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DocFig MCP server

com.docfig/docfigdocfig.comstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

Bank statement PDFs to checked transactions, plus a free offline check for transaction tables.

4 tools: 4 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the DocFig MCP server can do

The DocFig MCP server is published by docfig.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: check_transactions, convert_statement, combine_statements and usage), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (convert_statement, combine_statements and usage).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • check_transactionsCheck a bank or credit card statement's transactions table for errors.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a bank or credit card statement's transactions table for errors. Free and offline: no API key, nothing is uploaded. Walks the running balance row by row and reports rows where the balance does not follow, swapped debit and credit columns, sign errors, duplicated or missing rows, dates out of order, and totals that miss the opening or closing balance, each with a likely fix. Give the table as csv_text (CSV or TSV with a header row) or as rows (first row is the header). Same result as `docfig check --json`.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check a transactions table
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • combine_statementsConvert several statements (or reuse statement_ids from the last hour) and combine them into one set of accounts: finds missing months (gaps), overlapping periods, duplicated trans…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Convert several statements (or reuse statement_ids from the last hour) and combine them into one set of accounts: finds missing months (gaps), overlapping periods, duplicated transactions (kept once) and balances that do not carry over. Returns the accounts, problems, counts and links to one combined Excel or CSV file (valid one hour). Uses the user's DocFig API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Combine several statements
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • convert_statementConvert a bank or credit card statement (PDF, scanned PDF, or a JPG, PNG or HEIC photo) into transactions, with every row checked against the balances.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "convert_statement" says "convert": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Convert a bank or credit card statement (PDF, scanned PDF, or a JPG, PNG or HEIC photo) into transactions, with every row checked against the balances. Give file_url or file_base64. Returns the bank, period, totals, check status, flagged rows, the first transactions and Excel and CSV download links that work for one hour. Uses the user's DocFig API key and their monthly pages (free key: 100 pages a month at https://docfig.com/api). Account numbers are masked; nothing is stored, results are deleted after one hour.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Convert a bank statement
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • usagePages used and left this month for the DocFig API key, and when they reset.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Pages used and left this month for the DocFig API key, and when they reset.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Pages left this month
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 2, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.docfig.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including check_transactions (write), convert_statement (write), combine_statements (write), usage (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http docfig https://mcp.docfig.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http docfig https://mcp.docfig.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__docfig__check_transactions",
      "mcp__docfig__convert_statement",
      "mcp__docfig__combine_statements",
      "mcp__docfig__usage"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as docfig. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__docfig__convert_statement untrusted-input
  • mcp__docfig__combine_statements untrusted-input
  • mcp__docfig__usage untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.docfig/docfig/verify?hash=1ec72b9d6835eb18bd12f88cf2b7f11effeaff7f2df4c25972156afe9bf18b23" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1ec72b9d6835, from Nov 14, 2026, 07:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.docfig/docfig/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.docfig/docfig
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.docfig/docfig.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.docfig/docfig)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 1, 2026, 08:17 UTC.

DocFig MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the DocFig MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the DocFig MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the DocFig MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the DocFig MCP server have?

4 tools: 4 write. check_transactions, convert_statement, combine_statements and usage.

Does the DocFig MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the DocFig MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the DocFig MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.