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Deploy to Agents MCP server

com.deploytoagents/serverdeploytoagents.comstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned

Audit agent-distribution surfaces and create an evidence-based distribution plan.

4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Deploy to Agents MCP server can do

The Deploy to Agents MCP server is published by deploytoagents.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: audit_app and create_distribution_plan), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (audit_app and get_audit_result); 1 tool can send data out of your system (audit_app).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.3.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • audit_appQueue a bounded audit of a public HTTP or HTTPS app and return an unlisted receipt URL.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Queue a bounded audit of a public HTTP or HTTPS app and return an unlisted receipt URL. Reuse get_audit_result until processing completes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • create_distribution_planTurn a completed technical audit into prioritized remediation plus official-registry, public-repository, customer-evidence, and independent-discovery actions.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_distribution_plan" says "create": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "create_distribution_plan" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "create_distribution_plan" says "create": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Turn a completed technical audit into prioritized remediation plus official-registry, public-repository, customer-evidence, and independent-discovery actions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_audit_resultRetrieve the current status, score, findings, privacy state, and evidence URL for an audit UUID.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_audit_result" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve the current status, score, findings, privacy state, and evidence URL for an audit UUID.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_customer_zero_evidenceReturn the public self-audit evidence and the explicit boundary between technical readiness and independent discovery.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_customer_zero_evidence" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the public self-audit evidence and the explicit boundary between technical readiness and independent discovery.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:37 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://deploytoagents.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including audit_app (write), create_distribution_plan (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "create_distribution_plan" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "create_distribution_plan" says "create": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http deploytoagents https://deploytoagents.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http deploytoagents https://deploytoagents.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__deploytoagents__get_audit_result",
      "mcp__deploytoagents__get_customer_zero_evidence"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__deploytoagents__audit_app",
      "mcp__deploytoagents__create_distribution_plan"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as deploytoagents. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__deploytoagents__audit_app untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__deploytoagents__get_audit_result untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.deploytoagents/server/verify?hash=4b79b1fe5ab3bc22531904d9d7259aa9840ea33995657a5154599263bde8985f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4b79b1fe5ab3, from Nov 10, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.deploytoagents/server/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.deploytoagents/server
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.deploytoagents/server.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.deploytoagents/server)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:54 UTC.

Deploy to Agents MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Deploy to Agents MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Deploy to Agents MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Deploy to Agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Deploy to Agents MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. audit_app, create_distribution_plan, get_audit_result and get_customer_zero_evidence.

Does the Deploy to Agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Deploy to Agents MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): audit_app.

Has the Deploy to Agents MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.