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Fitralo MCP server

com.fitralo/carriersfitralo.comstreamable-httpv3.73.33Scanned

European directory of freight carriers: find carriers by route, equipment and certificates.

3 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things and 2 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Fitralo MCP server can do

The Fitralo MCP server is published by fitralo.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: send_request). 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_carrier); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_carrier and send_request); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_request). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 3.73.33.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • send_requestAsk carriers for a price: one transport request goes to each carrier chosen from search_carriers, in the carrier's own language and in the name of the user's Fitralo account; the c…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_request" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "send_request" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask carriers for a price: one transport request goes to each carrier chosen from search_carriers, in the carrier's own language and in the name of the user's Fitralo account; the carriers answer the user directly by e-mail. It needs the user to link a free Fitralo account once (OAuth). It sends e-mail to companies: first show the user the request and the carriers, and call it only when the user agrees. Fitralo checks and translates the request, then it goes to each carrier in its office hours, usually within minutes, and the user gets an e-mail when it went. The account's monthly limits apply. Returns the request's number and page; carriers that take no requests are listed with the reason. A missing route, loading day, cargo or contact name returns an error that says what to add. Each call sends a new request: do not repeat one that succeeded. At most 300 calls an hour from one address, for all tools together.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Send transport request
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_carrierOne carrier's full profile on Fitralo, with its phone, e-mail and website and where and how it carries.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_carrier" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "mail": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "mail": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One carrier's full profile on Fitralo, with its phone, e-mail and website and where and how it carries. Use it after search_carriers, which gives no contact details: for a carrier the user picked, wants to contact or wants to know more about. To find or compare carriers, use search_carriers. One carrier a call; what it has not published is null. A carrier that is unknown or no longer listed returns an error asking for a profile_url from search_carriers. Read-only and without an account: it changes and books nothing. At most 300 calls an hour from one address, for all tools together.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Carrier profile
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_carriersFind road freight carriers in Europe that run a route and offer the equipment, services or certificates a load needs.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_carriers" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find road freight carriers in Europe that run a route and offer the equipment, services or certificates a load needs. Write the query plainly: the places of loading and delivery (town, postcode or country), then what is needed, e.g. "reefer from Venlo to Rome", "ADR tank Rotterdam to Poland", "groupage Germany to Italy, tail lift". "based in Italy" keeps carriers based there. Returns the carriers that fit, best first, with what the search understood: if that is not what the user meant, phrase the query again. It returns at most limit carriers (10 unless set, up to 25); carriers_that_fit counts all that fit, and results_url shows them all on fitralo.com. When nothing fits exactly, carriers_that_fit is 0 and the list has the carriers that come closest. A query without a route or need returns an error that says how to write it. Then call get_carrier for contact details. Read-only and without an account: it changes and books nothing. At most 300 calls an hour from one address, for all tools together.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search carriers
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__carriers__send_request"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:38 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://fitralo.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://fitralo.com
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 destructive). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://fitralo.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including send_request (destructive)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1
  2. Oct 29, 2026
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://fitralo.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
    • Authorization servers: none to https://fitralo.com
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 1.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://fitralo.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp; Authorization servers: none -> https://fitralo.com; Dynamic client registration: not observed -> yes (and 1 …View diff
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://fitralo.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
    • Authorization servers: none to https://fitralo.com
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes

Install

Pinned to version 3.73.33. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http carriers https://fitralo.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http carriers https://fitralo.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__carriers__search_carriers",
      "mcp__carriers__get_carrier"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__carriers__send_request"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as carriers. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__carriers__get_carrier private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__carriers__send_request untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.fitralo/carriers/verify?hash=bdf74ffd448768244df14dd415fbfa54a01a6cca844c6f66a6b7daec3a4944a4" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash bdf74ffd4487, from Nov 9, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.fitralo/carriers/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.fitralo/carriers
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.fitralo/carriers.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.fitralo/carriers)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 28, 2026, 12:17 UTC.

Fitralo MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Fitralo MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Fitralo MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: send_request.

Can the Fitralo MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Fitralo MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 destructive, 2 read. send_request, search_carriers and get_carrier.

Does the Fitralo MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Fitralo MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_request.

Has the Fitralo MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 9, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.