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exclude-feed MCP server

com.dropwatchhq/exclude-feeddropwatchhq.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Screen a business for federal exclusions & sanctions: OFAC SDN, HHS-OIG LEIE, SAM.gov debarment.

4 tools: 4 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the exclude-feed MCP server can do

The exclude-feed MCP server is published by dropwatchhq.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: screen_exclusion, screen_batch, roster_rescreen and watch_entity), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool can send data out of your system (watch_entity).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • roster_rescreenRe-screen an ENTIRE ROSTER of employees, contractors, and vendors against the federal exclusion & sanctions lists (HHS-OIG LEIE, OFAC SDN+Consolidated, SAM.gov debarment) in ONE ca…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Re-screen an ENTIRE ROSTER of employees, contractors, and vendors against the federal exclusion & sanctions lists (HHS-OIG LEIE, OFAC SDN+Consolidated, SAM.gov debarment) in ONE call, and mint a DATED, ed25519-SIGNED COMPLIANCE RECEIPT. This is the OIG-mandated MONTHLY exclusion check for healthcare billing / RCM / compliance teams: OIG guidance says screen every employee, contractor, and vendor against the LEIE each month, because a single excluded person on a claim triggers Civil Monetary Penalties. The signed receipt is your audit artifact — verifiable offline, proving WHO you screened, against WHICH list build, on WHAT date. Returns per-entity verdicts (cleared vs. flagged) plus a verifiable receipt URL.
  • screen_batchBulk-screen up to 50 entities in one call against all federal exclusion/sanctions lists.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Bulk-screen up to 50 entities in one call against all federal exclusion/sanctions lists. Pass an array of names (or {name,npi,state} objects). Returns one verdict per row. Free tool (rate-limited).
  • screen_exclusionScreen a business entity / vendor / counterparty for FEDERAL EXCLUSIONS & SANCTIONS before you onboard or pay it.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a business entity / vendor / counterparty for FEDERAL EXCLUSIONS & SANCTIONS before you onboard or pay it. One unified, DEDUPED check across OFAC SDN, OFAC Consolidated (sanctions), HHS-OIG LEIE (healthcare exclusions), SAM.gov (federal contractor debarment/suspension), and publicly-available state debarment lists. Returns match / possible-match / no-match, the matched record(s) with source + exclusion type + dates, and a confidence score. FCRA-SAFE: this is KYB/sanctions compliance for entities — NOT a consumer report, not for credit/employment/insurance/tenancy decisions about individuals.
  • watch_entityAdd an entity to a watchlist that is RE-SCREENED daily.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "add": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.webhook): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Add an entity to a watchlist that is RE-SCREENED daily. You get alerted (webhook/email) the first time it appears on any federal exclusion or sanctions list. Use for continuous vendor / counterparty monitoring.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:26 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://exclude.dropwatchhq.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including screen_exclusion (write), screen_batch (write), roster_rescreen (write), watch_entity (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http exclude-feed https://exclude.dropwatchhq.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http exclude-feed https://exclude.dropwatchhq.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__exclude-feed__screen_exclusion",
      "mcp__exclude-feed__screen_batch",
      "mcp__exclude-feed__roster_rescreen",
      "mcp__exclude-feed__watch_entity"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as exclude-feed. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__exclude-feed__watch_entity outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.dropwatchhq/exclude-feed/verify?hash=08905f12ab4757582b37b5736461e4e9938cceb5448b969caef68059baa6f35a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 08905f12ab47, from Nov 17, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.dropwatchhq/exclude-feed/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.dropwatchhq/exclude-feed
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.dropwatchhq/exclude-feed.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.dropwatchhq/exclude-feed)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:54 UTC.

exclude-feed MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the exclude-feed MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the exclude-feed MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the exclude-feed MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the exclude-feed MCP server have?

4 tools: 4 write. screen_exclusion, screen_batch, roster_rescreen and watch_entity.

Does the exclude-feed MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the exclude-feed MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): watch_entity.

Has the exclude-feed MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.