ET Ducky MCP server
com.etducky/etduckyetducky.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Read-only access to an ET Ducky organization's agents, alerts, and fleet summary
5 tools: 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the ET Ducky MCP server can do
The ET Ducky MCP server is published by etducky.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_device_context).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
get_agentOne agent with its latest health sample (CPU, memory, free space on C:, uptime, pending reboot, make and model) and its number of active alerts.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_agent" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it One agent with its latest health sample (CPU, memory, free space on C:, uptime, pending reboot, make and model) and its number of active alerts.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_device_contextEverything about one device for a support ticket in one call: the agents matching a hostname (the full name or, when no agent has it, the first DNS label cut to 15 characters) or a…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_device_context" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "ticket": it reads issues, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Everything about one device for a support ticket in one call: the agents matching a hostname (the full name or, when no agent has it, the first DNS label cut to 15 characters) or an agent_id, each with its latest health sample, its active alerts (newest 10) and dashboard links that open Live Session or remote control after a technician signs in and confirms. matchedBy says how the device was found; "short_name" can be a different computer whose name starts the same way, and "none" means no agent matched. Give hostname or agent_id.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_fleet_summaryCounts for this organization: agents, online, offline, Windows, Linux, other OS, isolated, and active alerts by severity.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_fleet_summary" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Counts for this organization: agents, online, offline, Windows, Linux, other OS, isolated, and active alerts by severity.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_agentsList this organization's ET Ducky agents (Windows and Linux endpoints) with OS, agent version, online state, last heartbeat, last signed-in user, isolation state and tags.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_agents" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List this organization's ET Ducky agents (Windows and Linux endpoints) with OS, agent version, online state, last heartbeat, last signed-in user, isolation state and tags. Sorted by hostname.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_alertsAlerts raised for this organization's agents, newest first.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_alerts" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Alerts raised for this organization's agents, newest first.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:37 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff
- Added:get_device_contextOnly reads
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http etducky https://etducky.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http etducky https://etducky.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__etducky__list_agents",
"mcp__etducky__get_agent",
"mcp__etducky__list_alerts",
"mcp__etducky__get_fleet_summary",
"mcp__etducky__get_device_context"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as etducky. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__etducky__get_device_context untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.etducky/etducky/verify?hash=9f9d73fad2cb11c5e94fac406ab9468ef78cdd0eef7584e2961b8480aa32736d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 9f9d73fad2cb, from Nov 13, 2026, 04:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.etducky/etducky/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.etducky/etducky)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:54 UTC.
ET Ducky MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the ET Ducky MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the ET Ducky MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the ET Ducky MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the ET Ducky MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 5 read. list_agents, get_agent, list_alerts, get_fleet_summary and get_device_context.
Does the ET Ducky MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the ET Ducky MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the ET Ducky MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 13, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.