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DeckExtract MCP server

com.deckextract/deckextractdeckextract.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Download DocSend and Papermark decks as PDF or PPTX, including email-gated and protected links.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the DeckExtract MCP server can do

The DeckExtract MCP server is published by deckextract.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: deckextract), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (deckextract); 1 tool can send data out of your system (deckextract).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • deckextractExtract a deck from a DocSend or Papermark sharing link.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract a deck from a DocSend or Papermark sharing link. Returns a temporary download URL and a readable `deckextract://deck/...` resource for the PDF/PPTX (or a ZIP for data rooms — a DocSend Space or Papermark data room counts as one extraction like any other link). Pass `analyze: true` (part of DeckExtract for Funds) to also return structured deck data. Decks that email the viewer a verification step return resume tokens with retry instructions: fetch the emailed 6-digit code and retry with `otp` + `otpSessionId` (Papermark), or retry with `url` set to the emailed confirmation link + `sessionId` (DocSend). Typical extraction takes 15-90 seconds; the public API is rate limited to 5 extractions per IP per 30 minutes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • account_statusReturns the calling account's plan (free or Pro), whether it's signed in, and this month's extraction usage and remaining quota.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "account_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the calling account's plan (free or Pro), whether it's signed in, and this month's extraction usage and remaining quota. Takes no input.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:37 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://deckextract.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://oszhmiypdhslydimpvwi.supabase.co/auth/v1
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://deckextract.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including deckextract (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http deckextract https://deckextract.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http deckextract https://deckextract.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__deckextract__account_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__deckextract__deckextract"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as deckextract. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__deckextract__deckextract untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.deckextract/deckextract/verify?hash=bef9f22deb20c1dc8dc4546461bd780430eb2537cc0024ee218644da7a6be7d4" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash bef9f22deb20, from Nov 13, 2026, 00:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.deckextract/deckextract/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.deckextract/deckextract
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.deckextract/deckextract.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.deckextract/deckextract)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:54 UTC.

DeckExtract MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the DeckExtract MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the DeckExtract MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the DeckExtract MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the DeckExtract MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. deckextract and account_status.

Does the DeckExtract MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the DeckExtract MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): deckextract.

Has the DeckExtract MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.