Skip to content

ECZ-ID Trust MCP server

com.ecocitizenz/trust-mcpecocitizenz.comstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

Read-only ECZ-ID Business Passport state lookup via the public ECZ-ID Resolver. Reports state only.

7 tools: 1 change things and 6 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 6 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the ECZ-ID Trust MCP server can do

The ECZ-ID Trust MCP server is published by ecocitizenz.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: create_request_to_resolve), but cannot delete data. 6 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_resolver_link).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • create_request_to_resolveAUTHENTICATED: create a neutral, shareable request for independently re-checkable ECZ-ID evidence.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_request_to_resolve" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    AUTHENTICATED: create a neutral, shareable request for independently re-checkable ECZ-ID evidence. Requires a Microsoft Entra bearer token with the RequestToResolve.Create scope (or app role). It never verifies a target, never sends messages, and absence of evidence is never rendered as unsafe.
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
  • explain_statusDeterministically render the exact ECZ-ID status using the claims-safe renderer (VERIFIED is an ECZ-ID state, not a Microsoft certification).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "explain_status" says "explain": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Deterministically render the exact ECZ-ID status using the claims-safe renderer (VERIFIED is an ECZ-ID state, not a Microsoft certification). Absence of evidence renders the approved neutral wording — never "unsafe". No LLM.
  • find_productGiven narrow context flags, return ONE best next ECZ-ID product action (free/community routes win where correct; neutral context routes to free public verification).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_product" says "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Given narrow context flags, return ONE best next ECZ-ID product action (free/community routes win where correct; neutral context routes to free public verification).
  • get_current_stateReturn the narrow current Resolver-derived state for an ECZ-ID (state, checked_at, Resolver link).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_current_state" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the narrow current Resolver-derived state for an ECZ-ID (state, checked_at, Resolver link). No risk/safety/compliance inference.
  • get_install_instructionsReturn deterministic official install/discovery routes for an ECZ-ID product or surface (canonical URLs only; planned Microsoft surfaces carry no URLs).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_install_instructions" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return deterministic official install/discovery routes for an ECZ-ID product or surface (canonical URLs only; planned Microsoft surfaces carry no URLs).
  • resolve_identityResolve an ECZ-ID through the public ECZ-ID Resolver and return the exact canonical state with checked_at, Resolver proof link, re-check action and the local-policy caveat.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "resolve_identity" says "resolve": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve an ECZ-ID through the public ECZ-ID Resolver and return the exact canonical state with checked_at, Resolver proof link, re-check action and the local-policy caveat. Never asserts safety, approval or compliance.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:37 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://trust-mcp.ecocitizenz.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://login.microsoftonline.com/organizations/v2.0
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://trust-mcp.ecocitizenz.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including create_request_to_resolve (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http trust https://trust-mcp.ecocitizenz.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http trust https://trust-mcp.ecocitizenz.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__trust__resolve_identity",
      "mcp__trust__get_current_state",
      "mcp__trust__get_resolver_link",
      "mcp__trust__explain_status",
      "mcp__trust__find_product",
      "mcp__trust__get_install_instructions"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__trust__create_request_to_resolve"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as trust. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__trust__get_resolver_link untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.ecocitizenz/trust-mcp/verify?hash=8f5caae3cc96b1243ef455e536bc9909c45222068778e6619b8c37ee74c4effb" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 8f5caae3cc96, from Nov 13, 2026, 02:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ecocitizenz/trust-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.ecocitizenz/trust-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.ecocitizenz/trust-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ecocitizenz/trust-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:54 UTC.

ECZ-ID Trust MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ECZ-ID Trust MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ECZ-ID Trust MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ECZ-ID Trust MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ECZ-ID Trust MCP server have?

7 tools: 1 write, 6 read. create_request_to_resolve, resolve_identity, get_current_state, get_resolver_link, explain_status, find_product and get_install_instructions.

Does the ECZ-ID Trust MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ECZ-ID Trust MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the ECZ-ID Trust MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.