Deploy to Agents MCP server
com.deploytoagents/serverdeploytoagents.comstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned
Audit agent-distribution surfaces and create an evidence-based distribution plan.
4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Deploy to Agents MCP server can do
The Deploy to Agents MCP server is published by deploytoagents.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: audit_app and create_distribution_plan), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (audit_app and get_audit_result); 1 tool can send data out of your system (audit_app).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
audit_appQueue a bounded audit of a public HTTP or HTTPS app and return an unlisted receipt URL.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Queue a bounded audit of a public HTTP or HTTPS app and return an unlisted receipt URL. Reuse get_audit_result until processing completes.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
create_distribution_planTurn a completed technical audit into prioritized remediation plus official-registry, public-repository, customer-evidence, and independent-discovery actions.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_distribution_plan" says "create": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "create_distribution_plan" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "create_distribution_plan" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Turn a completed technical audit into prioritized remediation plus official-registry, public-repository, customer-evidence, and independent-discovery actions.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_audit_resultRetrieve the current status, score, findings, privacy state, and evidence URL for an audit UUID.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_audit_result" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve the current status, score, findings, privacy state, and evidence URL for an audit UUID.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_customer_zero_evidenceReturn the public self-audit evidence and the explicit boundary between technical readiness and independent discovery.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_customer_zero_evidence" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the public self-audit evidence and the explicit boundary between technical readiness and independent discovery.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:37 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://deploytoagents.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including audit_app (write), create_distribution_plan (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "create_distribution_plan" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "create_distribution_plan" says "create": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http deploytoagents https://deploytoagents.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http deploytoagents https://deploytoagents.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__deploytoagents__get_audit_result",
"mcp__deploytoagents__get_customer_zero_evidence"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__deploytoagents__audit_app",
"mcp__deploytoagents__create_distribution_plan"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as deploytoagents. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__deploytoagents__audit_app untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__deploytoagents__get_audit_result untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.deploytoagents/server/verify?hash=4b79b1fe5ab3bc22531904d9d7259aa9840ea33995657a5154599263bde8985f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 4b79b1fe5ab3, from Nov 10, 2026, 14:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.deploytoagents/server/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.deploytoagents/server)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:54 UTC.
Deploy to Agents MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Deploy to Agents MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Deploy to Agents MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Deploy to Agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Deploy to Agents MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. audit_app, create_distribution_plan, get_audit_result and get_customer_zero_evidence.
Does the Deploy to Agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Deploy to Agents MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): audit_app.
Has the Deploy to Agents MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.