp__dechonet__asn_lookup",
      "mcp__dechonet__whois_lookup",
      "mcp__dechonet__domain_history",
      "mcp__dechonet__infrastructure_pivot"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__dechonet__http_security",
      "mcp__dechonet__email_auth",
      "mcp__dechonet__port_scan",
      "mcp__dechonet__subdomain_discovery",
      "mcp__dechonet__lookalike_domains",
      "mcp__dechonet__ip_info",
      "mcp__dechonet__email_header_analysis",
      "mcp__dechonet__subnet_calc",
      "mcp__dechonet__security_scan",
      "mcp__dechonet__owasp_check",
      "mcp__dechonet__impersonation_exposure",
      "mcp__dechonet__domain_changes",
      "mcp__dechonet__watch_domain",
      "mcp__dechonet__set_expectations",
      "mcp__dechonet__verify_expectations",
      "mcp__dechonet__check_before_action",
      "mcp__dechonet__crypto_check_before_sign",
      "mcp__dechonet__wallet_address_check",
      "mcp__dechonet__crypto_dapp_check",
      "mcp__dechonet__crypto_exchange_check",
      "mcp__dechonet__report_page",
      "mcp__dechonet__golive_check",
      "mcp__dechonet__pqc_readiness",
      "mcp__dechonet__mcp_server_check",
      "mcp__dechonet__phishing_link_check",
      "mcp__dechonet__exposure_map"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as dechonet. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 33 rules
  • mcp__dechonet__dns_lookup private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__ssl_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__http_security untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__dechonet__email_auth untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__port_scan untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__dns_propagation untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__reverse_dns untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__asn_lookup private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__whois_lookup untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__subdomain_discovery untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__lookalike_domains untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__ip_info untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__email_header_analysis untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__security_scan untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__owasp_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__impersonation_exposure untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__domain_changes untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__domain_history untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__infrastructure_pivot untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__watch_domain untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__set_expectations untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__verify_expectations untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__check_before_action untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__dechonet__crypto_check_before_sign untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__dechonet__wallet_address_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__crypto_dapp_check untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__dechonet__crypto_exchange_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__report_page untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__dechonet__golive_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__pqc_readiness untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__mcp_server_check untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__dechonet__phishing_link_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__dechonet__exposure_map untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.dechonet/mcp/verify?hash=e082819d6a9dd13ea2c00074888eec551fbae0305ad056bfe77dfe8255519d26" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e082819d6a9d, from Nov 14, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.dechonet/mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.dechonet/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.dechonet/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.dechonet/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 16:17 UTC.

dechonet.com MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the dechonet.com MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 34 tools, 26 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the dechonet.com MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the dechonet.com MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: crypto_check_before_sign.

What tools does the dechonet.com MCP server have?

34 tools: 1 irreversible, 25 write, 8 read. crypto_check_before_sign, http_security, email_auth, port_scan, subdomain_discovery, lookalike_domains, ip_info, email_header_analysis and 26 more.

Does the dechonet.com MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the dechonet.com MCP server send data to outside services?

6 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): http_security, check_before_action, crypto_check_before_sign, crypto_dapp_check, report_page and mcp_server_check.

Has the dechonet.com MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 5 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 14, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.