Evolize MCP server
com.evolize/accessibility-scannerevolize.comstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Accessibility scans with evidence, public reports, and fresh checks after fixes.
3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Evolize MCP server can do
The Evolize MCP server is published by evolize.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: scan_website), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (get_public_report, scan_website and get_scan_result); 2 tools can send data out of your system (get_public_report and scan_website).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
scan_websiteRequest an Evolize accessibility assessment of a publicly reachable website, then read the result with get_scan_result.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "request": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Request an Evolize accessibility assessment of a publicly reachable website, then read the result with get_scan_result. By default a completed assessment up to 24 hours old is reused; pass refresh=true to require newly executed work (for example after deploying a fix). This CREATES work: it can start a real browser-based scan whose result is retained and may become a public report under Evolize's existing publication policy. Free public assessments are bounded: a completed result up to 24h old is reused unless refresh=true, at most 3 newly executed assessments per website per 24h, and the platform's own per-IP, per-domain and global scan limits still apply.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_public_reportRetrieve an EXISTING public Evolize accessibility assessment for a website.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_public_report" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve an EXISTING public Evolize accessibility assessment for a website. Read-only: this starts no scan and creates no work. Returns not_found when no public report exists for the target — which says nothing about whether the site has accessibility problems. Evolize inspects publicly reachable pages of the target website in a real browser and runs deterministic accessibility checks (axe-core plus Evolize rules). It is not a local browser agent and it does not read your source code: findings reference the rendered DOM, so your coding agent maps them to source using its own repository access.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_scan_resultRead the result of an Evolize assessment started with scan_website, using the scan_handle it returned.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_scan_result" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Read the result of an Evolize assessment started with scan_website, using the scan_handle it returned. Read-only: it never starts a scan, never refreshes an assessment, never changes publication state, and never consumes scan quota — polling is safe. While the assessment is pending it returns the status and a retry_after_seconds. Follow next_cursor to read every finding.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:38 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://evolize.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_website (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http accessibility-scanner https://evolize.com/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http accessibility-scanner https://evolize.com/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__accessibility-scanner__get_scan_result"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__accessibility-scanner__get_public_report",
"mcp__accessibility-scanner__scan_website"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as accessibility-scanner. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__accessibility-scanner__get_public_report untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__accessibility-scanner__scan_website untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__accessibility-scanner__get_scan_result untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.evolize/accessibility-scanner/verify?hash=c4d093a184bc25c1eef1ceaddc2cdb7aa7f4fab390f50d16d09c707ff0d54db3" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash c4d093a184bc, from Nov 13, 2026, 04:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.evolize/accessibility-scanner/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.evolize/accessibility-scanner)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:54 UTC.
Evolize MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Evolize MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Evolize MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Evolize MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Evolize MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. scan_website, get_public_report and get_scan_result.
Does the Evolize MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Evolize MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_public_report and scan_website.
Has the Evolize MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.