FieldTranscript MCP server
com.fieldtranscript/transcriberfieldtranscript.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Verbatim transcription of public video/audio URLs to clean text, SRT, and timestamped records.
4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the FieldTranscript MCP server can do
The FieldTranscript MCP server is published by fieldtranscript.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: delete_job) and create or change data (1 tool: submit_transcription). 2 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (submit_transcription); 1 tool can send data out of your system (submit_transcription).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
delete_jobPermanently delete a finished (done or errored) transcription job and its stored text.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "delete_job" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The description says "Permanently delete".
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Permanently delete a finished (done or errored) transcription job and its stored text. Refused while the job is queued or running. This cannot be undone.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
submit_transcriptionSubmit a public video or audio URL (YouTube etc.) for verbatim transcription.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_transcription" says "submit": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit a public video or audio URL (YouTube etc.) for verbatim transcription. Returns a job_id immediately. Transcription takes ~1-10 minutes: poll get_job with the job_id every 30-60 seconds until status is 'done', then call get_job with include_transcript=true. Not for private/internal URLs.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_jobCheck a transcription job.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_job" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a transcription job. Returns status (queued / working / done / error) and metadata. Set include_transcript=true only once status is 'done' and you actually need the full text in context - transcripts of long videos are large.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
list_jobsList all transcription jobs on your account, newest first.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_jobs" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List all transcription jobs on your account, newest first.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:38 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 530
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 530.
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 530
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 530; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 530
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http transcriber https://mcp.fieldtranscript.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http transcriber https://mcp.fieldtranscript.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__transcriber__get_job",
"mcp__transcriber__list_jobs"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__transcriber__submit_transcription"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__transcriber__delete_job"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as transcriber. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__transcriber__submit_transcription untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.fieldtranscript/transcriber/verify?hash=11393668987ff307a531eee19b72dc9837c89155e0192682a5dc2d39eb6fdf8d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 11393668987f, from Nov 13, 2026, 05:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.fieldtranscript/transcriber/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.fieldtranscript/transcriber)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:54 UTC.
FieldTranscript MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the FieldTranscript MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the FieldTranscript MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_job.
Can the FieldTranscript MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the FieldTranscript MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 destructive, 1 write, 2 read. delete_job, submit_transcription, get_job and list_jobs.
Does the FieldTranscript MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the FieldTranscript MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): submit_transcription.
Has the FieldTranscript MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.